Innocent until proven guilty beyond a shadow of a doubt makes sense with the public justice system. Not so when dealing with anonymous pseudonyms and sock puppets asking for large sums of money and power.
If I wasn’t a big fan of risk, comedy, and game theory, I wouldn’t touch NSR with a 10 foot pole.
I say comedy because I giggle every time Phoenix uses the word, “Shareholders” talking about all the support he has.
If Nu fails, he is the biggest loser, so he will try to repair the peg.
And if he really does have majority control over the network and can pass whatever grant or motion he wants, what will he do if his plan to restore the peg fails? Or let’s say it is restored but no way is found to make liquidity operations sustainable and the peg collapses again. What will Phoenix/Jordan do then? If the peg still collapses while the network is under his complete centralized control, then he will have to wake up and realize that he’s wrong and his model doesn’t work. Or is there another way for him to profit from the failure of Nu?
There is no way for him to get profit from the failure of Nu, I’m afraid.
Very true. I was always hoping to get NSR added to cryptoid, because they also have a clustering method directly in the blockchain explorer (here for PPC): https://chainz.cryptoid.info/ppc/#!wallets While there of course is some uncertainty in those methods, it can help a lot to figure out major points of centralization.
If he owns a lot of NBT then he can now freely print and dilute NSR and then front run his own NBT buy orders so he gets hard BTC for his NBT while leaving most other holders in the dark. This whole thing is about recovering as much value as possible from his own failed investment.
I made some statistics for blocks 840000 (Apr 20, 2016) to 850000 (Apr 27, 2016) when minting rates were low and there weren;t a lot of drama. It’s useful to understand voting situation in “normal” times, and it’s a good control data set for the “hyper” times…
There were 275 minters with 295 m shares,
of which 248 (291 m) voted for 41 motions/grants.
@cryptog’s datafeed had ~34 subscribing addresses with ~70m nsr
@Cybnate’s datafeed had ~52 subscribing addresses with ~38m nsr
47 address (72 m NSR) in the address group in OP also voted. None of the addresses subscribed the two datafeeds above. I think there are two possibilities for each of these addresses: it belongs to @JordanLee/@Phoenix and has been voting all the time; or it belongs to someone who has been voting and happens to agree with @Phoenix’s motion/grants. There are two subgroups in these 47, which internally voted synchronizedly across different motion pattters, but didn’t share motion patters with the other subgroup. One is very rich, with 52m nsr in 6 addresses
Sbwq3atmexdqk6GTXCmKo6WtL4KEuzoQp4 8906890
SZ2515gk4oRrnHMKzcS1Y1q739S9yKwoFN 7283719
SNtZMkA3TVKwz4MHVpdyfrn7nGopSC4hVa 9962147
ScFJdRp988CARnoVrgzz6pBjgRnTLhKz8X 8155335
Sfusz6rPJC4tQsXHNx8UFwZHoYdZpcvLiS 9351963
Scdpq6yyKfmozXx8234f6seTuwpQuzkC3b 8791832
the other one has 22 address with17m nsr, keeping in sync across 4 pattern changes
Sb6qsKxzwuVMHpP99Xn6LLLT2DRzFA6S4Y 381146
SRQ8FzrG1LHK67u8oHr8YGLrvG1hugow6s 1113502
SRrKrzkJKKPJWGt4bmSxvmm4CsMCQKh56k 767080
Sc37HmJ3W9U2PHy4fVpy89wdVLPVd6Bo4C 327000
SWxrH3Viz79ohWp5v1KTBUZHk9oJvJU5nm 791559
ShuskmMoG9wkcPgRgcNMfn7aqAaSSNqip4 1959036
Sb5jeeXmdVHmFiE7ki288Bfj38U6yzp412 419560
SWsxViiwzUnK7b2oniFWHUzTXzqE9YSbGF 426598
SQWfkZG1ZtdiQqynQc6Qq6FVatQyJYmg5D 946303
SQ5cKn1oK6i1THjZPjPRADfsnT9sag4BDh 908769
SftiCDZrfGBuQeX9deQ9WugyEhYWbK5N8a 916336
STiHiRxTgD65aT25zyPhaLWBAArGCRFhkb 460120
Si43HyY47Ea3uKgPLMAQyFqpfVFd7NbKSj 773565
SZoNo3aT7NYh5uG7iPA38iGZwhhZNankPP 460200
SXmG95YvFKFnULRPUvyzq9BHgdYk2EShDZ 49120
STtNC8Mq3yo85Ec1uFj5TMpDNePuqnmiXu 2002704
SZbMiBR5Lx4e3HfTVTS2vRECmi4uCqnwUy 2644784
SSvFUpNVgda9pXqW4SKfA21YgKHbGo5iVb -2502836
SVbnMZAdoH3zTQrXFMKxfR6HGmtvajvL5Y 2087095
SchSfr1RswBCkKMmxmx31dw2qEQqft1TSv 2076290
STHZEpRQQkbJxJdiJdXtStaP1kHmMCjp2m 56120
SgPecoaa94HqvCy9muZkeL5fUqJgYDQk8k 471960
Except for these two subgroups, there are 47-6-22=19 addresses that are likely random voters who happen to support @Phoenix.
Regardless who these two subgroups are, they didn’t subscribe @Cybnate or @cryptog’s datafeeds, and they probably belong two individuals or subscribing two different datafeeds which i haven’t looked into.
It’s safe to say that 206m - 72m = 134m NSR came out of shadow recently and voted for @Phoenix , 134/462 = 29% current voting shares.
But this is where you are wrong, my friend. If you allow that the main motive of our masters is personal profit, then it doesn’t mean they will keep best interests of nu as their top priority, broken peg for them is just another opportunity to profit.
What’s worse is that when peg is restored and people resume thinking that everything is under dao control, innocent parties who buy nsr/nbt will expose their investments to very high risk.
Share distribution is very important in pos. And when it breaks it’s our responsibility to fix it or we’ll be complicit in wrong doing of perpetrators.
After he repairs the peg(pay off Nu’s debt), I suggest to shut down the business unless a revenue model is provided.
The voting behavior of many addresses is similar to that of other addesses. I have made some correlation analysis. Between block 840,000 (20 Apr 2016 05:26:00) and 960,000 ( 11 Jul 2016 02:10:06) there are 120,000 blocks, minted by 421 addresses, 379 of which voted for at least one of 94 motion/grants (called m/g hereafter).
Every address has a pattern in the 2-dimensional block-m/g space. A correlation score is calculated using the following method:
All voting addresses are grouped based on their correlation with others. Starting with the address that has the highest balance (taken approximately when OP was posted), all addresses whose correlation with the address is >= 97% are regarded as of the same unrestricted group. The process repeats until there are less than 20 addresses not in any unrestricted group. These addresses have small balances and don’t find many blocks (reliable scores ), and are put into a loner group.
An address can show up in multiple unrestricted groups, which is understandable. To investigate vote distribution, each addresses is allows to only belong to the group where it has the highest score. If the scores of an address are the same in multiple groups, the highest “Total number of block scores” is used. If a group turns out to have one member, its member are put into the loner group. Eventually there are less than 40 such unique groups.
In the following charts, every row shows the number of shares every group contributed to voting in the 5000 blocks starting at the height marked on the left. Every cell is marked with the number (unit is million NSR). The shade of red and size of blue bar is proportional to the number. For example cell D:840000 has 54.8. It means this group had 54.8 m NSR voted for some motion from block 840000 to 845000 (about a half week’s time). The whole column is 49-54 m NSR meaning that this group has been constantly voting (compare it with group G, which voted on and off).
Using multi-motion pattern information, I can associate some groups with datafeed provider, or at least have some comments on its main characters:
B 67 biggest group by membership. unidentfied. constantly voting.
C 44 *first to vote for Phoenix’s motions
D 29 cryptog datafeed.
E 24 cybnate datafeed 18/24
F 22 *only vote for pheonix
G 15 *phoenix
H 15 the loner group
I 14 cybnate datafeed 7/14
J 14 *phoenix?
K 13 cybnate datafeed 11/13
M 11 cybnate datafeed 6/11
N 10 old cryptog feed?
O 9 cybnate datafeed 3/9
P 8 cybnate datafeed3/8
Q 7 *only vote for pheonix
R 6 “sixpack” phoenix fan
AA cybnate data feed3/3
The left column shows block height. Earlier blocks are at higher places. The folloing is a rough timeline of block numbers and “voting started” “pass” of some of the motions
20 Apr 2016 05:26:00 840000
8 May 2016 01:06:53 865000
22 May 2016 886496, start voting "1%"
25 May 3:27am ~889500 start "mOD"
7 Jun 4:39pm 908031 start "firing"
9 Jun 1:02am 910200 withdraw "firing"
15 jun 18:20 920690 start "commander"
19 jun 12:50pm 92500 pass "mOD"
22 Jun 2016 20:22:55 930000
23 Jun 2016 21:58:54 931878 "1%" reaches 80% support in 100 conseq. blocks.
24 jun 3:09am 931554 start "elect"
24 jun 3:37am start "20m nsr grant"
25 Jun 2016 16:22:17 935000
28 Jun pass "1%"
28 Jun 2016 17:33:13 940000
28 jun 9:52 start "report"
4 Jul 2016 03:48:42 950000
4 jul 6:15 "20m nsr grant" passed
4 jul 4:44pm pass "elecct"
11 Jul 2016 02:10:06 960000
where the “mOD” and “1%” etc. motion/grants symbols are
The total network minting power is 414 m NSR at 955000. It can be seen that groups B-E,H,L-N,S,T are constantly voting, providing 153 m NSR. The broken column shows the group coming into and out of voting.
The analysis tools developed for Nu blockchain voting can be applied to a single or a group motion/grants.
The next chart shows @JordanLee’s votings for “1%” motion.
22 May 2016 886496, start voting “1%”
25 May 3:27am ~889500 start “mOD”
19 jun 12:50pm 92500 pass “mOD”
23 Jun 2016 21:58:54 931878 “1%” reaches 80% support in 100 conseq. blocks.
28 Jun pass “1%”
28 Jun 2016 17:33:13 940000
It can be seen that both long-term voting groups B to E and O voted for it at some point. B’s support was important for its reaching high support and passing. Equally important is group G which only showed up to support Phoenix’s motions.
The next chart is for @masterOfDisaster’s competing motion. Support is widespread. Popular datafeed switched to this motion from the “1%” one above. A supported both. This motion passed earlier.
@Phoenix had a series m/gs that had little community support. This post takes a look at voting support of these m/gs of @Phoenix:
SUrJhmYVeNThoG6oFWjY9pMawRJ3iCTHCq
89fc44bd7ebe3c3c4c9c017f5483d82122b64b7f
ShrB92Q61TiL9ZaQXZQCMB2qszYKqTMkGU
5219085f8d307426f9f45ee9b2c3e80fd37052ca
c0ee465965ce8fe1fe03b169024ac049211e4a76
57ee6c5da13b0c91ca05a4f32e1a7bf9b44811b4
faafd2dea7c11fc27155118469140c0b0dd66eb3
SRKudQwjKPAgcvAoqUpYJ5KwBBqbJYrPn5
0a07006225dde507319ea0beb50b6a509a9ae380
SWm1xC4n5jSGjRRdSKfzroUBgTto2zRA8X
70aa7e974a4a82b866c0835ba62be43f65c96409
These m/gs do not include “100% Reserve Required for NuBits”, “Temporarily cap NBT supply with full reserve” which are less controversial, and the “1%” one studied in the last post.
These m/gs passed quickly. This chart shows who voted for them and how.
Compare the chart with the overall voting chart in a previous post, one can see that most groups that voted yes only started voting when @Phoenix’s m/gs started voting, first from 920000, then 93000 (ref the timing table posted previously). The timing coincidence is not accidental. Looking at which m/gs they voted and it’s proved that these groups basically only voted for @phoenix’s m/gs and never voted for other ones. The exceptions are groups C and R. C voted all the time. It is judged to be Phoenix’s because it was able to find the first blocks of Phoenix’s m/gs very quickly after voting started, with G having the same behavior (within minutes). R has its own voting pattern and is perhaps a community member supporting phoenix.
The total minting power of these phoenix and fans groups is 250 m NSR at 955000, 60% of that of the whole network.
Interesting project. It will help grouping same-wallet addresses, but won’t help identify group members of different wallets (datafeed subscribers)
I only tried to use same-wallet addresses to validate with my own addresses and with group of addresses connected in a big transaction.
My method is sensitive to voting patters of an address whose balance is less than 0.1 m nsr.
This analysis is very interesting. Thank you for taking the time to do this.
I think this data is confirming my concerns – that there is a lot of minting power under either direct central control, or there are some large whale shareholders that vote but don’t participate in the community and deny us the privilege of understanding their logic / point-of-view.
In regards to a fork, I think this makes it possible to identify the Jordanites with decent accuracy. My take is in the recently seen maximal minting power that there is 60% Jordanites, 40% Entrepreneurists.
I would be curious how the Jordanites would vote in a “poison pill” motion. In fact there is kind of one of those motions – the “No liquidity without a plan” vs. the “repeal that motion”. I think both are like 30% - 40% or something.
I’d also be curious about if or how the “newly sold NSR” are voting. There are a lot of NSR going into the system.
Really smart analysis, you should apply at the secret service of your choice, they soon need people with those skills 
What I am missing a bit, but what you probably left out on purpose, is some kind of conclusion out of that. So yes, there seems to be some correlations with high density of NSR and yes, it looks in many ways like its a single identity.
But what can be gained from this data? For once I guess you can define some kind of filtered motion process that excludes particular clusters above and therefore wold reflect the opinion of the “other” shareholders. You can also use it for hard fork preparations, but somehow I don’t know if there is really unambiguous support among the real shareholders for that … I think many just want to sit it out right now, willing to risk that JL crashes their investment even further.
I don’t understand what kind of surprise would there be. Phoenix has already stated that he will keep them at ~40%. He can probably manage his part. What a show.
Thanks. The methodology is quite usual in analysis field.
The posts about methodology should remain mostly factual so they canbe applied elsewhere. Interpretation can be included if generally useful but they really should go into separate posts.
The single identity conclusion has already been made in the OP and the post of control data, which used patterns of m/gs in a voting block to show overwhelming evidences of a single actor. But the data period and motion address coverage were both limited in those studies.
The last few posts give overall pictures of the voting scene, in terms of time-coverage and address coverage, using un-ordered m/g vote information in voting blocks to show that most shares voting for a specific group of m/gs only come out for special purposes, so are someone’s tactic tool.
Another evidence to show that a single actor is in control is that all these high-balance addresses start to find blocks of a new m/g within less than an hour. Human votors would started voting in hours if not days.
Finally good-old transaction analysis like MArk referred to can definately associate addresses with one wallet/actor.
These can go into a paper on detecting potential danger, in way of open or covert concensus control., faced by POS based voting systems.
We have to understand the situations before we recgnize the problems. I think it is fairly clear that an single actor absolutely controls ~170m nsr and some supporters 50m. The majority community (by head count) oppose the actor and have ~150m nsr. Other 50m have their own thoughts.
I already have a script to print 100-block consecutive Yes percentage by a list of addresses in any time period. So it is already possible for a group of community members to pass their own motions if instead of 100, 5000 blocks is used.
[Edit: there is no need to change local wallets in order to run the script]
Is there any way to find out if BlockShares have been compromised in the same way? We can’t advocate for people to trust B&C unless we know for sure that a single entity doesn’t control a majority of shares, allowing them to eventually steal all deposited funds.
It’s possible to gather the pubkeys of these minting NSR addresses and then check the corresponding BKS addresses. If they’re smart enough about anonymity though, we might not catch anything more than the airdrop BKS. Still, I’m guessing that 20%+ BKS are in the hands of those controlling these addresses.
I don’t think there have been highly controversial B&C motions that could differenciate potential groups.
I remember a motion that tried to reduce the rolling voting window to 2000 blocks.
Somebody planned ahead…
I found it. It’s from May 2015:
