Motion hash to place in your Nu client:
When our network began, we had a way to increase the NuBit supply at the will of shareholders. We then decided to add a way to decrease the NuBit supply at the expense of increasing the NuShare supply (due in the 0.6.0 release). It should not be surprising then, that a mechanism for reducing the NuShare supply would also be introduced, to complete our flexible supply of both shares and currency.
Specifically, I am proposing that in most cases, instead of distributing dividends, proceeds from the sale of NuBits be used to purchase NuShares in the open market, which are then burned. This is commonly done with equities and is known as a share buyback. Due to low liquidity in the NuShare market, we can expect such activity will have a marked positive effect on the NuShare price. This high NuShare price will enhance our ability to sell NuShares later when we are in the opposite part of our economic cycle and need to support the NuBit price. Therefore, we will have two complimentary mechanisms which are the exact inverse of one another:
- When NuBit demand is low, NuShares will be created and sold while NuBits will be purchased with the proceeds and burned. NuShare supply increases as NuBit supply decreases. This depresses the NuShare price as it supports the NuBit price to the pegged level.
- When NuBit demand is high, NuBits will be created and sold while NuShares will be purchased with the proceeds and burned. NuBit supply increases as NuShare supply decreases. This inflates the NuShare price as it suppresses the NuBit price to the pegged level.
Fortunately, no protocol or even client changes are needed to do this beyond what is already approved by shareholders and scheduled for our 0.6.0 release. Whether dividends are distributed in addition to share buybacks being done will be up to shareholders to decide on an ongoing basis. Shareholders can also decide what proportion of NuBit sale proceeds go to dividends and what proportion go to share buyback by how they pass custodial grants.
In order to move to the model described above, which is decentralized and eliminates counterparty risk to NuShare and NuBit holders, the LPC operations of KTm and Jamie must be wound down. Their service was of great value at the launch of NuBits, but it is time for Nu to mature into the decentralized, counterparty risk system it was originally envisioned as. Similarly, it is important that the undistributed NuShares I possess (currently nearly 300 million) either be distributed or burned. Once these actions are taken we can say that Nu is free of any single points of failure or catastrophe: decentralized, free of counterparty risk, robust and resilient.
Ending the LPC service of KTm and Jamie is also the key to unleashing share buybacks and dividends. Right now they are holding the proceeds of their NuBit sales as reserves. Transitioning to our zero reserve model is synonymous with ending the LPC operations of KTm and Jamie. When this transition is complete, proceeds of NuBit sales will not be held at all. Rather, NuShare holders will be immediately rewarded when those proceeds are used for NuShare buyback and burn or dividend distribution. In order to unlock the full benefits of share buyback and dividends, shareholders need to make a full commitment to paying a transparent and upfront cost for liquidity from LPCs providing their own funds. As I’ve said before, this feels kind of like paying health insurance premiums, but allows you to accurately predict the costs that will be incurred. While KTm and Jamie continue operations, we only know that our cost for their service will be between their modest 2% fee and 2 million NBT, if shareholders lost control of the funds somehow. Nu cannot afford a 2 million NBT cost at this point in its development. We can and ought to eliminate the possibility of this potential catastrophe quickly by purchasing insurance, so to speak.
The following is the finalized motion intended to permit Nu to operate in the manner described above:
Motion RIPEMD160 hash: ed7b9fc65dc4e9d9acad61e528420c2690f599d2
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Kiara Tamm and Jamie Miller must cease operations completely within
90 days. Within 5 days of passage of this motion, 25% of the shareholder
funds in their possession should be burned as NuBits. 33% of the
remaining funds should be burned as NuBits between 25 days and 30 days
after passage. 50% of remaining funds should be burned as NuBits between
55 days and 60 days after passage. All remaining funds should be burned
as NuBits between 85 and 90 days after passage. They should receive
their pre-determined commission on funds actually used to provide
liquidity, not their total grant amount. This motion amends or nullifies
previous agreements between shareholders and KTm and Jamie as required
to comply with this motion.
Within 60 days after the protocol is altered to permit custodial
grants of NuShares, Jordan Lee must burn all undistributed NuShares.
Within 30 days after this motion is passed Jordan Lee must burn all
NuBits held on behalf of shareholders in excess of 250,000 NuBits.
Details of burning which apply to Jamie Miller, Kiara Tamm and Jordan Lee:
Burning is to be done by publicly announcing the address that corresponds to
the spendable outputs to be burnt. Burning should be accomplished by
designating the spendable outputs as transaction fees. We have a burn
RPC scheduled for development that will make this simple. If that is not
developed by the time burning is required (a special build not yet
released could be used), one of our core developers will assist in
constructing a raw transaction to accomplish the burning. This way, the
burning can be verified by anyone at anytime who possesses the
blockchain or access to it via a block explorer.
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Verify. Use everything between including the <motionhash></motionhash> tags.
Good preparations will need to be made to see the network in good health after this motion is fully executed. New LPCs will need to be funded and cultivated. The implementation of a liquidity pool is one particularly inclusive way to do this. Being an LPC requires ownership of significant liquid funds that can be put at high risk, it requires the skills and time to run NuBot, as well as a good understand of trading and the nature of Nu liquidity operations. A liquidity pool would separate these requirements: A pool operator needs the skill and time to run NuBot and the understanding of liquidity operations, but they do not need to have any funds. Individual users of the pool only need a tiny sum of liquidity they can put at high risk, because users’ funds are pooled together to create a significant quantity in aggregate. Individuals pool users don’t need any special knowledge and it won’t require any of their time on an ongoing basis. The potential profits for pool operators and individual pool users are huge at the present time. Based on recently passed LPC proposals, we can see that 10% return per month can be had. We shouldn’t wait for pools to emerge and fail to elect standard LPCs. As the Nu network matures, I expect we will see a mixture of LPC pools and LPCs providing their own funding. I would rather see the network supported by 100,000 NBT of liquidity by LPCs providing their own funds than 400,000 NBT of liquidity by LPCs using shareholder funds like KTm and Jamie.
Once the transition is complete we will have two main types of LPCs, as mentioned in the whitepaper: single side (called sell side in the whitepaper, but this is being modified to include granted NSR that is used to apply buy side pressure on NuBits) and dual side LPCs. Single side LPCs come in two sub-types: (1) those that have been granted NuBits to apply sell side pressure and NSR buyback (and burn) or dividends, and (2) those that have been granted NuShares which they can sell to apply buy side pressure and NuBit burn. Dual side LPCs are the more common type that liquidity pools will be which provide both buy and sell side liquidity in order to create a buffer zone of liquidity for the peg. The purpose of single side LPCs, on the other hand, is to balance the buffer zone created by the dual side LPCs.
Proper preparations for the burning of undistributed NuShares will be the granting of a small percentage of outstanding NuShares (perhaps two or three percent) to a multisig NuShare address. This will allow the signers to agree to sell the NSR quickly to purchase NBT to support the peg when buy side liquidity is low. The idea is to have no more NSR than could be possibly needed for sale in a two week period. If additional NuShares are needed for sale beyond a two week period, they can be created in a new NSR custodial grant. Rather than creating a large fund for future development as originally planned, development will be funded with NuBits on an ongoing basis. If the emission of these NuBits creates too much selling pressure, the selling pressure will be counteracted by an NSR grant and an NBT burn. Our development savings are held in our market cap.
Interest rates may still be used a peg support mechanism. However, it is possible that NSR grants combined with NBT burning will become the more important mechanism.
If this plan is implemented NuShares will be even more volatile than they are now. It makes sense that they would be, because we are basically diverting the volatility the market naturally wants to impose on NuBits to NuShares. NuShares will be a speculator’s delight. They should never approach zero so long as the network purpose of a pegged currency that is is used continues to be served.
I welcome your comments and suggestions for amending the motion as it is currently a draft. I will take care to use the new template for motions when this is finalized.