Haven’t you allegedly only been here a couple of weeks?
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There are many other applications with these data. For example to find out the effectiveness of data feed, distribution of address (shareholder) balances, how many apathetic shareholders and minters, how much impact to reimburse voting addresses in a NSR dilution hence dilute the apathetic shareholders only…
It;s better to be honest with ourselves. The first step of solving the problem is recognizing the problem (some say is admitting the problem…)
2 Likes
Great work @mhps this helps me understand how the chief operations w/e motion passed. This whole thing is starting to turn into a big comedy act, I have lost any and all faith in @Jordanlee and consider him a rogue actor. I feel it’s in our best interest to start localizing as accurately as we can all the funds he holds of NSR/NBT/BKS and propose a hard fork to burn those funds. The list of NSR that voted in favor of his proposals is a good place to start. We can assume that all NSR he holds he will have used to vote in favor of his own proposals. The longer we let him run around and do what he wants to the more harmful it will become for our already damaged network.
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Actually that would be better than starting from scratch, hard fork it burning all nsr in compromised accounts that voted exactly the same. It would definitely improve share distribution.
We need to hard fork anyway to burn all the developer funds Jordan still holds. It would be very bad for us not addressing those large amounts of funds.
I understand your concerns as I am equally concerned about the centralization of the network.
However it is better to wait and see right now the results from phoenix leadership regarding liquidity than to hard fork because there is a chance than there are big shareholders who are closely related to pheonix voting for him or her with the right intentions and decision making, and hard forkinf would damage further the nsr price.
Jordan lee does not exist any more at least on the forum and even it he comes back he will not have any credibility any more so there is already collateral damage for him or her.
However i agree than the funds that he holds are problematic.
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Seeing Jordan’s complete disappearance (with dev funds!) and “sudden” arrival of @Phoenix I have no doubt that there is evil doing going on. Suddenly a large amount of shares voting in a 100% similar pattern on multiple motions at the same time is way too much to be “coincidence”. We should now realize that a single malicious actor (who might or might not be our previous architect) is attempting to hijack the whole project. In face of such perils we have no other option than to hardfork and remove the actor by force.
There is no impressive plan from @Pheonix all he’s doing is selling NSR (something everyone already agreed to) and using the proceeds to buy Nubits. My retarded nephew could have thought of that plan, there is nothing special or impressive about what he’s doing. Except maybe for the sheer amount of theatrics he’s displaying.
We need to show the world that we’re willing to take action to prevent centralization of voting and minting power by a single malicious actor. Our project is in dire enough weather as it is and seeing what has passed the “conspiracy” theories of Jordan being the one selling NSR in the buybacks for his own benefit and him being the one who dumped the 60+k nubits that sub sequentially broke our peg seem more and more credible. For all we know he could be the one using funds he gained from the buyback to buy up more cheap NSR!
2 Likes
If true that d be so humiliating but the thing is that we do not have any ways to know for sure.
Innocent until proven guilty beyond a shadow of a doubt makes sense with the public justice system. Not so when dealing with anonymous pseudonyms and sock puppets asking for large sums of money and power.
If I wasn’t a big fan of risk, comedy, and game theory, I wouldn’t touch NSR with a 10 foot pole.
I say comedy because I giggle every time Phoenix uses the word, “Shareholders” talking about all the support he has.
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If Nu fails, he is the biggest loser, so he will try to repair the peg.
And if he really does have majority control over the network and can pass whatever grant or motion he wants, what will he do if his plan to restore the peg fails? Or let’s say it is restored but no way is found to make liquidity operations sustainable and the peg collapses again. What will Phoenix/Jordan do then? If the peg still collapses while the network is under his complete centralized control, then he will have to wake up and realize that he’s wrong and his model doesn’t work. Or is there another way for him to profit from the failure of Nu?
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There is no way for him to get profit from the failure of Nu, I’m afraid.
Very true. I was always hoping to get NSR added to cryptoid, because they also have a clustering method directly in the blockchain explorer (here for PPC): https://chainz.cryptoid.info/ppc/#!wallets While there of course is some uncertainty in those methods, it can help a lot to figure out major points of centralization.
If he owns a lot of NBT then he can now freely print and dilute NSR and then front run his own NBT buy orders so he gets hard BTC for his NBT while leaving most other holders in the dark. This whole thing is about recovering as much value as possible from his own failed investment.
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I made some statistics for blocks 840000 (Apr 20, 2016) to 850000 (Apr 27, 2016) when minting rates were low and there weren;t a lot of drama. It’s useful to understand voting situation in “normal” times, and it’s a good control data set for the “hyper” times…
There were 275 minters with 295 m shares,
of which 248 (291 m) voted for 41 motions/grants.
@cryptog’s datafeed had ~34 subscribing addresses with ~70m nsr
@Cybnate’s datafeed had ~52 subscribing addresses with ~38m nsr
47 address (72 m NSR) in the address group in OP also voted. None of the addresses subscribed the two datafeeds above. I think there are two possibilities for each of these addresses: it belongs to @JordanLee/@Phoenix and has been voting all the time; or it belongs to someone who has been voting and happens to agree with @Phoenix’s motion/grants. There are two subgroups in these 47, which internally voted synchronizedly across different motion pattters, but didn’t share motion patters with the other subgroup. One is very rich, with 52m nsr in 6 addresses
Sbwq3atmexdqk6GTXCmKo6WtL4KEuzoQp4 8906890
SZ2515gk4oRrnHMKzcS1Y1q739S9yKwoFN 7283719
SNtZMkA3TVKwz4MHVpdyfrn7nGopSC4hVa 9962147
ScFJdRp988CARnoVrgzz6pBjgRnTLhKz8X 8155335
Sfusz6rPJC4tQsXHNx8UFwZHoYdZpcvLiS 9351963
Scdpq6yyKfmozXx8234f6seTuwpQuzkC3b 8791832
the other one has 22 address with17m nsr, keeping in sync across 4 pattern changes
Sb6qsKxzwuVMHpP99Xn6LLLT2DRzFA6S4Y 381146
SRQ8FzrG1LHK67u8oHr8YGLrvG1hugow6s 1113502
SRrKrzkJKKPJWGt4bmSxvmm4CsMCQKh56k 767080
Sc37HmJ3W9U2PHy4fVpy89wdVLPVd6Bo4C 327000
SWxrH3Viz79ohWp5v1KTBUZHk9oJvJU5nm 791559
ShuskmMoG9wkcPgRgcNMfn7aqAaSSNqip4 1959036
Sb5jeeXmdVHmFiE7ki288Bfj38U6yzp412 419560
SWsxViiwzUnK7b2oniFWHUzTXzqE9YSbGF 426598
SQWfkZG1ZtdiQqynQc6Qq6FVatQyJYmg5D 946303
SQ5cKn1oK6i1THjZPjPRADfsnT9sag4BDh 908769
SftiCDZrfGBuQeX9deQ9WugyEhYWbK5N8a 916336
STiHiRxTgD65aT25zyPhaLWBAArGCRFhkb 460120
Si43HyY47Ea3uKgPLMAQyFqpfVFd7NbKSj 773565
SZoNo3aT7NYh5uG7iPA38iGZwhhZNankPP 460200
SXmG95YvFKFnULRPUvyzq9BHgdYk2EShDZ 49120
STtNC8Mq3yo85Ec1uFj5TMpDNePuqnmiXu 2002704
SZbMiBR5Lx4e3HfTVTS2vRECmi4uCqnwUy 2644784
SSvFUpNVgda9pXqW4SKfA21YgKHbGo5iVb -2502836
SVbnMZAdoH3zTQrXFMKxfR6HGmtvajvL5Y 2087095
SchSfr1RswBCkKMmxmx31dw2qEQqft1TSv 2076290
STHZEpRQQkbJxJdiJdXtStaP1kHmMCjp2m 56120
SgPecoaa94HqvCy9muZkeL5fUqJgYDQk8k 471960
Except for these two subgroups, there are 47-6-22=19 addresses that are likely random voters who happen to support @Phoenix.
Regardless who these two subgroups are, they didn’t subscribe @Cybnate or @cryptog’s datafeeds, and they probably belong two individuals or subscribing two different datafeeds which i haven’t looked into.
It’s safe to say that 206m - 72m = 134m NSR came out of shadow recently and voted for @Phoenix , 134/462 = 29% current voting shares.
7 Likes
But this is where you are wrong, my friend. If you allow that the main motive of our masters is personal profit, then it doesn’t mean they will keep best interests of nu as their top priority, broken peg for them is just another opportunity to profit.
What’s worse is that when peg is restored and people resume thinking that everything is under dao control, innocent parties who buy nsr/nbt will expose their investments to very high risk.
Share distribution is very important in pos. And when it breaks it’s our responsibility to fix it or we’ll be complicit in wrong doing of perpetrators.
2 Likes
After he repairs the peg(pay off Nu’s debt), I suggest to shut down the business unless a revenue model is provided.
3 Likes
The voting behavior of many addresses is similar to that of other addesses. I have made some correlation analysis. Between block 840,000 (20 Apr 2016 05:26:00) and 960,000 ( 11 Jul 2016 02:10:06) there are 120,000 blocks, minted by 421 addresses, 379 of which voted for at least one of 94 motion/grants (called m/g hereafter).
Correlation
Every address has a pattern in the 2-dimensional block-m/g space. A correlation score is calculated using the following method:
- when A finds a block at hight N, if B also finds a block within N +/- 200 block hight distace from the block of A (called the sample range), then a 2-block score is calculated as the ratio of the number of m/gs that both A and B voted yes, divided by the total m/gs they vote, in these pair of blocks. So the score is 1 if they vote identically. Agreement of no vote doesn’t count.
- If B finds more than one blocks in the sample range, an average score is taken. A vriance is calculated. This score is the block score of B for A at N.
- Then all block scores of B is averaged for all blocks A has found to get a correlation score bteween A and B. The vriance is also averaged. (Weighted average was tried but not used). Total number of block scores for every “B” is also recorded for refernce.
Groups
All voting addresses are grouped based on their correlation with others. Starting with the address that has the highest balance (taken approximately when OP was posted), all addresses whose correlation with the address is >= 97% are regarded as of the same unrestricted group. The process repeats until there are less than 20 addresses not in any unrestricted group. These addresses have small balances and don’t find many blocks (reliable scores ), and are put into a loner group.
An address can show up in multiple unrestricted groups, which is understandable. To investigate vote distribution, each addresses is allows to only belong to the group where it has the highest score. If the scores of an address are the same in multiple groups, the highest “Total number of block scores” is used. If a group turns out to have one member, its member are put into the loner group. Eventually there are less than 40 such unique groups.
Group voting
In the following charts, every row shows the number of shares every group contributed to voting in the 5000 blocks starting at the height marked on the left. Every cell is marked with the number (unit is million NSR). The shade of red and size of blue bar is proportional to the number. For example cell D:840000 has 54.8. It means this group had 54.8 m NSR voted for some motion from block 840000 to 845000 (about a half week’s time). The whole column is 49-54 m NSR meaning that this group has been constantly voting (compare it with group G, which voted on and off).
Using multi-motion pattern information, I can associate some groups with datafeed provider, or at least have some comments on its main characters:
B 67 biggest group by membership. unidentfied. constantly voting.
C 44 *first to vote for Phoenix’s motions
D 29 cryptog datafeed.
E 24 cybnate datafeed 18/24
F 22 *only vote for pheonix
G 15 *phoenix
H 15 the loner group
I 14 cybnate datafeed 7/14
J 14 *phoenix?
K 13 cybnate datafeed 11/13
M 11 cybnate datafeed 6/11
N 10 old cryptog feed?
O 9 cybnate datafeed 3/9
P 8 cybnate datafeed3/8
Q 7 *only vote for pheonix
R 6 “sixpack” phoenix fan
AA cybnate data feed3/3
The left column shows block height. Earlier blocks are at higher places. The folloing is a rough timeline of block numbers and “voting started” “pass” of some of the motions
20 Apr 2016 05:26:00 840000
8 May 2016 01:06:53 865000
22 May 2016 886496, start voting "1%"
25 May 3:27am ~889500 start "mOD"
7 Jun 4:39pm 908031 start "firing"
9 Jun 1:02am 910200 withdraw "firing"
15 jun 18:20 920690 start "commander"
19 jun 12:50pm 92500 pass "mOD"
22 Jun 2016 20:22:55 930000
23 Jun 2016 21:58:54 931878 "1%" reaches 80% support in 100 conseq. blocks.
24 jun 3:09am 931554 start "elect"
24 jun 3:37am start "20m nsr grant"
25 Jun 2016 16:22:17 935000
28 Jun pass "1%"
28 Jun 2016 17:33:13 940000
28 jun 9:52 start "report"
4 Jul 2016 03:48:42 950000
4 jul 6:15 "20m nsr grant" passed
4 jul 4:44pm pass "elecct"
11 Jul 2016 02:10:06 960000
where the “mOD” and “1%” etc. motion/grants symbols are
- bd4d153bb5c2d8cd6013b77ad8780eabc7bae79e @masterOfDisaster 's 1% Maximum Spread for ALP/MLP, Above 1% Allowed for Nu Funded Liquidity Operations (e.g. Gateways) b71a585de0b5e552648036fbc8282e11fea4a1cc 1% Maximum Spread in Shareholder Funded Liquidity Operations
- c070f654c2ff3e43a10fc5ff1dbf8ad74e36b18f Make Firing and Replacing Incompetent Liquidity Providers Our Top Priority
- SWm1xC4n5jSGjRRdSKfzroUBgTto2zRA8X Elect Phoenix Commander of Liquidity Operations
- 70aa7e974a4a82b866c0835ba62be43f65c96409
- SUrJhmYVeNThoG6oFWjY9pMawRJ3iCTHCq Grant NSR to Phoenix for liquidity operations
- 89fc44bd7ebe3c3c4c9c017f5483d82122b64b7f
- ShrB92Q61TiL9ZaQXZQCMB2qszYKqTMkGU Elect Phoenix as Chief of Liquidity Operations (compromise version)
- 5219085f8d307426f9f45ee9b2c3e80fd37052ca
- c0ee465965ce8fe1fe03b169024ac049211e4a76
- f8b9e060dc73a97fd28a62ecfdd419114892787a Temporarily cap NBT supply with full reserve
- 57ee6c5da13b0c91ca05a4f32e1a7bf9b44811b4 Create Chief of Liquidity Operations Position
- 1118f2334d0ef45676b38ebe2daaf30a8a345a7f 100% Reserve Required for NuBits
- 470ba7bf40099c395b8fb569367d16ce6167c2bd
- faafd2dea7c11fc27155118469140c0b0dd66eb3 A Report on Peg Abandonment and How to Proceed From Here
- SRKudQwjKPAgcvAoqUpYJ5KwBBqbJYrPn5 2nd NSR Grant for Liquidity Operations
- 0a07006225dde507319ea0beb50b6a509a9ae380
The total network minting power is 414 m NSR at 955000. It can be seen that groups B-E,H,L-N,S,T are constantly voting, providing 153 m NSR. The broken column shows the group coming into and out of voting.
4 Likes
The analysis tools developed for Nu blockchain voting can be applied to a single or a group motion/grants.
The next chart shows @JordanLee’s votings for “1%” motion.
22 May 2016 886496, start voting “1%”
25 May 3:27am ~889500 start “mOD”
19 jun 12:50pm 92500 pass “mOD”
23 Jun 2016 21:58:54 931878 “1%” reaches 80% support in 100 conseq. blocks.
28 Jun pass “1%”
28 Jun 2016 17:33:13 940000
It can be seen that both long-term voting groups B to E and O voted for it at some point. B’s support was important for its reaching high support and passing. Equally important is group G which only showed up to support Phoenix’s motions.
The next chart is for @masterOfDisaster’s competing motion. Support is widespread. Popular datafeed switched to this motion from the “1%” one above. A supported both. This motion passed earlier.
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@Phoenix had a series m/gs that had little community support. This post takes a look at voting support of these m/gs of @Phoenix:
SUrJhmYVeNThoG6oFWjY9pMawRJ3iCTHCq
89fc44bd7ebe3c3c4c9c017f5483d82122b64b7f
ShrB92Q61TiL9ZaQXZQCMB2qszYKqTMkGU
5219085f8d307426f9f45ee9b2c3e80fd37052ca
c0ee465965ce8fe1fe03b169024ac049211e4a76
57ee6c5da13b0c91ca05a4f32e1a7bf9b44811b4
faafd2dea7c11fc27155118469140c0b0dd66eb3
SRKudQwjKPAgcvAoqUpYJ5KwBBqbJYrPn5
0a07006225dde507319ea0beb50b6a509a9ae380
SWm1xC4n5jSGjRRdSKfzroUBgTto2zRA8X
70aa7e974a4a82b866c0835ba62be43f65c96409
These m/gs do not include “100% Reserve Required for NuBits”, “Temporarily cap NBT supply with full reserve” which are less controversial, and the “1%” one studied in the last post.
These m/gs passed quickly. This chart shows who voted for them and how.
Compare the chart with the overall voting chart in a previous post, one can see that most groups that voted yes only started voting when @Phoenix’s m/gs started voting, first from 920000, then 93000 (ref the timing table posted previously). The timing coincidence is not accidental. Looking at which m/gs they voted and it’s proved that these groups basically only voted for @phoenix’s m/gs and never voted for other ones. The exceptions are groups C and R. C voted all the time. It is judged to be Phoenix’s because it was able to find the first blocks of Phoenix’s m/gs very quickly after voting started, with G having the same behavior (within minutes). R has its own voting pattern and is perhaps a community member supporting phoenix.
The total minting power of these phoenix and fans groups is 250 m NSR at 955000, 60% of that of the whole network.
4 Likes
