This basically valid concern has been addressed by Jordan Lee and put into a proper relation to the @KTm and @jmiller grants. One important part in @JordanLee’s pleading for more support of LPC activity is this:
My advice would be that if you think it is too expensive, present a competing proposal that is less expensive. If you are unable or unwilling to do so, you cannot demonstrate that it is too expensive.”
I am considering voting
It also appears expensive to me given the risks. However the alternative is ‘Do nothing’. The issue is that this is somewhat attractive as long as JMiller and Kiara Tamm are still around. It is clear that the market for liquidity providers is not yet mature because of the perceived risks. The problem is that these risks can only be addressed by having a multitude of liquidity providers proving that the risk is low while still being very profitable.
It is good to read this: Decentralized liquidity without counterparty risk not yet implemented to gain a better understanding of the situation before making the decision to vote or not to vote.
I will vote for it given the above, the 60-day term which I like from a continuity perspective (90-day would be even better) and the lack of competing proposals.
This “state of union” from Jordan Lee is I believe a crucial one.
I also called for more competition in my own LPC proposal here and for more providers here, since after more than 1 month of voting my proposal did not pass while at the same no other competing proposals were made.
I am convinced now shareholders should vote for @muchogusto 's proposal since there are no better proposals right now.
I will vote tomorrow since my computer where Nu is installed is away. I wish I could use my own json data feed but it seems a bug regarding some formatting need to be fixed.
It cuts both ways. I cannot demonstrate it is not expensive, either. Many don’t propose because they just can’t cough up that much money.
I suggest Nu just offer a compensation for exchange rate loss directly to the LPC, and a cut of exchange rate profit from the LPC, after the term is over. In current proposal Nu is paying for like 40% BTC loss (10k / 25k) up front but getting nothing if BTC price goes up.
For the long term if Nu can remove exchange rate risk from LPCs many more people would be interested in becoming LPCs by asking for compensation for their time and exchange default risk. If @Excoin wants to have bots, it would be attractive to do it out of its own pocket after the exchange rate risk is removed.
Edit: I wrote the above before reading Jordan’s decentralized-liquidity-without-counterparty-risk-not-yet-implemented, which sets the perspective right. I am now neutral to the current prosal and even stronger suggest that the shareholders remove exchange rate risk from LPCs to stimulate growth of LPCs, for the reason I said above
So in your view, there are 2 type of risks:
- exchange rate loss risk
- exchange default risk.
In my understanding, the former corresponds for example to the decrease of BTC/USD in case LPC offers liquidity on NBT/BTC.
I believe that if we could somewhat minimize that risk by offering some hedging instruments (contracts) that Nu could pay for and that the provider would include inside the LPC proposal, we would be able to grow drastically the market of LPC mentioned by Jordan Lee.
Right. There are many ways for Nu to remove or greatly reduce such risks – offering compensasion after the term, hedging, developing bots that exchange NBT/BTC by making an atomic execution of NBT/USD and BTC/USD transactions (this needs the exchange to cooperate and is basically what ShapeShift does, as I know. The liquidity offered won’t be as great but that is the cost of being exchange-rate-risk-free)
anyone can verify the hash of the proposal? I cannot verify it using http://crypo.in.ua/tools/eng_ripemd.php
@cryptog The proposal text shows newlines which aren’t there. Select the proposal text and quote it, then copy the text from the input text box to the website.
indeed. but i had to use this site [http://www.md5calc.com/]. hash of this proposal confirmed.
There is no motion to vote, only a custodian grant.
Do you see what I mean now @muchogusto? Proposals must be lay down cristal clear, no edits, and be simple to follow. Otherwise things like this happens
let’s see how this proposal is doing
@assistant custodian vote BB1eCrqde2g5vWTH7RsaBJ8NWTUF2D8ogq
You can also check here: http://blockexplorer.nu/votes
This motion is on route to pass, but we have Learnmore about to bring in $20k on Excoin in a few days right?
And the bot can’t support both at the same time yet?
Here are the details for the Custodian Vote on BB1eCrqde2g5vWTH7RsaBJ8NWTUF2D8ogq:
Blocks: 2939 (
Share Days: 936668014 (
The following is the first of TWO custodial grants that will be requested. Grant the first means that shareholders agree to be bound to pass the second grant in the amount of 9,999 NBT upon satisfactory completion of the proposal. I ask for payment after LPC services are complete, but the first grant is necessary as @JordanLee mentioned to allow broadcast of liquidityinfo. First custodial grant pair:
The text of the proposal (previously a motion) is unchanged and the hash will remain just for reference, not because it should be entered in the client:
First, I want shareholders to pass a motion
use my LPC services. When the motion is over, I will begin by providing
liquidity for sixty days using NuBot to Exco.in in the amount of 50,000
NuBits total. To begin, 25,000 NBT and the equivalent of 25,000 NBT in
BTC will be used for balance. When the sixty days are past, and I did
everything I promised, shareholders are required to pay 10,000 NBT
through a custodial grant to an address I choose. Therefore, I extend
trust to shareholders, not require shareholders trust me with money
I use spread of 0.2% if Exco.in no charge my account fees, and 0.4%
if they do charge fees to me. If parametric order books are available, I
will use a 0.1% spread and a curve that approximates the level of
liquidity in the Bitstamp BTC/USD market.
You have questions for me?