Continuing the discussion from [Draft] Grant for NSR buyback and PPC reserve operation calculator:
Nu is known - at least at a lot of shareholders - for its superior governance model.
Grants and motions give direct control over weal and woe to the shareholders.
In the early days of Nu a lot of consulting and guidance was provided by JordanLee. This was intentionally reduced to make Nu less dependent on single people and single points of failure
On of the important steps to relieve JordanLee from responsibility was the creation of FLOT for reserve and liquidity management.
I dare say FLOT did and does quite well.
FLOT acts as a kind of representative on behalf of shareholders to step in where grants an motions are just not fast enough.
As FLOT is reponsible for liquidity management it made decisions within what FLOT considers discretion. So far shareholders didn’t correct that by motions. At some occasions there were discussions about the limits of FLOT’S reponsibility and discretion.
While it’s control wise in the best interest of shareholders to make all decisions by motions and grants, it’s a burden as well.
Delegating decisions to FLOT or another group might be a good compromise between full control and reducing ongoing efforts for single shareholders.
One option is to use data feeds to reduce the efforts for (minting!) shareholders to configure their votes, but given the number of available feeds I think that is not really the solution to this problem - and some actions might need to be taken, which can’t wait for a motion or a grant.
I think there’s little interest in limiting the discretion for FLOT to act in situations that require immediate action. I’m speaking of unforeseen situations; were they foreseeable, there could be a charter for it 
Another field requires the attention of shareholders and I expect that to grow over time:
payments for service providers.
There are already some service providers that deal with liquidity, operate bots, operate pools, are involved in development, etc.
A lot of them offer their services for a compensation. Some are paid by grants, some by FLOT.
If shareholders have a set of requirements that needs to be met, before a payment is executed, this payment can very well be delegated to another group that executed the payment once the requirements are (provably!) met.
This way the shareholders can control the group with regard to following their mandate.
Do shareholders want to be fully responsible for each single payment, or is it good - even better - for the business to have custodians (like @CoinGame for the website redesign, or @Cybnate for NuDroid) and groups that manage funds on behalf of Nu?
By no means I’m trying to pave the ground for creating a kind of “Nu foundation” or making the FLOT one.
On the contrary I’m trying to find out how and to what level shareholders want to elect representatives, delegates that are allowed to act on their behalf.
Tongue-in-cheek I could ask why there’s worry about transparent payments executed by FLOT for services - just because there’s lack of strict requirements?
What would shareholders base their decisions on and couldn’t FLOT (or any other group that gets created for that) decide based on the same requirements?
It’s hard not to smirk, but why is so much interest for having control over a few hundred bucks at most when the whole core development of Nu is still completely intransparent?