The full proposal is a 12 minute read, but what is 12 minutes for the future of Nu?
Below the summary to warm you up.
Summary
The proposal establishes a US$1 peg and focuses on supporting B&C and decentralized exchanges. It does this by reducing the NBT liabilities by burning them at a relatively high rate by protocol in a period of about 3 months to pay off debt and increase reserve rates to at least 50%. In the first period this also includes NSR auctioning until the 50% reserve mark is established and the peg is established at US$1.
The burning will be embedded in the protocol and therefore requires a client update. The amount of burning relates to the coinage and therefore discourages use of NBT on centralized exchanges or holding them in off-line wallets for longer periods. NBT value will slowly erode by protocol and the fee is paid when transactions occur. To counteract the erosion NBT holders are encouraged to park against rates which shareholders will set according to the monetary policy.
The Shareholders will determine the rates and with that control the monetary deflation rates and with that have the ability to increase or decrease velocity of NBT which attracts transaction fees. The monetary deflation and the transaction fees will provide a continuous revenue stream.
The cost for the required development are no more than US$ 8k payable in NSR or BTC by FLOT. Cybnate will act as the custodian for this work and asks NSR 500k payable by FLOT or custodial grant on completion and public distribution of the updated Nu client supporting the new protocol.
The main risk is that the new client doesnât reach the required uptake to activate the protocol.
Please add the motion hash to your client to support it.
The proposal didnât explain how the burning-by-protocol happen enough. How exactly is it connected to coin age? If I donât move my nbt for the duration of step 3, nothing will happen to them, right?
The revenues:
When using gateways, use double the exchange fee as a wall offset for
the fiat gateways. This means that, for every NBT thatâs bought and
then sold again, Nu earns money on the spread. Thatâs revenue.
Itâs not for every nbt. people can trade between Nu sell and buy prices among themselves.
No nothing will happen, until you make a transaction. Then the coinage will determine the burn. Active NBT holders will park to offset (partly) the burn. The longer the park the higher the offset.
I will add this to my proposal as an example. Also need to determine a more precise burn rate. Running out of time today.
That is correct, the wider the peg, the more likely trading in between will happen. Thatâs why is only see this as a secondary revenue source.
How do not updated clients treat transactions from not updated clients?
Do they put them into mempool, but they get dropped from there after some time?
Only updated clients include proper transactions (with coinage dependent tx fee) into blocks.
So itâs really only the minting clients that need to be updated.
This is the best proposal I could find that not only has a chance to get the peg back to $1, but keep it there thanks to revenue and increased reserves.
Focusing on NBT/USD and fiat gateways instead of BTC/NBT is very important for the sustainability of Nu.
Nu didnât pay for commercials, but it spent a lot of money for a tight peg at BTC/NBT.
That was a kind of commercial as well.
And it didnât end so good.
NBT/USD is less fancy, but it can work.
It requires a protocol switch. Majority of NuShareholders needs to mint with the new client. As soon as the switch happened the new protocol is in place and any transaction should be subject to it.
We need a better understanding how it exactly can be made to work but that is the idea. Only people like @sigmike can explain how this could be made to work and what needs to be done.[quote=âConfusedObserver, post:4, topic:4198â]
Nu didnât pay for commercials, but it spent a lot of money for a tight peg at BTC/NBT.That was a kind of commercial as well.
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Eventually we could provide some trading on BTC/NBT via B&C, but more as market maker with mainly a wide peg and possibly some hand cash each day at a small peg when revenues can offset this. But I believe this should be a separate decision the Shareholders need to make after the peg has been established.
Clients will reject transactions that do not have enough fee according to their known rules (extra fee is ok). That means rejecting invalid transactions from the mempool but also rejecting blocks that contain them. The sender will also most likely end up being banned.
Basically the network will split between upgraded and non upgraded nodes. We can make it a little smoother, especially if the new rule implies that the fee is always bigger than in the previous rule, but non upgraded nodes will never be able to send transactions that follow the new rule, and non upgraded minting nodes will keep including invalid transactions in their blocks so itâs probably not worth the cost.
Right. An example with numbers please. I still donât understand why coinage must be used. Why not just a fixed ratio haircut on all nbt that donât park? Why is it better than the Restricted Network Access proposal?
I am glad that fiat gateways that can be widely deployed is on the map. Otherwise there is risk that we will only see like 1000 nbt transaction volume a month like it was on ccedk nbt/usd market. (However as @Benjamin pointed out, nbt/btc will take demand of nbt/usd, so reducing/removing nbt/btc pegging support should increase nbt/usd demand. )
At which point would you take the fee if not in the tx fee? The coinage is a number that increases over time the longer the coins are not used, so you charge for holding liquid NBT.
Then you charge for transferring NBT and not storing them. Two consecutive transactions with the same NBT will therefore be charged twice, while in the case of coinage the actual number of transactions with those NBT does not influence the amount of NBT that will be charged, but the time that went by between those transactions.
So RNA: charge for transacting (unparked) NBT, this: charge for storing unparked NBT. In practice the effect is that here parking is the only way to âwait it outâ and that the coins that are on exchanges will be charged which they wouldnât in RNA if they only change owner within the exchange engine. So it will (a) increase number of parked NBT, which increases confidence for short-term NBT buyers because the coins are locked up and (b) clear the sell side order book as a function of time.
Thanks for the explanation. Demurage hasnât brought adoption to Freicoin. Would Nubit be the first coin to use demurage to get itself out of insolvency? Would future customer perceive a moral hazard?
I guess exchanges will just keep all deposit parked and disable withdrawal for the period of step 3. Trading can go on as usual with nubits â just remember that what will be traded are nubit futures delivered on the day when step 3 ends.
It looks like you propose for park rates to counteract burn rates, giving holders a chance to preserve their NBT? If so, the supply may not drop as planned. We just learned that B&C has 120k NBT, which is already over the 100k supply goal. If those can be preserved by parking, you can expect they will be (with good reason!).
And thatâs just one entity. Certainly there are others who would act to preserve their NBT.
Not sure if this was used before. Doing it now is certainly unfair to the customer because they are forced into this new agreement and cannot get out.
But this is ok, because then the remaining NBT are parked (for e.g. more than two months in order to preserve their value). They cannot enter the market for a long time so anyone who thinks about buying NBT right now can be confident to be able to sell them tomorrow.
In fact the ideal solution to all this would be that all current NBT holder park their NBT for a really long time, therefore preserving their value. At this point the order book is also empty and Nu can start business as usual while making profit from short term holders.
The notion that all unparked nubits are borrowed from Nu hence should be charged an interest will change the fundamental of Nubit â from a currency to a debt. I think that shouldnât be taken lightly because the market will price the change in and force nubit to be sold at a discount one way or another. Charging storing coins doesnât make sense as it is the user who pays for the storing.
For those who end up not moving their nbt for, say, a year or more, why does Nu have to punish them? Their coins give no more sell pressure to the buy side than the coins parked for a year. Actually the parked ones gives more pressure as they will come back with interest! What Nu wants is actual not moving coins. Parking is just one way to encourage. If someone bought 10k and leave it in a paperwallet for two years, Nu has no need to punish and irritate him.
So I suggest charge the fee only when a coin is actually moved, only during the step 3 period.
I think it does make sense, since every non parked NBT (which can be sold at any time) will have to be covered by the liquidity operations of Nu, therefore generates cost. Nu provides the service of a stable crypto currency w.r.t. the USD at low spread and with sufficient liquidity to cash out all non parked NBT. This is a service someone should be willing to pay for. And the longer someone uses this service, the more this person should get charged imo.
If you plan to hold NBT for two years without selling them, then you can park them with the old private key and set the paper wallet pub key as unparking address. This way you wonât lose any money and the private key of your paper wallet never touched a computer.
The proposal really charges people who want to use any amount of NBT at any time. In my view, these are exactly the people who create unpredictable market movements and the more you have of this kind of money, the more liquidity you need to provide to minimize the chance of getting the buy side cleared. Handing the cost of this liquidity back to the users who actually produce it sounds right to me.
This depends on how you align burning rates and parking rates to each other.
The scenario I described is already unrealistic because a lot of people will never install an offline wallet. But this is not about finding a fool, if they donât do it and liquidity will be restored in two months then they lost money while those who parked didnât. So you have basically three options:
Sell now at the current NBT rate
Wait for a good price and keep your coins on the exchange (they will be drained then with this proposal)
Fine. Charge when the coin is actually moved during step 3 then. If a coin doesnât move, it wonât cost Nu in peg maintenance.
As you point out, running an off line updated wallet isnât for everyone. Just keeping the local blockchain updated often can cost a lot of attention. Imagine someone bought 10k nbt as part of his 10-crypto portfolio â Keeping track what is going on with Nu every 10 weeks is demanding. Parking needs another address which can be a problem for people who buy nbt on exchanges and send them to paperwallets.
If Nu has an option, Nu should threat the customer as nicely as possible so they will love Nu back.
Wouldnât you agree that the required amount of liquidity Nu needs to provide depends on the amount of non-parket NBT? Because I think this is were our basic disagreement is.
In mean you basically say that a parked NBT is not different to a non-parked NBT. But if I consider buying NBT today, I would like to be sure that I can sell this NBT tomorrow. If Nu can proof the reserve for the unparked NBT and the parking graph shows me that no additional NBT will enter the market until tomorrow, then I will be confident that I can sell it, and might also be willing to pay the fee for it.
Again, I think the focus group should be two kinds of customers: short-term users (hedging, money transfer with stable value, etc), who have to pay the bill and long-term users (parking, retirement money etc) who basically lend money to Nu and therefore might even get something back. By balancing parking and burning rates you can define any other user group in between as well (e.g. availability once a month).
Yes, from exchange to paper wallet wonât work anymore, thatâs right. Of course, someone could provide a little online service that receives the exchange transaction, parks it and sets the paper wallet as parking address. Wouldnât be trustless of course, but easy to develop.
EDIT: actually, after a bit of thinking, this service could solve the offline wallet issue entirely as long as it can be trusted well enough. maybe FLOT should set something like this up. Otherwise I am pretty sure @backpacker can write this up in a day and if you then charge 0.1% fee then you could make a pretty good deal considering the development effort.
I actually think of them as mostly the same. I think most people would not buy a NBT today and sell it tomorrow. Theyâd sell it in some future after unparking may have occurred.
I disagree. Besides hedging (which is ultra short term), above time frame would be pretty usual for any kind of online remittance. Letâs say you want to accept cryptocurrencies but would like to have a stable value. In a normal business you then collect the payments over one day or week or month and then liquidate them at once, just as you pay only once per month for rent and utility.
Parking allows Nu to prove that over a particular time span no more than X NBT will hit the market and therefore allows service providers like described above to calculate with confidence that they will be able to cash out when they want. Non-parked NBT donât offer this confidence.
What I miss in the considerations is that most Altcoin buyers want to make money. This choice that we should fulfill. And we should provide the money revenue outside of Nu.
Nu has the option easy to park money. This money could be used to invest in stocks or to trade currencies.
The profits we could pay as interest for parking. Investment strategies, we can make it public and deny or vote.
Anyway, money income must come from outside. Otherwise, the system always has the appearance of a Ponzi scheme
What we need is someone with vision.
And we need a better voting system. Why do not we use software for political parties? So a kind of âdemocracy Softwareâ. In Europe, well, the Pirate Party have developed. Then we come to better results faster.
The current system is cruel. (Iâve never voted because this is too complicated. These numbers, this secret language, these abbreviations in computer science, who will understand âŚ)
If we want to be a stable currency, then we need to invest in conservative values. In real values. Gold, agriculture, forestry.
Let us be a proper organization.
In everything we try here, the question arises:
What is a decentralized organization? Whatâs this? Is there anyone with clear responsibilities? Is there no âownersâ meetingâ? Is there no one who is chosen?
The most important decision in the next few weeks will be:
Yes, we want to make money.
The second explicit decision:
Yes, we want a stable currency.
The third important decision:
Yes, we want to be an organization that implements our objectives.
If that is clear, I can not imagine that this is not accessible to me.
Yes, the required amount of liquidity Nu needs to provide depends on the amount of non-parket NBT. But the required amount of liquidity Nu needs to provide actually depends directly on the amount of moving NBT component of the non-parket NBT. So if we can we donât need to charge this non-moving non-parked NBT. Itâs just a more precise solution to solve the problem so that collateral damage will be smaller.
I donât know about NBT user base. It often surprises me how many people buy a crypto and leave them there for a while only to come back after many months. Most donât follow what is going on. Look at the amount of new ID asking what happened since the peg collapsed. Look at the 2/3 non-minting NSR. It would be a rude surprise that the fund got a hefty hair cut.
Anyway canât the blockchain stop charging the coinage tax after step 3, when Nu got its N% reserve?
