Motion RIPEMD160 hash: TBD
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Shareholders will not pass NuShare custodial grants for the purposes of maintaining a NuBits price peg if the circulating supply of NuShares exceeds 1,000,000,000 NuShares, or the equivalent NSR amount after re-denomination occurs.
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It has become very clear to me from watching NSR trading volumes over the past six months that almost nobody here is purchasing NSR anymore. I think the biggest factor for this behavior is that there is no hard cap on the supply of NSR; in an emergency, NSR could become worthless with unlimited dilutions possible. This is a tremendous problem that this motion will solve.
This motion does not prescribe any additional controversial mechanisms into the liquidity operations model. The current supply of NSR is approximately 794,000,000 right now, so this motion allows FLOT or a representative to sell up to 206,000,000 additional NSR to defend the peg if necessary. Should that not suffice, the network will have to use higher parking rates or other options, such as capital controls, or allow the peg to temporarily break.
NuShare adoption has suffered because there is no perceived scarcity. Without a large pool of NuShareholders, our NuBits adoption suffers due to the lack of vocal advocates. I know I havenāt personally purchased NSR in months even though I believe strongly in the future of the network. Should this motion pass, I will be resuming my accumulation of NuShares.
This motion puts an effective hard cap on the supply of NuShares at 1,000,000,000 as originally specified in the release white paper, except in two circumstances:
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Where shareholders dilute NSR to fund a profitable expansion of their business (eg. a 100,000,000 NSR grant to fund B&C Exchange)
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The minting reward (currently about 2% per year).
This motion is the bare minimum required to re-instate scarcity into our NSR model. This motion will properly allocate the risk of NBT ownership between the users and shareholders, as opposed to the unlimited liability weāve imposed on shareholders in the current model, all while still providing robust Tier 6 NSR sales protection.
Iām interested in feedback from data feed providers in particular, as I need your support for this motion to pass. The motion content is written to be as uncontroversial as possible to assure its passage. Letās make NSR scarce again while still providing significant protection for NBT users.