I am studying the motion…
This motion is currently attracting about 25% of the vote in the past 100 blocks. Thank you to everyone who is voting for it so far.
All NuShareholders should be in favor of this motion if they agree with my logic presented in my above posts and summary here: [Withdrawn] Motion to create a new Tier 6 (Restricted Network Access) of liquidity . One common viewpoint I think is held by @Cybnate, so I’ll share my counterpoint.
I encourage you to write out a scenario explaining how you think this chain of events would unfold, because I still don’t agree with your view here. In the event of a critical emergency where we would expect 80% of demand to disappear overnight, the very first thing I would do as a shareholder would be to sell all my NSR, because I know the value will tank. I’m saying this as an actual shareholder, not a hypothetical shareholder. This sell-off will require NSR sale dilutions that inflate the NSR supply by many orders of magnitude, because NSR will have lost most of its value. Imagine the NSR supply inflating from 800M to 5B or 10B or more. We cannot reliably back the price of an asset (NBT) with a second asset (NSR) that derives most of its valuation from the success of the first asset (NBT); we can only use it as a marketing tool to assure NBT users that NSR holders share in the risk of the network.
My proposal gives shareholders the confidence that mass NSR dilutions won’t be required, so that shareholders hold their NSR during crisis periods. The increased NBT transaction fees will slowly reduce the excess circulating supply over time while limited NSR sales occur to help keep our public relations positive and speed the removal of Restricted Network Access status.
I encourage everyone to take 5-10 minutes to read the motion and vote. This is a critically important feature for our network in my opinion, as it will allow shareholders to strengthen their guarantee of a stable NBT price peg over long periods of time.
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That is partially true. When NBT holders know that NSR shareholders have barely any stake a NuBits sell-off will be even faster and with that encouraging a further decrease in NSR value.
You may try, but you won’t see much, if any, value of it back in such a situation especially not in a panicking market. No buyers. You and other Shareholders most likely end up as a bagholder in such a situation as it is already too late. Most of us know that. So most likely a large number of Shareholders will try to jump ship as soon as ‘Restricted Network Access’ (your T6) will be in place, basically diminishing NSR value for T7 at almost the same time. T7 is therefore useless by the time it is required.
With turning it around some NSR value could be used to buyback NBT before Restricted Network Access comes in place. This would likely slow down panic from NBT holders more than restricting Network Access basically implying that they may foot the bill.
As said before I can see a scenario where both measures would be activated at the same time. Dilution of shares and Restricting Network Access. Users and Shareholders would be both punished for panicking behaviour equally. It will be messy anyway.
We need to keep in mind that when Tier 6/7 needs to be activated, most likely there already will be panic. The real problem is how to get individuals (both NBT and NSR holders) behaving when the odds of losing are getting more favourable. I don’t have all the answers and literature is thin on this subject. It balances between rational and psychological responses which happen when certain triggers occur and one sheep crosses the dam. Usually thereafter the rational goes down the drain.
I’m still not convinced of the value of your proposal as currently worded. I would settle to have both Tier 6 and 7 combined in time. Still appreciate the concept of Restricted Network Access as an ultimate measure.
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I think we’re in agreement here, and my intent was for both Tier 6 (RNA) and Tier 7 (NSR sales) to be used simultaneously. Both can be activated at the same time, with Tier 7 only taking a little longer to complete due to the logistics of selling NSR. Here is the section of the OP where I discuss this, where I assume a future network state that has the ability to set transaction fees quickly:
My intent with the motion wording was to keep things very high-level, so that shareholders could have maximum flexibility in prescribing the tools during an emergency. I share your view that Tier 6 (RNA) and Tier 7 (NSR Sales) should activate at the same time.
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Unfortunately your motion is drenched in statements as the above quotes show that there is a strict order. Tier 6 should be the plasters while we are preparing for proper medical care representing Tier 7. During that we will still need more plasters (NSR sales). Your motion clearly suggest the opposite intention in my opinion which makes it hard to support it.
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Not having NSR sales before or at least simultaneously with RNA will undermine the trust in and the credibility of Nu.
Restricting access before shares get diluted to mitigate a crisis is skinning customers before owners taking on responsibility.
That is too close to what we already know from traditional banking/social misconceptions to hope for being able to resemble it.
Does Nu want to become something better than current central banks, something that limits the devastating power of central banks, something that might make the world a slightly better place?
Then it shouldn’t try to step in the shoes of central banks.
No skinning of customers!
I was for that reason I included sale of NSR in a draft I once created - way before the situation is absolutely dire:
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I think also we should show that Nu cares about NuBits holders and that Nu will do everything in its power to protect the holders even if dilution is needed.
In other words, Nu will protect the interests of customers before the interests of shareholders…
But that sounds anti-capitalistic …Well yes but Nu is a new form capitalism.
But protecting the peg could be regarded as the best way to protect the value of nushares on the long run so after all it is not that anti-capitalistic.
Nu holders already take a risk when they use nubits compared to FIAT so we should counterbalance that with a thick protection, I feel
So when could RNA be activated.
Maybe when a lot of nubits are help by bad actors for example?
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Nothing in the hashed motion text indicates that they cannot be executed simultaneously. What are you referring to? You’ve only linked comments of mine from various points of discussion, none of which suggest that only Tier 6 (RNA) could be applied while ignoring Tier 7 (NSR sales).
However, as this motion seems to be stalling between 20-25% I would like to ask both @Cybnate and @cryptog what proposed wording changes to the motion would increase their likelihood of adding it to their data feeds. As others such as @Nagalim have noticed, you two have significant voting power under your control and it appears I will need to work with you to arrive at a motion wording that has a chance of passing.
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Which as a side note - and not trying to side track the discussion - is another great integral part of Nu’s governance (so please, rather don’t comment that here; I just couldn’t forbear writing this).
I’m so overly happy that @Coingame stated what’s obvious for most of us, but hidden for so many.
And until recenty I wasn’t aware of the importance for Nu - the inner workings and as a means to attract active contributors, who favour agile endeavours, which have a solid consensus mechanism.
Data feeds belong to that.
With them you can delegate your vote, but need to keep that delegation up only as long as the delegate acts and decides more or less according to your interest.
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I think that is overestimated. I’ve seen on numerous occasions that at times people choose to not join a datafeed and vote in their own way. I’m not sure whether either cryptgo or me is able to help you to 50% rewording this motion as the current 25% might not like the rewording and you still won’t have a majority.
I think my point is clear, the gist of this motion and the tier numbering is that we first put RNA (tier 6) in place and then start selling NSR (Tier 7). That is the part I don’t appreciate. Most simple solution is to turn the tiers around.
More sophisticated is to add another paragraph detailing e.g. the amount of NSR to sell (e.g. 50%) as soon as tier 6 is activated. This will create a barrier for shareholders to ensure they have done everything before putting RNA in place and with that protects the NBT holders. The other 50% if still valuable can be used to sell when RNA is in place to mop up some spills likely to occur when RNA is gearing up.
Hope that helps and like to see others chipping in @cryptog. I think RNA is a great last resort mechanism to have in place. We just have to make sure we apply it properly.
Im still unclear what this motion does other than force us to change the language we use.
The only actual compelling number in there is 10%, which is lower than the number which triggers nsr buybacks, making this a higher tier than nsr buybacks. So is this entire motion just trying to get consensus on that 10% number? Why not 15%? Why not any number and just say ‘set high fees when we’re in economic trouble’? Why not just let shareholders do that themselves without trying to do some weird kind of semi-marketing using a motion?
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I think I would be comfortable with RNA being named T7.
T6 being new NSR issuance.
And I think we need concrete numbers.
Like: we start to create new NSRs to protect the peg while at the same time we do not increase the fees.
We continue to do that as needed.
If we reach a point in which we have increased by x% (Ex: 50%) the number of NSRs in circulation, then we can start increasing the tx fees (freezing the accounts) while at the same time we stop the new issuance of NSRs.
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Why do you think buybacks are unacceptable without NuShares backing NuBits? Because we’re “manipulating” our share value? If we distribute dividends and then all buy NuShares for the money, wouldn’t it end up the same but less efficient?
Why is it necessary to display good will by selling NuShares? Our share value will be in danger anyway in such a situation. Isn’t that enough as incentive for Nu to avoid ever getting there?
As I see it, Nu promises to provide NuBits at $1.00 and at reasonable velocity. Does it matter how Nu does that?
I still question how much selling NuShares to pay for exiting NuBits will help, regardless of whether it’s before or during Restricted Network Access is in effect. If selling NuShares is necessary, go ahead, but I don’t understand the rationale for doing that just to show Nu is serious.
Regarding the concerns for Nu’s reputation. Surely, it’s irresponsible to care more about perception than actual stability? It sounds good that NuShares back NuBits, but will they really in practice to a justifiable degree? It may be risky to sell away network power as well.
I imagine selling NuShares while Nu is not in Restricted Network Access will be ineffective because too many NuBits will flow for Nu to keep up (we’d be in that situation for this reason). Even when RNA is active (assuming NuBits only) shareholders may want to exit themselves and push the value of NuShares down even further. Including NuShare transactions in RNA seems interesting to reduce panic selling effect in NuShare value, but I guess would need some exception for Nu’s sell transactions to go through?
I guess we don’t have much choice as last resort to sell NuShares, and I believe I support that. I think if NuShare sales are necessary they should occur when RNA is active. RNA is not a pleasant situation, but seems a lot better than letting a panicking market run Nu into the ground.
Moreover, what does Nu do if one of its currencies is failing and keeping a peg is deemed infeasible? When Nu needs to abandon a currency, we can’t keep throwing shares at it and risk the remaining currencies in the network.
Edit: How does Nu’s buy side work? 
Is selling NuShares for peg support integral to the design of Nu? Perhaps in this post I’ve neglected how Nu stores value in NuShares for use toward pegs. While the network is in good condition, that should work well, but in emergencies I see RNA as the action before an emergency sell-off of NuShares. Differentiating a normal NuShare sell and the sort during RNA.
Hope I’m making some sense.
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That is called psychology and marketing. There is limited rational beyond panic. It is usually the wrong thing to do anyway, but it is hard for us all to help ourselves given extremely challenging situations.
The current fractional reserve model we have is build on this. That is why we are doing share buybacks. When we need to buy back NuBits NSR is one of the last resort reserves we have. I tend to agree that NSR is not the most effective reserve, but many believe that share buyback is the way to go implying that it is a useful reserve. If that is the case we should use it as such which means before the panic of RNA imo. Not saying we need to sell endless NSR before entering RNA. But say bringing at least 50% to the market shows at least that Shareholders are serious about defending the peg and footing the bill before NBT holders have to do that.
These are key statements that summarize my position quite well, thank you Jooize. I would even go so far as to say that having a Tier 6 that puts 100% of the risk on NuShareholders (through potentially endless NSR dilution that erodes all equity wealth) is unlikely to be effective at all, because no shareholders will authorize endless dilutions as it harms their self-interests. This may even be impairing our current NSR market cap - who wants to buy NSR knowing there is a chance that the share supply could increase by many multiples in an emergency? Having RNA should actually reassure NuBits users that while they may lose temporary access to the network in an emergency (if they don’t want to pay high fees), over time the situation will return to normal.
You cannot reliably back the value of one asset (NuBits) with the value of another (NuShares) that derives the vast majority of its value from demand for the first asset (NuBits). Period. I will continue repeating this over and over. At best, NSR sales serve as a PR tool to convince NBT holders that we suffer during an emergency too, and I’m open to that if NBT users demand it.
@Cybnate @cryptog Taking your most recent comments into consideration, how would you feel about an updated motion text that specifies simultaneous activation of the two tiers? So 25,000,000 NSR (or whatever amount FLOT has at the time of the emergency) is immediately put up for sale, while RNA is activated alongside it. Then, further NSR sales can take place to minimize the time RNA is activated. With very high transaction fees, the NuBits circulating supply will be reduced quickly from users who place the highest priority on network access, reducing the need for extensive NSR dilution.
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RNA makes shareholders’ problem a problem of the end users. Transactions between nubits users could suddenly cost an arm and leg even if a localized economy uses nubits to clear internal transactions. What if someone sells you a money that could charge 20% tx fee that you have no way to avoid? Think about it. Will you use it? Will you recommend it to your customers?
On a more technical level we basically don’t know how a variable fee network work. Last time we tried to raise fee there were numerous problems. We are several technical readiness levels away from putting this technology to support a production peg.
Selling nsr to defend the peg has been tried and worked, otoh.
See this and associated posts
I don’t like panic selling nsr either. However with NuSafe and Distributed Reserve and possible hedging I think we could have a decentralized reserve as a significant tool to defend the peg. Any panic sell below Nu’s actual value, which is backed by reserve even its fraction, is a opportunity to buy cheap nbt and nsr.
It’s important when the NSR get sold to remove NBT fom the market!
If you wait too long, maybe even after the peg has taken significant damage, it’s likely that you need to sell way more NSR to fix this, because the NSR price will have gone down.
NSR need to be sold rather early than late:
We need to react on swings in demand fast and must not wait until it’s too late.
If we stuff BTC proceeds fom NBT sale into NSR buybacks, if the T4 reserves are above a threshold, the rational choice is to sell NSR for removing NBT from market, it the T4 are below a certain threshold.
The proposed 9% leave a buffer to the 15%, which allows an early and efficient NSR sale.
9% might not be perfect. It was just a proposal. Yet a way more fair and efficient proposal than having countermeasures, on which neither NSR holders nor customers can rely on and which can’t be tested before without endangering all.
You can test the waters of selling some NSR once the reserves start to run dry without putting all at risk.
Do we want to wait until the whole forest is about to burn down, just because we are afraid to limit that danger by cutting or burning down some trees to prevent the fire from spreading uncontrolled?
Don’t make Nu just another central bank that puts more risk on the customer’s shoulders than on the own shoulders…
…that even risks total failure to avoid (temporary) cutbacks of NSR value and scarcity.
Why risk so much, if you can risk much less?
If there’s (temporary) profit from increasing NBT demand, buy back NSR.
If there’s declining NBT demand and the reserves start to run dry, sell NSR.
Is it really our best plan to wait until it’s literally almost too late?
If so, I’ll just close my eyes and turn away, because I wouldn’t be able to watch this happen.
The demand collapses I’ve mentioned are far in excess of a gradual drop from 10% buy-liquidity to 9%. It could take the network from 50% to 0% in a matter of days. RNA is another protective tool for our network.
NuBits customers have zero risk right now. NuShareholders have indicated through motion that they will sell new NSR until equilibrium is reached, even if NSR are diluted 10,000% in the process. This is almost certainly hurting our NSR adoption, because there is no perceived long-term scarcity. One government announcement could destroy all NSR value. I have slowed my purchases of NSR on the open market since NSR sales were enabled, and I think other shareholders have too.
The hybrid model I proposed to Cybnate and Cryptog above is a responsible shared approach to risk. RNA is inconvenient for NuBits users but ultimately takes zero value from them if they wait until the crisis passes. NSR sales in limited amounts are inconvenient for NuShareholders but necessary. That is the responsible model we should pursue in my opinion.
For those interested in the economic theory, I am advocating a macroprudential view to our network’s health as opposed to a microprudential. .
The term macroprudential regulation characterizes the approach to financial regulation aimed to mitigate the risk of the financial system as a whole (or “systemic risk”). In the aftermath of the late-2000s financial crisis, there is a growing consensus among policymakers and economic researchers about the need to re-orient the regulatory framework towards a macroprudential perspective.
I’d like to really drive my point home with more economics. Back in November 2014 we had @Benjamin educate us on the “Impossible Trinity”.
From the Wikipedia article on the Impossible Trinity:
All three of the policy objectives mentioned above cannot be pursued simultaneously. A central bank has to forgo one of the three objectives. Therefore, a central bank has three policy combination options:
Option (a): A stable exchange rate and free capital flows (but not an independent monetary policy because setting a domestic interest rate that is different from the world interest rate would undermine a stable exchange rate due to appreciation or depreciation pressure on the domestic currency).
Option (b): An independent monetary policy and free capital flows (but not a stable exchange rate).
Option ©: A stable exchange rate and independent monetary policy (but no free capital flows, which would require the use of capital controls).
Currently, Eurozone members have chosen the first option (a) while most other countries have opted for the second one (b). By contrast, Harvard economist Dani Rodrik advocates the use of the third option © in his book The Globalization Paradox, emphasising that world GDP grew fastest during the Bretton Woods era when capital controls were accepted in mainstream economics. Rodrik also argues that the expansion of financial globalization and the free movement of capital flows are the reason why economic crises have become more frequent in both developing and advanced economies alike.
Right now we’re trying to do all three as a network which is impossible in the long-run to sustain. My approach is very similar to Option ©, which is advocated by the Harvard economist.
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Though off-topic from the motion at hand, I’d like to re-kindle the idea of a protocol level method to buy NBT for time-locked NSR.
TL;DR: we offer to sell NSR that are discounted to the open market (say, 10%), but time-lock those just-sold NSR using a method similar to the NBT interest rate model.
With this mechanism, if the investment proposition is good, investors would be motivated to buy NBT in the open market and “bring them home” to the network. The Nu Shareholders would have full control of the exchange since this happens in the blockchain. i.e.: this would eliminate the need for Tier-N pools, custodians, exchange defaults, etc.
Since this is a “buying” action and not a “selling” action, this may help retain liquidity in off-blockchain NSR exchange pairs, instead of inducing (more) panic selling because giant NSR sell walls popped up or a custodian had to sell in to the bids (like a hot knife thru butter).
This could also be virtuous in adding buy-side NBT liquidity and be a force to drive the peg up.
This moves the illiquidness (and risk) to NSR and to investors, as is the intent with the coupled NBT (stable) / NSR (risk) model.
And yes the locked-up NSR come to market (eventually). Nothing different than an IPO with locked-up investors.
All of this works if the network imbalance (call it “debt”) is temporary (a liquidity issue). If the network goes insolvent, there is no hope. But, presumably the network has a revenue stream and there would be a way to “pay off the debt” and eventually buy back those shares by way of the revenue stream the network receives.
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