[Withdrawn] Make Firing and Replacing Incompetent Liquidity Providers Our Top Priority


#323

I’m not saying others - you - haven’t. I only joined in Jul of '15.


#324

I know, but it was a thought experiment @Sabreiib enjoyed bringing up.

That was when I was still there. I replied in the thread:

And I still think that. There are several ethereum based concepts floating around which deal with integrating external signals into a blockhain with minimal trust. Oraclizing the nubits price or even better the nubits demand would be crucial to perform all of this automatically. But it of course does not solve the basic problem in the system design that you cannot assume a buyer only if you promise future buybacks. @Benjamin’s proposal was just a decentralized way to decide and conduct the buybacks.

I am not sure how 2b should be implemented in a decentralized way, since in order to send or burn coins from this address someone has to know the private key. However, assuming you just hire someone to do that (or multisig or whatever), then there is not much to implement here. The RIPEMD-160 of “the price of Nubits is > 1 USD” is 166ef7775713e1e2a8da48dccf7d721eb0174148 and the hash of “the price of Nubits is < 1 USD” is e07ec56043bbe8660786bba4e22dd8a24a79c26e. Add the corresponding motion to your blocks and you have the external signal measured in a decentralized way. Executing the auction would require special code.

But all this isn’t really the issue right now, @Nagalim’s seeded auction model (although I didn’t read it fully) appears to me to do the job with not more risk than any gateway LPC.


#325

I don’t think creon would consider NBT payment at this point.

One thing I don’t agree with him is that Benjamin was the strongest proponent of the 0 reserves model but it takes a lot of care to work. And while we’d be waiting for all those preconditions, playing with BTC was dangerous to begin with and a black swan could have happened in the other direction.

There have been attempts to diversify to other coins. NSR buybacks, NuSafe, the unrealized PPC reserves all operated under the assumption that BTC tends to drop in price. But somehow the price shot up as block reward is close to halving. Nu had not been careful enough in handling money, but blaming it all on buybacks takes a lot of hindsight. The best way to deal with those uncertainties and avoid practical issues with buybacks was perhaps to just put everything into NuSafe, which completely goes against Benjamin’s ideas.

As for profit, demurrage, trading options, loans, alternative fee models and what not, those have all been suggested and discussed before. There were many practical restrictions in that 1. demurrage isn’t viewed very favorably in general 2. there is no outlet to loan NBT 3. Not even NuLagoon or Poloniex want to share transaction fees with us 4. counter-party risk is still real, just to list a few. I’m inclined to think that Nu is either too much ahead of time or not ambitious enough, that it requires a lot of support infrastructure to work well.

But what made things more difficult was that all these somehow attracted less attention compared to setting rule after rule to tie up people who try to make things work. Being a FLOT member, i.e. monitoring walls, checking regulations, arguing about small details about transactions etc. really drained a lot of energy out of me, that at some point I being stopped being able to contemplate and talk about the broader picture of the network. My decision to quit was partly because I could no longer afford the time, facing difficult times in my own personal life.

Probably only moD had the energy to do so many things at once. For this reason I found the “firing” pitch by JL quite offensive - all liquidity providers, as well as active community members, are basically volunteering significant parts of their lives to hold up the network; there’s all to be gained and almost nothing to be lost to just walk away from our responsibilities, and I’ve grown tired of fighting for the network just for peanuts.


#326

@creon you are brilliant.
The only thing I would change is 0.25 guaranteed annual interest rate on protocol level so parking does not seem like a punishment.


FLOT BTC Operations (buy side)
Get NuBits' liquidity flowing
[Voting] Enable Dynamic Transaction Fee in NBT
#327

We don’t need to throw BTC at the exchanges. We need to throw BTC at this. Now.


#328

What s the main idea of creon hardfork proposal?
Providing a disincentive to store nubits?
What happens to nsr any way?
Hardfork means what for nubits brand?
A restart from zero?


#329

The main idea is that NBT will reduce by X% every year - this is something we control. Every time you transfer NBT the fee will be dynamic:
NBT * X% / 365 * Coin Days

Yes, if you store it longer it will hit you more. Keep it in motion - or in Nu’s hands.
Nothing should happen to NSR.

Brand? Is it any worse than what we’re facing now?

We wouldn’t restart from zero - as far as I know. The NBT would be there. We’d just face a new TX fee scheme that would reduce the amount of NBT in circulation - thereby providing income for the network since it can create NBT.


#330

So it would mean that we would have waited a severe crisis to figure out a way to make money out of transaction fees, regardless of the health of the system?
In any case how is it supposed to solve the crisis?
It seems it would take time to burn generate enough tx fees for reducing the outstanding nubits quantity that is at the heart of the problem.
Also is it some sort of inflationary mechanism at the end of the day that we would have totally discarded so far?
How would nubits holders react to such a proposal?
In any case interesting idea!

Ps: i agree it would not harm so much our brand at this point :slight_smile:


#331

It is actually deflationary. Every year NBT in circulation would decrease. This would allow Nu to do a monthly accounting to rein in spending on grants.

The goal is to reduce liability and to make Nu a rare commodity again. We could easily reduce NBT in circulation by burning Nu held NBT. This would reduce the market pressure that Nu itself is creating. Forcing holders to sell @ 5% just to get out.


#332

If your nubits holdings decrease in value, it is as if you underwent some kind of inflation in the sense that you lose purchasing power.
In any case your holdings value decreases. Ok.


#333

This isn’t some kind of proposal that you should send me your last BTC that you have. Better hold tight on those! You have a capable development team which should be able to do this easily and fast. I mean in the end you really just need to add some coinage dependency after this line here: https://bitbucket.org/JordanLeePeershares/nubit/src/cd6e9ee263579fc3e2cddd3cad1e6eef685112a5/src/main.cpp?at=master&fileviewer=file-view-default#main.cpp-819

to something like:

CValidationState state; CCoinsViewCache view; uint64 nCoinAge;
if(!GetCoinAge(state,view,nCoinAge)) ... // error
int64 nMinFee = (1 + (int64)nBytes / 1000) * nBaseFee + factor * nCoinage;
...

Defining factor is up to the shareholders. Its a hard fork, because old clients will underestimate the required fee and accept invalid transactions in their blocks which then later get rejected by the newer version. You should ask your development team if they think that the risk that comes with any kind of hard fork is worth the potential benefit. This is really up to you.


[Withdrawn] Think big, act small and establish revenue stream
#334

Sorry - yes. You are correct - purchasing power decreases.

It is an incentive to not store them, but use them. If nu holds them - fine - nu can always make more, but never more than what has been lost.


#335

@creon good to see you again! Wonderful idea that would definitely improve parking tier.


#336

It is a good idea in theory, but here is where i see the problem…

Nu’s liabilities are already pegged to an inflationary asset (usd), now we want to inflate it more because we are in a bind?

Personally i see any solution that imposes a mandatory haircut on an NBT holder as a failure of the project.

Voluntary haircuts, fine. Debt equity swap in exchange for future potential reward, fine.

This is just another way of breaking the peg and pretending nothing happened…

I think the only valid solution is one that gives confidence to LP’s and the greater crypto community to rise up and defend the peg.


Get NuBits' liquidity flowing
#337

Debt equity swap:


#338

For those who didn’t read yet, I tried to articulate Jordan’s liquidity engine model from my interpretation of it. Please give it a read when you have some time…


#339

Yes this is correct and I agree that any other way to get real value out of your operations would be better. Now changing the rule is like selling someone a subscription telling him its free and after some months you start charging for it without giving the customer an option to unsubscribe. So the solution is definitely unfair, no doubt.
On the other hand, if this would have been part of the model from the very beginning, then I would not see it as peg breaking action but as regular account fee that compensates the DAO for the service it provides.

It is just that there is a chain reaction going on, panic sellers trigger each other and it would require an in my opinion not obtainable amount of buy side support to stop the instant sell-offs. Now by introducing this rule you are basically offering the following options:

  1. You think Nu will fail / you need the money asap: Then keep your funds liquid and on-exchange and be ready to sell at any time once liquidity is there. A fee on your funds from the DAOs side will apply.

  2. You think Nu will not fail and are willing and able to wait for it: Remove the funds from the exchange and park them to avoid the fee.

This would at least take some NBT away from the exchange, reducing this giant 100k sell wall to something where a similar buy wall can be placed on the other side with the remaining funds. Anyone who buys NBT at this point can see in @backpacker’s nice parking graph how many NBT are locked up and therefore might at least start hedging again with small amounts. It could calm down the whole situation on the market.

But yeah, in the end its betrayal of the customers, but let’s not forget that similar approaches are taken in RL if a company is basically insolvent because of liabilities yet could make a profit if these liabilities wouldn’t keep them down.


#340

Thank you for that - very nice.

Except in our case - it is a motion up for vote. Shareholders have a choice. Anyone can have a voice - even NBT holders. If it shouldn’t happen - GO BUY NSR and stop it! :slight_smile:


#341

Basically bankruptcy protection…

Nu needs a way for NBT holders to vote for that to be legit… Nu has to propose a plan to it’s largest creditors…


#342

In RL these choices aren’t up to the debtor though… it’s up to the creditors, and if an agreement can’t be reached, the courts…