What s the main idea of creon hardfork proposal?
Providing a disincentive to store nubits?
What happens to nsr any way?
Hardfork means what for nubits brand?
A restart from zero?
The main idea is that NBT will reduce by X% every year - this is something we control. Every time you transfer NBT the fee will be dynamic:
NBT * X% / 365 * Coin Days
Yes, if you store it longer it will hit you more. Keep it in motion - or in Nu’s hands.
Nothing should happen to NSR.
Brand? Is it any worse than what we’re facing now?
We wouldn’t restart from zero - as far as I know. The NBT would be there. We’d just face a new TX fee scheme that would reduce the amount of NBT in circulation - thereby providing income for the network since it can create NBT.
So it would mean that we would have waited a severe crisis to figure out a way to make money out of transaction fees, regardless of the health of the system?
In any case how is it supposed to solve the crisis?
It seems it would take time to burn generate enough tx fees for reducing the outstanding nubits quantity that is at the heart of the problem.
Also is it some sort of inflationary mechanism at the end of the day that we would have totally discarded so far?
How would nubits holders react to such a proposal?
In any case interesting idea!
Ps: i agree it would not harm so much our brand at this point 
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It is actually deflationary. Every year NBT in circulation would decrease. This would allow Nu to do a monthly accounting to rein in spending on grants.
The goal is to reduce liability and to make Nu a rare commodity again. We could easily reduce NBT in circulation by burning Nu held NBT. This would reduce the market pressure that Nu itself is creating. Forcing holders to sell @ 5% just to get out.
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If your nubits holdings decrease in value, it is as if you underwent some kind of inflation in the sense that you lose purchasing power.
In any case your holdings value decreases. Ok.
This isn’t some kind of proposal that you should send me your last BTC that you have. Better hold tight on those! You have a capable development team which should be able to do this easily and fast. I mean in the end you really just need to add some coinage dependency after this line here: https://bitbucket.org/JordanLeePeershares/nubit/src/cd6e9ee263579fc3e2cddd3cad1e6eef685112a5/src/main.cpp?at=master&fileviewer=file-view-default#main.cpp-819
to something like:
CValidationState state; CCoinsViewCache view; uint64 nCoinAge;
if(!GetCoinAge(state,view,nCoinAge)) ... // error
int64 nMinFee = (1 + (int64)nBytes / 1000) * nBaseFee + factor * nCoinage;
...
Defining factor is up to the shareholders. Its a hard fork, because old clients will underestimate the required fee and accept invalid transactions in their blocks which then later get rejected by the newer version. You should ask your development team if they think that the risk that comes with any kind of hard fork is worth the potential benefit. This is really up to you.
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Sorry - yes. You are correct - purchasing power decreases.
It is an incentive to not store them, but use them. If nu holds them - fine - nu can always make more, but never more than what has been lost.
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It is a good idea in theory, but here is where i see the problem…
Nu’s liabilities are already pegged to an inflationary asset (usd), now we want to inflate it more because we are in a bind?
Personally i see any solution that imposes a mandatory haircut on an NBT holder as a failure of the project.
Voluntary haircuts, fine. Debt equity swap in exchange for future potential reward, fine.
This is just another way of breaking the peg and pretending nothing happened…
I think the only valid solution is one that gives confidence to LP’s and the greater crypto community to rise up and defend the peg.
Debt equity swap:
For those who didn’t read yet, I tried to articulate Jordan’s liquidity engine model from my interpretation of it. Please give it a read when you have some time…
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Yes this is correct and I agree that any other way to get real value out of your operations would be better. Now changing the rule is like selling someone a subscription telling him its free and after some months you start charging for it without giving the customer an option to unsubscribe. So the solution is definitely unfair, no doubt.
On the other hand, if this would have been part of the model from the very beginning, then I would not see it as peg breaking action but as regular account fee that compensates the DAO for the service it provides.
It is just that there is a chain reaction going on, panic sellers trigger each other and it would require an in my opinion not obtainable amount of buy side support to stop the instant sell-offs. Now by introducing this rule you are basically offering the following options:
-
You think Nu will fail / you need the money asap: Then keep your funds liquid and on-exchange and be ready to sell at any time once liquidity is there. A fee on your funds from the DAOs side will apply.
-
You think Nu will not fail and are willing and able to wait for it: Remove the funds from the exchange and park them to avoid the fee.
This would at least take some NBT away from the exchange, reducing this giant 100k sell wall to something where a similar buy wall can be placed on the other side with the remaining funds. Anyone who buys NBT at this point can see in @backpacker’s nice parking graph how many NBT are locked up and therefore might at least start hedging again with small amounts. It could calm down the whole situation on the market.
But yeah, in the end its betrayal of the customers, but let’s not forget that similar approaches are taken in RL if a company is basically insolvent because of liabilities yet could make a profit if these liabilities wouldn’t keep them down.
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Thank you for that - very nice.
Except in our case - it is a motion up for vote. Shareholders have a choice. Anyone can have a voice - even NBT holders. If it shouldn’t happen - GO BUY NSR and stop it!
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Basically bankruptcy protection…
Nu needs a way for NBT holders to vote for that to be legit… Nu has to propose a plan to it’s largest creditors…
In RL these choices aren’t up to the debtor though… it’s up to the creditors, and if an agreement can’t be reached, the courts…
Along these lines… I think if the biggest creditors (to the point of majority) agreed to a debt equity swap deal, it would be (semi?)-legit to force those same terms on everyone else… That is how it would work in the real world…
There is no distribution of power, and no independent courts who would have the power to make a final decision. Coming from a country where people sue each other over tiny scratches in their car, I was honestly surprised how even registered companies like CCEDK and BTER are apparently legally in no trouble whatsoever if they simply continue operation after a hack and promise to pay back their customers at some day (or maybe not).
But of course I agree that a step like this here has to be well communicated and the consequences need to be understood by all participants.
@Confucius you said doubted buying Nu because of a lack of investment possibility in shares earlier and I couldnt reply so Im tagging you so you see this response by teek.
People investing in NSR enabled NBT right? They have the right of control. NBT holders can have a say - through NSR.
As a central figure, I think alot of the success and failures of the community are attributable to you, J Lee. Without assigning fault, i feel that your role just need to enforce a chill atmosphere that will allow other professional developers to flourish – and not worry so much!