i see, two days is only when the majority agrees that quickly, i guess it is fine like this
Is there a reason that this proposal is needed now? Did we find ourselves in a situation where it would have been beneficial to have a motion past faster than the 10,000 blocks that is currently required? I’m not sure I’ve seen anything contentious that would have triggered the need for such a radical change.
I disagree with a 48 hour window for motions to potentially pass. It’s common for people to take a day or two to step away from their computers (long weekend trip, for instance). While I’ve been an advocate of figuring out ways to seek consensus quicker, the duration just feels too short to me. 72 hours (~3000 blocks) instead?
This isn’t accurate. If the community has only 48 hours to put together a discussion that could sway some members of the the majority to go against the proposal the new timeframe certainly could stop or limit discussions.
how I understand it now it is a minimum, 1001 votes in any 2000 block period. Consensus can be made quicker, and only for motion votes (not custodial), the 1001 votes can be reached in any 2000 block period, most motions will still probably take longer than 48 hours, I guess.
If we change our perspective such that you have to be swayed to vote rather than swayed not to vote (which is the way the protocol is set up anyway) then this isn’t an issue. Though I agree, this motion puts a bigger burden on shareholders to avoid voting for motions that haven’t had time to be discussed.
This is inverse to how I consider treating motions.
First they are raised.
Then follows a discussion (unless it’s the purported no-brainer).
Then starts the voting for it.
If you need to convince people to go against a proposal, because you assume they would vote for it otherwise, I need to declare Nu doomed.
But have a look at this motion.
It’s quite controversial, the first vote was roughly 4,000 blocks ago and it’s at 10% of the votes with 35 votes in the last 100 blocks.
It wouldn’t have passed in a reduced window size.
People that are away can’t join discussions, but they can’t vote for motions as well.
The only weak link is a service that is very useful as well: data feed providers.
If there’s enough minting power registered to a feed, that power can be used to let motions pass.
But that’s already the case and works with even more dangerous custodial grants.
It’s good to remember how important and powerful data feed providers are.
I don’t know, but if we want to start a motion to reduce the rolling window size on the occasion we already would need the reduced size, it’s unlikely that it can pass in time
The rule that helps here as well as in real life:
don’t sign contracts, you don’t fully understand.
The motions are a kind of contract. The rule applies.
What also applies:
Counter Example: This motion appeared seemingly out of nowhere.
Agreed, but voting for it is not on a “dangerous” level in terms of passing.
Agreed, but voting for it is not on a “dangerous” level in terms of passing.
I don’t know how to interpret that statement. If this motion adhered to the proposed voting rules it would already be nearing 36% (if the explorer’s “last 100” and total votes since it was first seen on the network are accurate).
Seems like it would be well on its way to passing.
I’m not against the concept, in general, but I don’t understand the rationale for the timeframe picked. With only 1001 votes out of 2000 needed, the majority could force something through with less than 24 hours of total discussion. I don’t see having a positive outcome.
I have no tools to parse the block chain and look for distribution of the votes.
Based on what I can derive from the block explorer:
with a current level of 10% of votes in the last 4,000 blocks it could be that the motion was quite soon at a level of close to 35 votes in 100 blocks.
That would have totaled 1,400 votes in 4,000 blocks or 14%.
I don’t know whether there has been a rolling window of 2,000 block in which 1,001 were carrying votes for this motion; I’d need to speculate.
What I see at the moment:
by the proposed rules the voting for this motion would be stalled at 35%.
That seems to be close to 50%, but you can interpret it as well as:
2 out of 3 voting NSR holders are not voting for it.
A majority can force anything through. That’s the basic of this consensus model. With the current window size this takes less than 4 days right now - that’s the only thing that changes; the time between starting the voting on a motion and gathering enough votes to let it pass.
The main difference of the reduced window size is a sped up process.
I consider that an advantage, because it makes decisions more agile.
I assumed to see security issues, which I now think do not exist.
I see your viewpoint, and under scrutiny it makes logical sense.
I’ll return to my primary concern then – that requiring 1001/2000 blocks is responsive and agile, but at the cost of giving sufficient time to socialize something to the larger community.*
* If the vote appears out of “thin air” without prior discussion. This argument could be made about the current configuration, as well, just with a different timetable.
I was wondering about this voting having appeared without first being flagged [discussion], [proposal], [new] or something like that.
But in the end it’s not the flags that make a motion a motion.
It’s the votes recorded in the block chain.
Due to my wonder I was at the beginning more critical than I might have been under different circumstances.
I was not in favor of this motion, because I found it dangerous (by default I consider anything dangerous I don’t understand ).
But I was convinced that this motion offers the benefit of faster motions while having no (recognized) drawback.
As soon as you have a majority for a motion, you don’t even need to discuss it here.
Talk about it secretly. Post it at a hidden place. Create a hash. Vote for it. That’s nasty, but entirely possible.
If you want to totally have this community on, post the motion here after it already passed and let them wonder in between, what that motion is about that is shown at the block explorer, but not found here.
Motions are not a part of the protocol.
They are a way to form consensus about things that are either not embedded in the protocol or form consensus about changes of the protocol itself.
At least this is my understanding. I might be horribly wrong with that.
You aren’t, that’s what they are for. To invoke some action, be it developmental, behavioral, or methodical that cannot be enforced directly by the network itself.
Not a good proposal.
Right now if everyone voted on a particular motion it would still take 3.5 days to pass. To me that is great buffer more so than a liability. Changing the period to such a short time would also negate many smaller holders from having an impact in the general voting consensus because they would roll out of the scope much faster.
Has anyone considered a hostile motion takeover? What if motion a is drafted in secret. It is being voted on in the blockchain, but nobody can figure out what it is for. Once it passes a group of large shareholders come forth to reveal the motion text which has passed.
Would that motion stand? It must. There’s no precedence to state that it would not. Shortening the period so drastically could make such a scenario reality. I think the notion that motions do not instantly invoke any real world action doesn’t mitigate the impact such a change would have.
Democracy is slow whether it’s on the blockchain or off it. Keeping the current block count gathers a broader consensus from shareholders on how the network should proceed. I can’t imagine anyone would vote for this without agreeing to lose impact in future voting against larger holders who mint much more often than them. It’s a consolidation of network will to larger holders.
I would love if there was a mechanism to quickly/instantly gather a consensus of shareholder will. I don’t think this is an appropriate way to get closer to that.
This! I see nothing good coming from a smaller voting window and I never felt a need for faster motions.
I think the response to this motion indicates that there may be a necessity for multiple tiers of motions that have varying consensus durations. I can see the merits of a shorter time window for emergency situations, and of longer windows for fundamental changes to the network.
For example, let’s pretend I go off the deep end tomorrow. I lock every contributor out of www.nubits.com, replace the Nu client with my own version 2.0 (which steals NuBits), and begin aggressively posting through @OfficialNuBits that free NuBits are available to anyone who downloads the updated wallet.
Shareholders could immediately make public posts about my actions, set up a contingency website and social media accounts, etc. As we currently operate however, the network would not officially sanction my actions through blockchain consensus until a one-week period had passed. That’s an awfully long time to let rogue Tom Joad destroy the network without official censure.
An ideal solution might be to have three levels of motions:
1 month (less common): Fundamental changes to NuBits or NuShares that affects their valuations. This could include introducing NBT burning, opening the source code, or changing the peg from USD to a basket of goods.
1 week (most common): Changes that affect the daily operations of NuBits or NuShares. This could include changing our logo, creating a new social media account, or migrating our forum to a different domain name.
1 day (least common): Emergency changes that threaten the network. It would allow shareholders to quickly signal to the world that it does not approve of a damaging action.
The structure above could probably use some refinement. For example I would prefer having NSR auction authorizations at the one-week level, so maybe a broad template for their use would need to be authorized at the 1-month level first. I think we’re starting to realize that not all motions have equal time requirements for discussion and perhaps we should look at enhancing the options available to shareholders. Just an idea.
This doesn’t change that using a shorter block window would give a greater voice to fewer larger holders potentially providing them the ability to cram legislation through at their will and alienating many many smaller holders. There is no way of changing that when you shorten the window. The diversity of holders within that window will be impacted.
This is an example of why shareholders should discuss such matters ahead of time and pass motions with plans in place. The Strategic Reserve Fund for NuBits is another example of that. It is not a good example of why we should shorten motions passing to a 24 hour period.
This is not accurate as well. A motion is considered passed if it has 5001 blocks of any 10k block window(and SDD % but that will be changing). If everyone started voting for the motion it could pass within 3.5 days from the date of proposal in our current system - not a week.
To the inverse of your example what if Tom was unavailable for a day and shareholders erratically passed a motion to strip your position managing the social accounts within 24 hour period? There are plenty of reasons that could cause you to be unavailable for a 24-48 hour period, and now you’ve been fast tracked to removal without the opportunity to show up and defend your position. I could posit any wildly ridiculous scenario as yours for the purpose of hyperbole but the point stands that a preemptive contingency motion is better in either situation rather than allowing ANY future motions to get fast tracked with less voter diversity.
Who is to decide what tier of motion their proposal deserves? I think this needlessly complicates the motion voting process and doesn’t resolve the major concerns with this change.
When we see legislation fast tracked without proper review from all parties in the real world it turns into stuff like The Patriot Act, Bank Bailouts, and Trans Pacific Partnership. Why anyone would support this for Nu is beyond me.
I would still like to hear more of Ben’s concerns responded to on what has prompted such a drastic change to the motion voting. If there are concerns in who can do what, when and where they should be discussed and voted on ahead of time. Anything that is proposed will have at the very least 3.5 days to pass. I think it’s ample time to foresee catastrophic issues related to the network and prepare for them.
Can we get some examples of emergency situations that this change would help resolve (like real network problems, not Tom having a meltdown and putting dickbutt all over our website). If anyone can provide those then great! let’s put together a plan today on how to proceed in that event. Get the motion started, and pass it in half a week.
No need to create a fast lane for motion votes and reduce the impact of smaller holders on the motion voting system.
The motion tier structure would be decided the same way that legislation is passed in existing governmental systems: with full debate and voting using the existing voting mechanisms present. Standards could be agreed upon for each level, and motions that didn’t adhere to those standards could be deemed invalid even if “passed”. I realize this would be a huge undertaking.
I thought I presented a real-world example of an emergency situation. My hypothetical actions above would cause severe damage to the network and the example wasn’t intended to be hyperbolic. A false wallet placed on nubits.com would destroy trust in NuBits. Having the ability to officially condemn my actions quicker is an advantage for shareholders.
I agree that a shorter motion window introduces risks of abuse, as you’ve pointed out. I don’t think the right attitude is to dismiss my opinion outright though as somehow being an immediate conduit to the Nu Patriot Act of 2015. Emergency and temporal legislation exist in governments for a reason; they are very rarely needed to satisfy crisis situations (both foreseeable and unforeseeable). The fact that we have not yet discussed what hypothetical restrictions should be placed on their use doesn’t mean that it’s a terrible idea. I remain convinced that shareholders should have as much flexibility as possible in the way they voice their opinions about Nu network operations, and a system with variable durations would be a step towards that.
could it be forced to make motions public, maybe from inside the client? to avoid situations where people are voting for a private motion