I think share distribution was unfair from the start, but with independent shares minting not sufficient for creators to pass anything they want. Crashing the system made enough independent investors dump their share outright to preserve some of their investment or move their shares to exchange waiting for better opportunity. Either way, distribution of votes became more skewed, enabling creators of this scheme do anything they want.
This kind of Nu fork is very appealing to me. I hope @cryptog didn’t vote for Phoenix. Or did you? 
In case you didn’t I’d be supporting this fork idea. Sacrifices must be made sometimes, so those unlucky shareholders who voted for Phoenix are to be left out for the greater good.
I’m thinking more and more a fresh start with a revised whitepaper and a new name would be better. We can let Phoenix(Jordan) try to get Nu back on track his way while we work on a new currency with a new model. We already have the decentralized structure and active shareholders in place to create a new currency which we could use for B&C.
Key changes for the revised white paper in my opinion would be:
-
several revenue schemes to get our new coin turning up net profit
-
100% backed reserves held in BTC and other alt coins (as @Nagalim suggested) next to USD stable reserves (a mix of Nusafes, Other stable currencies and perhaps some form of high leverage shorts)
-
100% decentralized structure and daily operations
-
fully transparent share distribution and developer funds
BKC can meet all your requirement, I don’t understand you as a large BKS holder will bother yourself to reinvent the wheels. PoW minting and exchange are the only two big profitable business in cryptoworld today, what’s the new product’s profit model since it’s PoS? Jordan is rich and can buy lots of new product, or shall we demand real ID for IPO? And I’m afraid not many people will join a new product IPO from a community with failed Nu record.
In Phoenix’s daology “A Report on Peg Abandonment and How to Proceed From Here” it seems the issue of contention was:
On May 27th, 2016, large NuBit sales were made by a single actor using a single address. In one day 14% of our entire money supply was sold. After these sales, our liquidity engine was functioning normally and was up to the task of replenishing our reserve, as is mandated by NuLaw in such a case. Shockingly, instead of refilling reserves using NSR sales and park rates, the entire liquidity engine was immediately shut down. Such an action had not been approved in any way by shareholders. It was a serious violation of many shareholder directives. It was the act of rogue and incompetent liquidity providers no longer acting as representatives of shareholders.
Maybe the intention was never to crash the peg but only to encourage NSR dilution? Same aim, different reason? Obtaining NSR under Tier 6 would seem to be a much better outcome than crashing the peg to achieve the same goal, hence the anger. I think the peg crashing was never the plan however it seems obtaining a controlling share concentration may have been. Pheonix may be honest when he said that other shareholders see his point of view and voted accordingly. However, what is to stop shareholders creating a voting pool to achieve joint aims? I think this is more likely the case here. If correct then using inside knowledge to exploit a weakness in the liquidity engine combined with a weakness in the DAC structure could enable such a controlling interest (a solution for which needs to be found). From what I can see your forum is pretty open and any outside observer could have seen that you were having trouble with liquidity after May 27th and exploited the situation no? If you have information that person was Phoenix then so be it but unless you can prove it then it could have been anybody. Also, what is done with that controlling interest determines whether or not an actor(s) is(are) malicious. Until now it seems devious which is not a good sign not to mention that a controlling interest in a DAC goes against founding principals.
My main concern about Nubits was and still is the lack of an accounting and revenue plan. If someone wants to be leader then this should now be the no.1 goal. I can see that someone is trying to be leader but completely ignores these issues in favor of liquidity, a short term focus. How can the focus be long term sustainability without accounting and revenue? I know that there is plenty of support in the forum to make this a priority but the way I see it as shareholders you are and always were responsible for getting this implemented. If you tried and were overridden by a controlling interest(s) then I understand.
Anyway, plenty of lessons to be learned here for next time (especially for me :0))
1 Like
What do you think of my proposal?
https://discuss.nubits.com/t/discuss-motion-to-make-bkc-the-first-hayek-coin-in-the-world/4320
Couldn’t JL then jump over whenever he pleases and again will have a majority of the shares? He can even play safe and burn NSR as long as he remains the majority on the former Nu chain. I still think whitelisting of private keys is the only way to be sure that JL is locked out.
In the strongest but safest form this would mean that only shares that were on addresses that contributed a block during the attack period and which did not include the attack motion. The snapshot would basically be taken in the past.
A weaker but less safe form would be to take this snapshot at some point in the future. In this case, everyone who contributed a block during the attack time but also had a lot of shares on other addresses (or exchanges) is now able to send those share to one of the addresses that found a block and those shares will be acknowledged. This would obviously lead to more shares to be taken into consideration, but it also assumes that JL is not in possession of a priv key (or is in cooperation with someone who has such a key) that found a block during that time. I think the case in brackets is particularly unclear.
2 Likes
It’s worth pointing out that this would cause the price of NSR to rise if the forked project garnered excitement. Perhaps that value would be better harnessed through an ICO for shares. Otherwise people would buy up NSR to get a stake. And then we have to assume the opportunity to profit will lead to a market for shared use of private keys that voted against Jordan’s proposal. That would be a heroic dose of irony, but I don’t think it is the safest path towards a goal of eliminating JL’s influence just like you pointed out.
We should want to reward the shareholders who were actively trying to influence the network (voting) when it really mattered, would my rational.
disclaimer: I am biased because I was minting against the motions
I can’t think of any other way to achieve this lockout either.
This is what makes the burn approach very unattractive.
This will be the most powerful, but most segregative version.
Using a snapshot in the future is, like you already pointed out, much weaker; blending in is possible.
Every statement will carry some bias. Thank you for pointing yours out.
Whatever window and behavior will be taken to whitelist addresses - people arguing will always be influenced by their bias, possibly trying to increase their influence.
“shareholders who were actively trying to influence the network (voting) when it really mattered” appears as important part that should guide the decision.
As I said before: fair distribution will be a crucial aspect for such a fork. You need to focus on that (and ways to verify that as good as possible) early and take it into consideration when shaping conditions of the whitelist.
The whitelist mustn’t prevent fair distribution after the fork.
I voted only for the capping of nubits (till we have recovered the peg)
I think many people voted foe capping nubits and 100% reserve motions. 2/3 addresses at some point voted forone of JL/ph’s motions. will post detailed results later.
Good. Then I’d be in favour of forking nubits in a way that cuts out JL’s share.
1 Like
Time to start working on/discussing of
- a set of parameters for a whitelist
- a revenue scheme for the fork
- the accounting
- the funding (for development etc.)
- infrastructure
- roles
- branding
- communication/advertizing what’s going on
I’m pretty sure I missed a lot and there’s no priority or order in what I wrote.
This brainstorming can be a start.
3 Likes
I like the way this discussion is heading.
Call me crazy, but I still think the biggest issue was our USD peg being executed via BTC, which was super volatile. We gave people a way to hedge against BTC, where we were always at the disadvantage – which sucks.
This also made it hard for the good guys to do “the right thing”. For example, I want to switch out some NBT. I can’t set an order on an exchange in BTC without worrying “what if the BTC price jumps/drops again…?” then I’d be selling NBT for more/less than 1 USD which is doing exactly what we’re not supposed to do…
NuBits themselves provide some really nice things such as (practically) immediate transaction confirmations and (supposedly) fixed fiat value denomination, but trying to enforce the USD peg via BTC seems like a fools errand.
USD Tether exists and seems to work now. I wonder what people think about re-starting this but using USDT as the conduit for enforcing our peg. This way you’re always exchanging NBT for something that is worth 1 USD by definition…
4 Likes
I fully agree.
Organic growth was sacrificed by a jump start when Nu focused on BTC/NBT instead of NBT/USD.
The liquidity engine requires that, but sadly the liquidity engine is an insatiable beast.
There’s no food left, so the beast needs to feast on itself.
USDT needs to be checked thoroughly first.
I’m not aware of USD Tether’s business model - where does their revenue come from? How do their books look like?
It could end just as bad for USDT as it did for Nu just a bit later, because they need to bear volatility risks in non USD/USDT pairs only for a short period of time and have mainly operational costs they need to compensate.
Still, if these costs don’t get compensated by revenue, it will be no 100% reserve model for long and collapse.
Pegging to USD through USDT might be better than using BTC, but it’s no solution; I’d only recommend that only as workaround while getting traction in NBT/USD.
USDT charges fees to buy Tether via fiat like USD (ie, same as Coinbase).
https://wallet.tether.to/transparency
More info on https://tether.to/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/TetherWhitePaper.pdf
1 Like
I’m glad to see we’re getting value eventually back to USD, however the problem still seems to be that we’re dealing with a volatile conduit between the two “currencies”.
The peg technically isn’t USD-NBT… its USD-BTC-NBT. In other words – I don’t know anywhere that will take my USD and give me NBT. Or even take my USDT and give me NBT. That seems super weird to me. I get the problems of dealing with fiat, but pegging to something as volatile as BTC doesn’t seem right – particularly when there are alternatives.
This seems even more strange when we know that BTC is a deflationary currency by definition, and the US Dollar is designed to be inflationary ever since the gold standard went away.
I feel that it’s a bit like saying “OK, you want to save some money in our bank. Cool. First go buy a bunch of shares in companies, and then you can trade those back for dollars and we’ll put them in your account.”
If we must use some conduit to go from USD <-> NBT, might as well be the most stable thing we can find (in the analogy above that’d be US Treasury bonds, in our example, USDT seems like an interesting option).
4 Likes
This is because BTC is the de facto means of exchange at most crypto currency exchanges while most don’t support USD because of KYC/AML at the same time.
That seems to be the prime reason why BTC/NBT was being used.
Better focus on getting NBT/USD going than using a direct competitor and earning them money, no?
I doubt this is a ‘must’.
It might just be more convenient to use BTC or USDT.
As dealing with USDT (e.g. withdrawing it) requires dealing with KYC/AML stuff, you can as well focus on NBT/USD and bypass USDT.