Yeah, that statement about a perfect opportunity to buy in… NO! Its insulting in so many ways.
I’m looking for a gamblevestment . Let’s put it that way, bank interest rates are practically a joke. My mom used to tell me about when people could make a living off their bank interest rate, can we go back to those times? Actually not, that is practically why all crypto was created, to get rid of manipulative banks who work not for the people.
Anyone notice that the Bittrex ticker for nubits was changed to NBT from USNBT? Is that why Bittrex market link on coinmarketcap is not working? Did we really just go from NBT --> USNBT --> NBT , lol.
Strange indeed, link is broken. Need to remove the US. However, they appears to still to the USNBT ticker else they wouldn’t show up under USNBT at all. Good find.
Then you’re right at Nu! Lost of gamble here, maybe even with some potential for investment.
Better buy NSR than NBT.
One reason: you have a better ROI, which is an assessment solely based on my guesstimate. Just imagine Nu manages to shift gears and enter the CN-NBT market! Ponzi engine at increased speed. Woot woot!
Another reason: it helps the Ponzi engine keeping fueled. Which is why you need to wait until the NSR buybacks are through and NSR sales continue.
For me, not all hope is lost, but the situation is bleak and chances of success are small… so I guess most hope is lost but not all.
For a very high risk investment it could be interesting, but it really is very high risk. At the moment there is little leadership around here, and it’s obvious that a lot needs to change if Nu is to be transformed enough to succeed.
Some key changes that are needed for long term success in my opinion include:
- safe ways to hold & move funds
- developing a clear revenue model
- NSR distribution needs to be reassessed so that no single shareholder can control the network
These aren’t easy problems, but not insurmountable if there is enough will in the community to move things forward.
The activity in the forum gives me some hope, and the current fairly stable base with reserves in equilibrium seems healthy for now.
It’ll be interesting to see how the conversation develops in the coming weeks and months, but unless there’s appetite to invest time / resources to transform Nu in the ways required, it won’t happen on its own.
I am impressed.
A quite safe and documented way to get there, would be to replace Nu with Augeas.
The first one is easy, because multisig groups aren’t rocket science.
The second one is what you should focus on.
Operators of liquidity didn’t believe in the established model and devalued US NuBits off its expected $1.00 value when tier 1–4 reserves were running low because of declining demand. One proper NuShare sale was performed, but the proceeds were placed at 90% devaluation, offering NuBit holders $0.10 per US NuBit.
@JordanLee left and @Phoenix appeared. He managed to gain shareholder support for taking over liquidity operations and recover the peg. I’ve worked with him since. Phoenix recently strongly disappointed shareholders by failing to secure large amounts of NuShares. He’s since given up control of all shareholder funds to me. I will move them to a multisig group. Meanwhile, the best assurance I can give is that I had already been in control of backing assets (BTC) procured since NuShare sales began under Phoenix as Chief of Liquidity Operations.
People have been accusing the model of being flawed and us recovering Nu to be corrupt in some way. I understand being upset about the peg break, but the claims while not all impossible have been conflicting and essentially reflected not believing in the model that apparently has worked so far. Some have even called for excluding certain shareholders from the organization and use current shareholder funds.
If you believe the model is viable, Nu is currently healthy though its operations are costly for now. Causes for concern are centralization around me and downward pressure on NSR because of the losses (may have been consumed by the market already, but unknown).
I’m aware of that. In discussions with Bittrex at the beginning of the year, I only reached agreement for continued listing. They may be more open to changes now that our NuBit pair is producing some volume. We want to be shown under $-markets as well.
You fail to mention the elephant in the room, the fact that reserves were low because they were frivolously wasted buying back and burning NuShares in order to boost the price. If shareholders didn’t support this when Jordan Lee advocated for it, Nu would not have been low on reserves in the first place and could have handled the decrease in demand.
Liquidity providers did not see any other choice and there was no time available to sell NuShares, so they acted in a way not authorized by previous motions and started buying NuBits back at less than $1. Some at Nu blame the liquidity providers for crashing the peg, but it’s difficult to see what other options they had. They had limited funds left that were evaporating quickly and it would have taken more time than they had to raise more funds by selling NuShares.
They were between a rock and a hard place and did what they thought would help the situation. Regardless of what the liquidity providers did or did not do, the peg most likely would have collapsed anyway due to lack of reserves.
There is an argument that park rates would have helped the situation by bringing some demand, but they were ineffective due to the fact that liquidity providers were not offering to buy back a NuBit at its full $1 value. After all, why would you buy and park NuBits if it’s not clear you’ll be able to get the full value back plus interest? It would not be profitable to do so in that case, so nobody would park. It’s unclear if this would have helped though, as potential parkers would have been weary of the dangerously low reserve fund. We may never know if park rates would have been effective if liquidity providers continued buying back NuBits at $1.
Thank you for adding the root cause of low reserves to the discussion and telling it apart from the bad end that couldn’t be avoided.
You just couldn’t have sold NSR fast enough. Look at the amounts of BTC that were had from selling NSR over the course of the last months.
Peanuts compared to what had been necessary.
If B&C hadn’t been “robbed” of its NBT, it would have been even worse.
The aim for Nu to achieve its goal with NuBits must be to reduce impact of volatile reserve assets. Nu does that by appealing to investors so they will support the currency in declining demand. Motivators include the reserve ratio giving them value via NuShare buybacks (or dividends), and the network becoming self-sustaining and profitable by transaction fees or other operations.
Executing this model with 100% tier 1–4 reserves is what’s unviable. The model transfers volatility risk from the reserve assets to investors. There will always be risk for currency holders!
You need to reduce tier 1–4 reserves or gamble everything on reserve asset volatility, which doesn’t seem like an interesting model. Would it be just a collective fund by all NuBit holders where they risk losing value to holders who withdraw before them in a reserve asset decline, and any increase in value would be distributed equally? The Nu model is to gamble 46.5% (currently) on reserve asset volatility, and the rest on investor confidence.
NuShare sales did recover Nu. There is only evidence that the model works. Liquidity operators gave up the chance to prove the model wrong when they withheld reserves. NuBit holders acted as they still had confidence in the promise of $1.00 per NuBit while some reserves were already being withheld by widened spreads, but when the NuShare sale proceeds were offered at $0.10 per NuBit, what are they to believe?
None of that makes sense.
There was at least $27,000 available (maybe $38,000). Funds will always be limited to some degree, but it’s irrelevant to the point. They began devaluing NuBits before the NuShare sale was performed. More importantly, they did sell NuShares once for $3,677 but withheld the funds. You make assumptions that just can not be made with the available data.
Is it difficult to see any other option? What they did is equivalent to waving a banknote in front of the owner and pulling away when they try to grab it.
# BTC was ~580 USD on June 6, 2016 580 * (35.74 + 12.287) = 27,855.66 27,855.66 + 10,568.606 = 38,424.266
Plus what @masterOfDisaster held in the gateway already along with the NuShare sale proceeds. If NuBot reports value the same regardless of spread it appears he stole more than 13 BTC. Not to mention the 25,560.4409 US-NBT reported we’ve previously neglected.
# US-NBT / btc_value 10,568.606 / 580 = 18.2217344828
That theft isn’t relevant to us today, and not in any way basis for the points I’ve made.
Please explain that in the context of considering NSR reserve asset, especially when looking at NSR volatility.
Had Nu traded NBT/USD instead of BTC/NBT, it had to have solved the challenge to keep USD, but there’d be no volatility of USD in relation to NBT.
You remember @Sabreiib’s suggestions regarding short term borrowing?
Of course a Ponzi scheme works as long as you find greater fools!
As long as you find people who buy NBT or NSR when you need money, it works.
You need revenue to be independent from that. Unless you have revenue you can call it startup. I call it Ponzi scheme, because there’s no prospect of revenue. Spare me the tx fee fairy tale.
As long as a less tight spread is untouchable, you’ll have a hard time to find a way to generate net revenue. The loss from trading BTC/NBT will eat so much money that Nu dies the faster, the more gets traded and hedged.
Sure it does.
Nu had six figure sums traded within hours. How long do you think a few thousand USD last?
That’d be strange. If you have the equivalent of 1,000 NBT in BTC at 0% offset, you have the equivalent of 2,000 NBT in BTC at 50% offset. But I don’t know about the inner workings of NuBot.
I’m trying to do some basic math. Maybe Nu learns from it?
The number might change depending on how to interpret that output. But I think you’ve found another part of the missing accounting. Not so intransparent after all
This @masterOfDisaster is starting to become @Phoenix style! That isn’t in the least meant to sound postive. Theft is theft.
Which means he owes Nu
12.287 BTC * 580 USD/NBT = 7126.46 USD
25,560 NBT * 1 USD/NBT * (coefficient, which is maybe 1) = 25,560 USD
Where do the 10,568 come from and how do they relate to the 12.287 BTC?
I beg to differ. Let’s get at least that part of the accounting sorted out, for which data is available!
I have no time reading all the posts, anyone can summarize what’s happening now? BTW, we are an active forum with low market value, a weird combination.
Any updates regarding the stolen funds?
Utilities that simplify determining the losses have been developed, including a more reliable block explorer and an interface for retrieving data. We do not have the amounts yet.
Any progress in 8 days?
It’s not so important.
The damage is already done.
Keep looking forward!
Jooize and Phoenix know their business. Please just trust them!
I bet they are busy focusing on multisig groups to relieve jooize from the burden of holding hundreds of thousands of USD value. It’s just a matter of time until single points of failure fail. Statistically speaking. While that’s true for multisig groups as well, it takes orders of magnitude longer
Hey jooize, it’s called math. You should try it!