I like the updates! Voted and will apply for the RSOT team aswell. I hope @mhps is also willing to join the team!
Voting now. @Sabreiib, I think it would help with visibility if your RSOT application was posted in its own thread, rather than buried in this one. It might be possible that people don’t realize you updated this motion, so your application should draw attention to the fact that we need more RSOT applicants.
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Not yet working on it, I have voted for your proposal and motion to join with my remaining shares however.
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It looks like a reasonable proposal to me.
It is important that B&C shareholders reach some consensus on who and how funds should be handled. Until that occurs, funds can’t be spent on any new initiatives, such as paying for an exchange listing or purchasing NSR as I have proposed. I would like to finalize motions to move forward with those endeavors, but that isn’t really practical until shareholders decide who should hold the funds.
No consensus has been reached on the formation of RSOT and who its members should be. Shareholders are rightly frightened of multisig groups given that these groups have been the primary cause of the loss of about 2 million USD in NuShares, BlockShares and NuBits in recent months. FLOT has been our most costly mistake, and B&C shareholders are demonstrating due caution to avoid a repeat of the severe failures of FLOT.
I have talked about a 2 of 3 group with @jooize and either @Sabreiib or @cryptog as the third signer. Neither @Sabreiib nor @cryptog are particularly eager to sign up for that. But we shouldn’t delay any longer.
That is why I plan to create a motion soon that will mandate B&C development funds be transferred to my custody. My guess is consensus can be forged for this action with defined rules for accountability. Later, the funds can be transferred to a multisig group once a better plan to make those groups accountable to shareholders is in place.
I plan to present monthly reports of total funds remaining and spending reports by category, probably with compensation and expenses as the categories. I will charge a 3% handling fee for all funds disbursed. I won’t reveal addresses because our contractors want some privacy about what they are being paid. It is easy to be critical of this small bubble of privacy in our otherwise incredibly open solution, but critics need to understand that making exact compensation arrangements public is undesirable to many contractors and such a policy would make it more difficult to secure the professional help we need. @sigmike has clearly stated his preference for privacy in his exact compensation arrangements, for instance.
I realize some will not support transfer of B&C funds to me. I would encourage such people to make constructive counter proposals. Saying you don’t like it doesn’t count. Where shareholders have rejected multisig groups for now, this seems like the most sensible way forward.
No. I only said I was not sure it was in everyone’s interest to make it public when one person asked for it.
I will hold the dev fund if RSOT motion passed. BTW, both @sigmike and @eleven have revealed their ID in linkdin. I wonder why we should protect nobody’s privacy.
Or @phoenix will write codes for B&C and wants to keep privacy?
Not sure about that either or don’t understand. Are you proposing to hold the funds outside a multisig?
I’m confused why we can’t get to a majority for multisig. Do shareholders really want all eggs in one basket?
Or do we only have one big shareholder with many faces like with Nu?
BTW I’ve added this motion to my datafeed for what it is worth.
I will hold the fund with other 5 RSOT members.
BTW, I prefer to lump sum contract . We pay the developers when they finish some software upgrade.
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Good, agree with lump sum proposal. Still can be split in e.g. 50% upfront and 50% on successful delivery.
Similar to the NuDroid contract.
Anything appears to be better than handing over the dev funds to @Phoenix who doesn’t seem trustworthy considering the shady renaming from @JordanLee to @Phoenix.
Even trusting @Sabreiib with the funds would create less uneasy feelings.
Moving the funds to RSOT multisig should clearly be the preferred way to go for shareholders.
Make sure to make the multisig 4 of 6 to require a majority of members to move the funds - just in case there are controversial decisions, consensus on RSOT level is required.
Btw. the dev funds are held in NBT, right?
Does NBT support multisig with 6 signers? I think I remember that FLOT had 5 signers. Was that due to organizational or technical reasons?
Voting.
After careful consideration, I think such a multisig wallet is reasonable.
We would not have the same problem of “action slowness” that FLOT underwent for liquidity operations.
If it is not efficient enough, we can always adopt @Phoenix s proposal.
I’m baffled that this hasn’t past, can any shareholders that oppose this motion clarify why they haven’t voted or what they would like to see changed? After all that has happened it seems paramount to me that we get the developer fund under shareholder control as soon as possible.
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I am opposed to the formation of RSOT. The main reason is that I don’t believe the community has enough qualified signers right now. I would like to see a 3 of 6 group, but 2 of 4 might work. However, I can’t name 4 signers I have enough confidence in who have also indicated a reasonable commitment to being a signer.
The failure of FLOT to move funds to keep liquidity operations running in June was a 2 million USD failure. With this kind of unaffordable waste and devastation in our very recent past, we need to be wary of a similar failure. I don’t think we have addressed the problems that occurred with FLOT in a manner that gives confidence in a new multisig group.
I am satisfied with the selection of reputed signers, however. Because all the signing they will do is automated, the risk of poor judgement or insubordination to shareholders is low when compared to manual signing groups like FLOT and RSOT.
In the case of FLOT, we found that signers simply weren’t informed enough about liquidity operations to function in their role. My guess is that signers that would be chosen for RSOT would be much less informed than me about issues that need to be understood to competently allocate and spend funds.
On a related topic, our problem with FLOT wasn’t that they spent funds on items they shouldn’t have. Rather, there was a consistent pattern of inaction when funds very much needed to be transferred. The problem of not moving funds when they should be appears much more likely than inappropriate transfer of funds. Accordingly, instead of 2 of 3, 3 of 5 or 5 of 8, I would like to see 2 of 4, 3 of 6 and 4 of 8. This also applies to reputed signer configurations.
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One globally distributed group of 5 of 8 signers take 6-18 hours to sign if there is complete consensus, simply because people wake up and able to sign at different hours. For a globally distributed 3 of 5 signers it’s 4-18 hours.
FLOT was formed to have one week signing requirement, as told by the architect after repeated questioning from me. FLOT members promised 24 - 48 hr reaction time and they mostly kept it.
Reaction time is not signing time. If there is no easy consensus among the members the time to sign is unknown. You can shorten signing-time-with-consensus by adding more groups. Reducing the number of members but only keep one group as
will not solve the problem. There is little you can do to shorten signing time if there is no majority consensus.
So don’t blame the FLOT and don’t repeat @JordanLee’s mistake.
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I think FLOT performed beyond what was promised and to be expected. I know you see FLOT or specific actions FLOT took as being responsible for losing the peg but I strongly disagree with that notion. The peg was lost because our reserves were to small and couldn’t handle the large selling pressure that we experienced in a matter of days. Why were the reserves to small? Because we spent 555 bitcoins on an inefficient buyback program initiated by Jordanlee. You try to scapegoat the small increase in buy offset that was only done when our reserves were already next to empty (roughly 20k USD left if I recall correctly) as the reason the peg failed while it most definitely wasn’t.
Now I know we won’t agree on the exact reason and it’s been debated to many times already. Regardless of your interpretation of the perceived “failing” of FLOT I don’t see how this is relevant to a multisig team that would hold developer funds. For as far as I can tell it’s mainly about holding the funds in the hands of multiple shareholders instead of a single entity that can vanish overnight (as we have experienced). No funds held by FLOT were ever intentionally misused, stolen or lost and multiple members of that team are still around so I have trouble understanding your claim that the community doesn’t have enough “qualified signers” at the moment.
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This position is untenable. We had about 40,000 USD in BTC plus 120 million NSR, valued at around 330,000 USD just before the peg was abandoned. That is 370,000 USD in assets at the time the peg was abandoned to support a money supply worth less than 700,000 USD. Besides the fact that these funds were almost certainly ample, more NSR could have been had within 2 weeks.
I understand many believe there wasn’t any liquidity in NuShares, so the 330,000 USD valuation of the NuShares was illusory in their view. It is true that liquidity would have been an issue for that large sum of NuShares, but not to anywhere near the degree some on this forum believe. There is a lot of empirical evidence on the question of NuShare liquidity, however. Let’s review it just a bit.
In 2015, there was an extensive NuShare sale program. There was ample liquidity. The program barely dented the NuShare price. We were keeping the peg, committed to keeping it, and there was confidence in our commitment to those things. So it worked.
In May, there were a lot of suicidal tendencies (self-defeating tendencies) and extremely anti-social inclinations being expressed by a lot of forum participants, which had been duly noted and condemned by Jordan Lee in advance of the senseless and anti-social default. As soon as the large sale occurred on May 27, these self-defeating and anti-social proponents captured the collective mentality of the herd against the loud objections of Jordan Lee, who maintained that there was only a need to execute carefully crafted plans endorsed by shareholders. The only thing dire about the situation was the anti-social and self-defeating behavior of gateway operators and FLOT members. There were no significant economic problems present in the network in the few hours between when the large US-NBT sales were made on May 27th and gateways operators decided to abandon the peg, without using any of our very considerable reserves and without selling so much as a single NuShare to support our currency.
Decision makers didn’t seem to understand the importance of confidence in the whole affair. They were saying things like the whole peg thing is over and in the past and NuBits would never be supported in the future. Nothing could be worse for the value of NuShares. It was this chorus of voices that destroyed the value of both NuBits and NuShares. Who wants to buy NuShares in such a scenario? I wouldn’t buy them in that context. Only a fool would.
Now let us imagine that FLOT and gateway operators had maintained fidelity to NuBits and had stated with unity and conviction they would defend the peg at any cost immediately. They immediately bring a large number of NuShares to market. The price of NuShares drop 20% immediately due to the rapid sales. However, BTC is quickly flowing into the network from the NSR sales. It is clear the sale on NuShares won’t last long, because soon the needed liquidity will be obtained and the expansion in NuBit use will continue afterward. In that context, NuShares are quite valuable. But FLOT and gateway operators didn’t maintain and create this positive, win-win environment. They chose the dystopian and anti-social world of unnecessary credit defaults. So we had something like an 80% deflation in the micro economy that spans Nu and B&C due to the defaults. Everyone lost instead of everyone winning. Everyone got angry and mad over their losses, became suspicious and stopped cooperating. FLOT and the gateway destroyed the community by initiating the credit defaults. That is very sad because there was no financial reason for the defaults. There were ample funds available at all times.
When I became Chief of Liquidity Operations, I changed the unauthorized policy of FLOT and the gateway operators and began to declare what we should have been saying all along: the support of NuBits is our highest priority. We will even perform a massive dilution of NuShares if we have to to support NuBits. What happened was we saw a resurgence of demand for NuShares and liquidity in that market. I have been able to bring the NuBit money supply down from about 700,000 to around 350,000 in just 60 days. Imagine what we could have done if we had never initiated the default. We could have sold NuShares for 300 or 400 satoshis instead of an average of around 60 or 70 satoshis. That implies we probably had funding to purchase well over 1 million NuBits in 60 days. That is more NuBits than there are circulation. My guess is we probably could have obtained 200,000 USD in the first week after May 27th if we had maintained our plans and stayed with our commitments. That is way more than would have been needed. The sale on May 27th should have been a one week event that involved a modest dilution of NuShares, zero peg loss, followed by a return to normalcy. Unfortunately, that path was not chosen. I don’t think it was malice. I think it was ignorance. It is an ignorance we can’t afford to indulge. That is why I am needed to handle funds.
If I had been at the helm of liquidity operations for all of 2016, I suspect we would have seen NuBit adoption grow steadily. I would give a 1% chance there would have been a peg break for even one day. The market cap of NuShares would likely be far above 2 million. I am worth a great deal to the network. That is why it should pay me a very large bonus after I demonstrate a little more success.
The difference in the success I have had versus the massive failure of FLOT is a very strong argument for me controlling funds. We just don’t have reason to be confident in the decisions of multisig groups due to the incredibly expensive ignorance signers have demonstrated. Using multisig groups isn’t worth the risk of destroying more value at this point.
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In 2015 when that NuShare sale program happened there was ample BTC funds in Nu’s pockets, right?
Sure you could sell NSR without having a big effect on the NSR price back then.
Lately the peg failed because Nu was recognized as bankrupt.
NSR rate plummeted, because Nu was recognized as bankrupt.
It was no peg failure that caused a drop in NSR rate. It was Nu appearing almost worthless that caused it. Who’d want to buy shares of a corporation with no assets, no cash, lots of liabilities and no revenue?
Stop trying to turn cause and effect upside down.
Nobody buys your story.
Nu can only turn the tide with revenue.
Start working on real revenue, if you want to do something for Nu.
Stop that eloquent ponzi scheme. Now!
This is nonsense. Not only are the revenue prospects for the network truly exceptional when compared to most other businesses (as they have always been), but we turned the tide a long time ago. NuBits are up more than 300% and have been way up for a long time.
I took a system badly broken from misuse that was only designed to maintain a peg. But I haven’t maintained the value of the currency. I have dramatically increased it, which is much more difficult to do. I did so with zero reserves, nothing from tiers 1 through 5, and with tier 6 at only 15% capacity after the unauthorized default. Everything that has happened indicates the power and viability of a liquidity engine. It stands undefeated and has never failed. Except when it was shut off and some poorly articulated, unauthorized strategy no one can characterize was used. We might call the strategy “hoard the reserve”, Hoard the Reservism. Whatever you want to call it, it was an extremely stupid approach.
Imagine we were selling a new line of experimental drone aircraft. We have put a great deal of effort into ensuring reliable flight of the drones. The drones do have an emergency shut off. After many successful test flights over the course of 20 months, there is a crash of one of the aircraft. The operator had activated the emergency shut off while the aircraft was in flight, in clear violation of flight protocol. This operator doesn’t want to take responsibility for their stupid mistake, so they are looking to blame the product: “This drone model is a failure. The control software only warned me three times that a crash would occur if I activated the emergency shut off. I turned off the engine mid-flight because I was worried there wasn’t enough fuel to land.” A review of the facts shows there was ample fuel to land. The problem is clearly user error, and a very stupid one at that. The defective operator continues to demand the drone model be scrapped and redesigned for its terribly unreliable performance. Others clearly see the drones are fine and that the operator was defective. Except in the case of Nu, we don’t have one operator at fault. We have many operators at fault, which constitute a majority of the active community. They all have the same interest: deflecting blame. That is why there are so many voices saying incorrect things: they all have the same perverse incentive, which is to hide their own role in the failure. In our metaphor, shareholders of the drone company need to make the right decision to blame the operator. If they fail to do so and allow the drone operator to blame engineering, the drone model will be a failure. Company shareholders, therefore, must blame the operator and gain consensus on the point. Otherwise their reliable drone model will be a needless failure. Nu’s situation is similar. There are quite a few defective operators trying to deflect blame from themselves. If we allow their story to become the accepted version, the project fails. That is why I have been so careful to eloquently explain the true nature of the failure.
@ConfusedObserver it is quite clear you have a strong motive to see the project fail. As such, you are most unwelcome here as far as I am concerned. What have you ever done to help develop our project? Nothing. You are a pesky distraction spouting nonsense. Why do you do it? I am going to speculate that if the network succeeds going forward, then it will be clear the ignorant and unauthorized actions of FLOT and gateway operators were the cause of the default in June. It seems your priority is deflecting blame from FLOT and gateway operators. That interest is at odds with the interests of shareholders and NuBit holders, which is why you don’t belong here.
So please, kindly make a change and become constructive or remain silent.