ad 1)
If the system isnāt flawed it should be almost imposible to double spend.
The economical incentives for a double spending are bad in my opinion.
This is a quite high level view of the double spending attack, but it should help to start a discussion.
NBT (NuBits) and NSR (NuShares) transactions are on the same block chain.
The block chain is secure by PoS.
Minting is done solely with the NSR.
Assuming you want to double spend NBT, you need to buy them, spend them, bring a fork into play which becomes the new block chain, reverse the transactions in the former valid block chain and execute a transaction with the same NBT again.
Not having in-depth knowledge about the protocol I can only assume that the design is close to Peercoinās PoS. An attack has either a low probability to be executed at a given point of time or needs a decent amount of NSR to be relatively projectable.
You might be able to try for an attack with a little amount of NSR and can even be successful with that. But how will you coordinate the surprising success with (double) spending the NBT?
If you have a sufficient amount of NSR and might be able to quite reliably pull off a double spending attack. But you shoot yourself in the foot undermining the trust in Nu which will likely crash the price level of NSR.
ā¦it will be hard to achieve financial gain under these circumstances and based on these assumptions.
So Iād like to contend that the probability for double spending is close to zero.
For accepting zero confirmation transaction there might be other risks that need to be evaluated separately.
ad 2)
Iām sorry that I canāt contribute anything useful to answering that question