here’s what Nu should do — put some of the weight on the shoulders of the traders. Deliberately remove buy walls sometimes so the peg is lost but the traders will then rush in to buy cheap nbt that they hope to sell later. as more traders start to do this the peg will start holding on its own. checkmate
I wouldn’t go that far, but I think there’s a lot we can learn anyhow. If we get NuBits back up or another product rolling, the event should have made us more resilient in areas we otherwise may have neglected, as we did.
Each time the NSR price dropped, after it was clear that NSR would be sold.
It’s precisely the anticipation of dilution that caused it.
Without revenue, you can’t sustain your business.
There will be no demand in the future, because there will be no belief, that NBT can be stable.
Most of all you need revenue.
I’ve had a look at Poloniex, which seems to be the major market for NSR.
There are over 3 million NSR below 0.0000013 for sale at the moment.
This will indeed create problems for the auction.
Maybe the minimum bid price created a price ceiling, which sellers at Poloniex undercut?
If the auctions ends with NSR left, maybe the next auction foregoes the minimum price and prevents such a ceiling from being formed?
Both defining/announcing such a minimum bid price and auctioning without it have risks.
You need to choose the one that seems most appropriate.
The chances for the auction aren’t as bad as they seem.
Payment is in NBT and NBT is at approximately $0.30 at the moment.
Bidding in the auction can be cheaper than buying with BTC at Poloniex.
With NBT floating around $0.33 mark the real minimum bid price for NSR is around $0.00033 instead of $0.001. That is competitive I would say.
Besides any sells on Poloniex won’t benefit Nu directly as they are being sold in BTC instead of NBT through the auction. Therefore they are less attractive for current shareholders.
Bidding in the auction is a vote of confidence and at the same time taking away ‘buy’ side in the form of NBT liabilities. It is the first step to return to a normal peg. The next step is more difficult as it involves at least a sustainable model in the short term to maintain the peg, with a chance to obtain revenues in the longer term.
Maybe clarify what happens when you need to choose bids at the same price: who gets chosen first? early time of bidding/paying, greater quantity, or partial offer from everyone?
I suggest add date and time in the BM message as the python BM client doesn’t keep time stamp in the header.
Earliest highest bid (price) wins. Any valid quantity is accepted. Is this unambiguous?
I expected timestamps to do the job, though I’m curious to know how Bitmessage sets that. Can clients fake the timestamp to some degree? If the Python client doesn’t even set it, would it be acceptable to go by what my client says (assuming it does say something in that case)?
Everyone will get their 48 hours to pay. Bidders who do not follow through cause worse deals for others in this auction. What can be done about that? After 48 hours the next qualifying bidder will get a chance?
Oops, screwed that up. In draft I set end of Thursday because I intended four days of bidding, but then went by motion which says until end of Friday.