No Peg (see title). This is an extreme viewpoint compare to those that Nu has operated under in the past. So extreme that @Phoenix is trying to get me banned for even mentioning it. First, all external loss mechanisms are abandoned. This primarily involves every mechanism by which Nu holds or influences the BTC market, but also includes dropping park rates to 0%. Without a BTC reserve, FLOT (also an external loss mechanism) is asked to burn all funds and give up their power. The remaining BTC would be used to pay off any developer debts and buy back as much nbt as possible to burn. No developer will be paid in NBT going forward, solely in NSR.
Next, we as a community encourage an auctioneer to begin dual side auctions. Dual side auctions can be summarized as participants submitting either NSR or NBT or both and getting back the opposite token in return. All received NSR goes to those that submitted NBT, all received NBT goes to those that submitted NSR. If no one takes up this mantle, I will do it in August.
At this point, the NBT supply has no method of growing and will only shrink negligibly due to txn fees, so will remain approximately constant. NSR will continue to grow with mint rates and dev costs. This is the backbone, a ‘stable’ NBT supply with a fluid NSR supply. Once dual side auctions find some consistency, shareholders submit NSR or NBT to auction to directly control the NBT supply. This submission process should involve paying both the auctioneer and the executor (who submits and burns the counter token) a small portion of the token submitted. Low-impact is the key here, and the NSR reward should be lower or on par with just the current cost of FLOT.
Once this ideal has been achieved, shareholders are in full control over the supply. At this point there is only one NuLaw rule that needs to be made: the velocity of execution.
In fact, the role of auctioneer and executor can eventually be imported directly into the blockchain in order to achieve perfect zero-cost aside from mint rates and no trust aside from PoS trust. However, that will require blockchain development and a hardfork. The velocity can be fixed, for example to a specific fraction of the NBT and NSR supply per auction every 1000 blocks. Submission could be done directly in the client and shareholder submission done by voting on a single boolean representing which token to dilute each auction.
The key here is that the ‘peg’ is not a peg. The stability of NBT would be solely in the hands of NSR holders, and could be pegged or not pegged to whatever the shareholders want at will. As the shareholders have only a single boolean to vote on (0=NBT, 1=NSR), I believe it would be babying them to impose a NuLaw on this to fix to a particular peg. However, if you really want to imagine a NuLaw 2.0, it could for example simply say that if shareholders believe NBT to be worth >$1 then they should vote 0 and if they think it’s worth <$1 then they should vote 1. But again, I think that such a motion would be unnecessary.
P.S.
I feel I should mention that this idea is not new, nor is it mine. It’s simply the culmination of conversations had over the past year.