I don’t think anything in my RNA proposal was poorly disguised - it is quite obviously a default mechanism. Shareholders continue to ignore contingency planning for a scenario where 90% of NuBits demand evaporates overnight. Default preparations are not a standard part of our operations; it is an end-game plan to preserve the network. To avoid these preparations is irresponsible.
If there are 1,000,000 NBT worth of currency demand today, and only 100,000 NBT worth of currency demanded tomorrow after a permanent crisis event (such as a government declaring it will prosecute anyone who holds NBT), it doesn’t matter how tight we keep our spread. Some NBT users must lose USD value of their holdings.
My RNA proposal attempted to add a semblance of fairness by providing a differentiation mechanism to ensure those who are willing to pay the most to redeem their NBT do so. The alternative to RNA in my permanent crisis scenario is at least a temporary collapse in the peg, and possibly permanent if no speculators arrive to purchase NBT.
I wholeheartedly believe in tight spreads and high liquidity in regular operations, as there is no question it improves the value of NuShares. I also believe in having a plan for a disaster situation. My RNA proposal is still the only mechanism that would preserve a 1.00 USD peg for users (provided they wait until the emergency state is lifted, which could be days, weeks or months as available supply reduces to match demand) in the event of a complete demand collapse. It is a common mistake to confuse continuing operations with crisis planning, and nothing in this post addresses the second concept.