So I see 2 issues with holding USD in a bank account as you’ve said:
Speed of withdrawal
1 is very comparable to an exchange default risk. The difference is that bank accounts are frozen individually (whereas exchange default wipes out all exchange accounts at once) and usually only for large volumes. The cure is to have many bank accounts participating, which is of course difficult to pull off
2 is actually not so much an issue if we’re talking T4 (deep pockets). Use the BTC sitting in T4 to buy back the NBT, use the USD to buy BTC via coinbase (or whatever) to put back in T4 for next week.
So I don’t think bank accounts are completely out of the question. As you already know, we’re talking about paypal and bank accounts here:
Frozen account is one thing but there’s also taxation problems, probably differs per country but I’m pretty sure I would get into problems with the IRS if I suddenly had several thousands of USD credited to my account without documentation as to where this came from.
I have no experience with coinbase so I don’t know fast you could get USD from bank to BTC. But bank transfers for example can’t happen in the weekend or overnight thus slowing down the speed at which we could liquidate our USD into BTC. Although the scenario where we don’t see “it” (the emergency) coming a few days ahead does seem very unlikely.
So you would take some of our T4 btc and buy usd on an exchange with it and just hold it there? Which exchange? So we lose the volatility risk, but we risk exchange default in addition to trusting the single owner of the account.
My proposal would be to put down collateral of equal value to the amount of T4 funds that we want hedged. Also I would be willing to take up the exchange default risk if I can store the USD on the exchange of my choosing + a small fee. In this scenario might the exchange default or I run away with the funds Nu holds collateral of equal value to reimburse shareholders.
Current model: T4 holds 10 btc. Assume btc price is $100/btc. Therefore T4 holds $1k. This is subject to full btc volatility, so if btc price goes to $50/btc we now have $500 in T4.
New model: @Dhume holds $1k in USD on exchange and puts up 10 btc as collateral. Therefore, Nu still holds 10 btc. If the price goes to $50/btc, @dhume has no reason not to default and walk away with the money and we are still left holding 10 btc at a total of $500 in T4. I don’t understand how you holding USD on exchange helps Nu.
I don’t understand what do you mean? I pledge to hold X amount USD for Nu while putting up X amount of BKS as collateral. It’s not a trade of any sorts both parties do not touch the funds until they are returned. I am not willing to either trade or sell my BKS its merely to be collateral to insure Nu that I would not run away with the funds, or in case of exchange default that Nu can use the collateral to compensate shareholders.
BKS price goes up. Collateral is now worth more than USD. Nu acts with impunity, so will return the collateral upon request. This is all well and good, but it gives the USD holder every incentive to trade the USD back for the collateral, as it is worth more.
BKS price goes down. USD holder has every incentive to buy back more than the collateral on the open market using the USD and let Nu keep the collateral that is now worth less than the USD.
Exchange defaults. Nu keeps the BKS.
In all of the above cases, the situation with the most incentive is the one where the deal either ends immediately or never. The only situation where this model functions as intended is the one where BKS price remains constant and exchanges don’t default, in which case Nu just holding the BKS has no risk anyway.
Reason I am willing to put up collateral is that I’m not planning to sell or trade the BKS for a long time. Even if price would shoot up 300% I would not suddenly be inclined to sell. To insure that this doesn’t happen I have no problem with agreeing to timeframes, let’s say 3 months at a time in which I agree to hold the USD regardless of price movement (and Nu thus holding the BKS). It’s not possible for me to cancel the agreement in between those 3 months, it is however always possible for Nu to demand the USD back.
It’s true if a significant drop in BKS price would occur (although this seems unlikely at the moment) that the collateral would not cover the full amount of USD funds anymore. I am however willing to conservatively estimate a BKS’s worth as to insure the BKS would still cover the USD amount even in case of a BKS price drop.
The deal would never end in between periods (3 months) unless Nu requires the USD back, moreover BKS estimated value upon initiation of the contract is to be set below market price to insure the collateral still covers the USD funds in case of a BTC price drop. Exchange default risk is taken on by the contractor to insure that Nu never loses funds.
These are probably the most risk free terms for Nu I can think of.
OK! With a time limit and >100% collateral it makes sense to me. Feel free to make a motion. I assume you’d want the BKS under multisig, it might be simpler to start with BTC as we already have FLOT working with BTC.
I would like to hear some more shareholders speak out for this idea before I make a motion. I’ve been thinking about where to store the BKS collateral and storing it in FLOT multisig would be fine for the moment although in the future I would prefer them to be held by @JordanLee for example so that he can use them for voting. If I have to hold a significant amount of USD then the collateral would have to be a significant amount of BKS as well. From my understanding if they are held in a multisig address by FLOT they cannot be used for voting. Seeing as not all shareholders are quite active with voting it would be a shame to have X% of BKS shares not voting because they are held in a FLOT multisig address as collateral.
Would like to hear @JordanLee thoughts about my proposal, and also if he would be willing to hold BKS collateral and use it for voting on BKS motions.
I’m sorry that you got the impression no reaction means no interest.
This is one of the topics I’m most interested about together with sorting out the liquidity model in practice.
It’s just that a lot of us have day jobs, other responsibilities (family, friends, hobbies) and are not always on.
And even if we are, more urgent topics might need our focus.
Hedging BTC volatility is important for a lot of community members - sadly parts of the ideas are burrowed in threads where you might not expect to find them:
NBT seems to be going for >$1.01 pretty consistently on NBT/CNY at Bter with respect to the yahoo feed. We could probably take advantage of this to hold a good bit of CNY on exchange.
So someone could put up a bunch of PPC, for instance, and be given NBT to go buy CNY with and hold it on exchange. At any point in the 3 months or whatever Nu can ask that person to buy NBT with CNY and burn it, or promote to Tier 1, or whatever the deal that’s been worked out is (flexibility is good here). At the end of 3 months, the person has the opportunity to request the PPC back via motion. If it passes, the person buys NBT or BTC with the CNY and gives it to T4, who will give back the PPC. Alternatively, the person can just continue the contract without much difficulty.
What happens if the CNY cannot be liquidated on-exchange at the end of the contract? For example, what if there were no CNY markets and the peg is already breaking upward on the NBT/CNY pair? If we require the custodian to return the same number of NBT as they were given, suddenly they are taking on a much bigger risk. That’s fine, but it will need to entail a lucrative reward scheme.
What if I want my ppc back? If the custodian is not responsible for the nbt, they have no incentive to get out at a reasonable price. If they are responsible for the nbt, we need to pay the custodian a lot more for taking on the risk.