In general I agree, especially if some random person comes here and offers this service then I would also take the market situation as most important reference. Again, this value should actually be a shareholder determined spread as often discussed.
But the price is not the only quantity here, you have to see all consequences. If these NBT will be removed from the buy side and taken out of the system, then we will have to encourage more buy side liquidity and also pay for this. So if NBT demand is low, then an NBT burn will always decrease the ongoing costs for shareholders, and this should be taken into account.
Here in Cybnates case I have to say that I see it differently: Its a very unique situation, which should never happen again, that someone wants to transform an NBT grant into an NSR grant. So Cybnate actually would have asked for an NSR grant initially, but since it wasn’t possible, she used NBT and now wants to take the step to NSR using the burn mechanism.
So let’s assume Cybnate came up with the Android proposal today and would ask for NSR instead of NBT. How much would you be willing to grant her? I would be willing to grant more value than the NBT, because it is just stupid to ask for NSR if you want to dump them directly considering the liquidity of the market and the price fluctuation. And I see somebody who builds a part of our infrastructure as someone I totally want to be part of the distributed decision process. So also giving NSR grants has various intentions which go beyond the value of the grant.
I like this discussion It’s actually very overdue. Note that all above problems with the risk of dumping could be avoided by making NSR unspendable, and I gave a lot of thought about unspendable share units over the last weeks because its very exciting regarding the incentives. For NSR this is not doable in the current state, however, if we continuously shift NSR trading activity to pure NSR / NBT switches on the protocol, then we could even discuss this further and hard fork to unspendable shares.