We want many minters for PoS security but we only want well informed minters for voting. The question is how to maintain a high PoS security while allowing for a distributed consensus that is both powerful and efficient. If a network has 1500 people who want something, 500 who don’t, and 8000 who don’t care, what should the system do? Currently, the answer is nothing and the system will become stagnant. With 0 mint we kick the 8000 out for both voting and security. With freq voting we attempt to ignore the 8000 for voting while still keeping them for security.
1 Like
@cryptog’s question is if there is a concrete case to solve the issue now. From recent important issue voting, the percentage of yes in the last 100 blocks often reached above 50%, which seemed to suggest a low apathetic rate.
I feel that apathetic minters is an issue but not an urgent one.
Correct, this is not presently an issue. However, as the OP suggests, there is an intrinsic link between mint rewards and apathetic voters. Therein, we can increase security and revenue by solving this issue, which I could argue are always a boon for the network. However, small measures of security and revenue are not vitally important right now, so I agree that this is not high priority.
I took a stab at fully solving the minting equation and it wasn’t too bad. I came out with the statement that increasing the minting rate from 1.025 to 1.05 while keeping a 35% mint rate siphoned money from the non-minters at an increased rate of 9,250 NBT/year. The siphon rate is maximized at 50% mint rate (not surprising) and it’s somewhat linear near unity mint rates. We should be able to get ~4 kNBT/year/% mint reward as a form of dividends paid by non-minters.
I used mathematica, the equation isn’t super simple so I’d rather not post it. Let me know if anyone wants to see it.
1 Like
Agreed. It’s an relevant issue although not an urgent one (yet).
I don’t understand what you are talking about. I may have missed something.
If you have a mint rate of x, a fixed marketcap of y, w nsr minting and v nsr not minting, giving an initial price of q, the amount of money you siphon from nonminters to minters is (estimate without using calculus):
$$ = qw * [ x(w+v)/(x*w+v) - 1 ]
It does not seem that such a proposal has a lot of support. I am not supporting it right now.
I won’t be hashing this due to lack of support.