I strongly encourage you to create your own motion.
Truth to be told, I am not in a stage where I can vote for the OP’s motion since I have not grasped the extent of the issue.
Writing your own motion will create a separate thread but will spark its own discussion that I will closely follow personally.
@masterOfDisaster I would also like to hash a different motion. Perhaps we can come to similar conclusions? I think we need to assume @Henry will resist this, so it’s best if we create something that explicitly states a method of accounting that is simple. I was thinking “if sell or buy side alone exceed 75% of the total liquidity provided in a 1 month period, the monthly reward will be limited to 4,000 nbt instead of the allotted 5,000. If a single side exceeds 90% of the total liquidity only 3,000 nbt will be awarded to NuLagoon for the full month of operation.”
I would prefer continuing the discussion here instead of creating another motion.
But as it now no longer is a draft and instead hashed and up for voting, there might be no other option left - unless the NSR holders are fine with this motion.
I see significant drawbacks in the current version that I tried to outline before and would like to find a solution that is fair for both NuLagoon and Nu - some proposals for different versions are already in this thread.
The solution should be a viable combination of easy accounting for NuLagoon and effective liquidity steering by Nu.
Expect another draft for a motion to reflect this to follow.
edit
It seems that there’s no reference created (at the post from which is linked) when replying as a linked topic.
I announced another draft to follow.
Here it is:
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I’m glad you are doing that. It may be a better idea, although I don’t know yet. It could only improve things.
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Thank you for your vote of confidence. I can’t foresee the outcome of the other motion, but from the ideas I gathered in this thread, I sincerely hope that the community finds an improved solution which serves both Nu and NuLagoon better than restricting the sell side compensation.
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Holding off on voting for this. Like to evaluate this further including the discussion started here
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Generally speaking, buy side liquidity is more important than sell side liquidity. Therefore buy side liquidity should be more rewarded that sell side liquidity whether it is ALP or MLP. I believe this is the case of all ALPs. Isn’t that the case of NuLagoon?
Is it chiefly caused by NuLagoon?
We would like to clarify that we are not accept this motion. We will be forced to stop NuLagoon operation at 1 Nov if this motion pass.
Because fund are shared by POOL A C D, all three pools are affected, we can not implement the calculation before 1 Nov, The only choice is to stop NuLagoon operation at 1 Nov.
Because there is a motion to regulate NuLagoon balancing operations, assuming that motion pass, this motion’s effect will be just as to lower the whole compensation. Later will be easier to implement at least.
Related info:
Hi @cryptog
Here are the details for the Motion Vote on 5a37c1d4abadffbded0ebbdfedb40cbfa68a49ef:
##5a37c1d4abadffbded0ebbdfedb40cbfa68a49ef
Blocks: 2393 (23.930000%)
Share Days: 896623257 (26.520183%)
Hi @cryptog
Here are the details for the Motion Vote on 5a37c1d4abadffbded0ebbdfedb40cbfa68a49ef:
##5a37c1d4abadffbded0ebbdfedb40cbfa68a49ef
Blocks: 2617 (26.170000%)
Share Days: 982228115 (28.335588%)
I was surprised to read this, and I am unable to understand why the only choice would be to cease operations. It is possible there has been a misunderstanding of the motion content. When it states compensation will be lowered for sell side liquidity, this refers to pool users that place NuBits in the pool. It does not refer to pool users who place BTC in the pool which gets converted to NuBits while in the pool in the course of providing liquidity. So, for the purpose of determining compensation levels, it doesn’t matter whether the funds are NuBits or BTC at a certain point in time. It only matters what side the funds entered the pool.
It appears to me that implementation of this motion will be very easy and straight forward. In terms of operating procedures, it will only change the number used to calculate a new NAV. @henry, have I misunderstood something? Why do you say you would have to cease operations?
This motion only has 26.5% support, although it appears it is rising to the low 40’s. It appears some shareholders haven’t voted for it with the expectation that an alternative would be offered by @masterOfDisaster. That hasn’t happened, and the thread opened to discuss alternatives is now inactive (for 7 days). I’m concerned shareholders are making the perfect the enemy of the good. This motion isn’t perfect, as additional improvements in how pools such as NuLagoon are run can be imagined. It is good, though. It is a simple method that will bring significant savings to shareholders. Let’s pass this, and then think about how to iteratively create additional improvements. We are at risk of accomplishing nothing by trying to accomplish too much at once. Successful projects are built iteratively, not all at once.
An alternative was offered. Henry came to consensus with the other shareholders and proposed a motion. I’m completely unclear about your concerns with that motion, as it seems to attain exactly what was desired without imposing an artificial buy/sell asymmetry.
I have to admit I was not clear about this by reading the original content of the motion. I believe most of the community members also missed this during the discussion.
In one of my response, I mentioned that It won’t work as expected neither to incentive pool participants to provide equal size of NBT/BTC when they initially provide fund.
@JordanLee, will you respond to the following questions?
- Do you agree that It won’t work to incentive pool participants to provide equal size of NBT/BTC when they initially provide fund.
- Why the fee rate should be lowered so sharply, (1/4 of the current rate)
- Why you said the cap will only impact Pool A operations.
Thank you.
The purpose of this motion is to reduce the cost of liquidity both in terms of the cost per dollar of liquidity and total network wide liquidity costs. Henry’s motion doesn’t lower liquidity costs at all. Therefore, I regard his motion as unrelated to this one.
I’m concerned that perhaps there is a lack of understanding among shareholders about the critical importance of reducing liquidity costs. Right now the costs are many times what is sustainable long term. There are many methods known to reduce these costs, the most important of which is B&C Exchange in the medium to short term. The viability of our network depends on the credibility of the claim that liquidity costs can be dramatically lowered from their current levels. It is OK if it takes a number of years to arrive at a cheap and truly sustainable cost, but we must make consistent progress on this. To date, costs have continued to climb.
At approximately $184,000 in tier 1, 2 and 3 liquidity, what we have now is excessive. It is time to cut this.
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I’m not sure I understand this question, because the motion proposes unequal incentives, which is expected to result in much more BTC being in the pool than NBT. This makes sense because off exchange NBT has little value. FSRT and I can always bring plenty of NuBits to tier 1 quickly as needed. Buy side support sitting off exchange does have considerable value as its supply is not nearly so endless.
See my above paragraph. Paying high premiums for off exchange sell side liquidity just doesn’t make sense, because there is plenty of it available for free or nearly free.
I’m going to turn this question back to you. How will this motion impact Pool A, C and D?
2 Likes
I agree on that.