I think you assume too much about my motivations. I am here to build a business and get rich while at the same time helping millions of people around the world. I’m not here to feel needed and I’m not here to make friends. While that would be a nice benefit, it is not required. I understand this is a business first and foremost and things aren’t always going to be pleasant when money is involved. My views and the views of other shareholders will eventually misalign and cause heated debates. That is inevitable.
I also don’t care about the cessation of decentralized liquidity operations. A centralized liquidity operations team that answers to shareholders makes sense to me and I agree with your logic there. It will need to become more decentralized though as we grow larger.
The reason I suggested people return to Peercoin has more to do with the findings of @mhps rather than any positivity you’ll get from that community. I can withstand being defeated through motion about the future of Nu as long as it’s fair and truly the will of the majority of shareholders. If however the initial NuShare distribution really was compromised by Jordan Lee, then Nu’s voting system is worthless and nothing but theater. All confidence in the system is lost, because voting doesn’t matter anymore. Not only does it open up the risk of 51% attack, but if one person can pass any motion or grant by themselves, what is the point of any other shareholder participating?
And please don’t tell me this is a conspiracy theory. You’re really going to tell me that practically every active shareholder on the forum voiced their opposition to your plans, yet somehow some unknown shareholders from outside the forum all started minting and voting and overrided everyone on the forum? That sounds ridiculous. Where have all these shareholders been since Nu started and why have they remained hidden? The invisible shareholders who support you makes more sense now because of the findings from mhps.
This is the third time you brought this view up so maybe you are serious. Anyone who got a grasp of how Nu liquidity worked knew that the compensation to nbt/btc LPs was not sufficient. Exchange risk alone is 4% per month assuming a total loss every two years. The the LPs have to bear opportunity cost and, worse, BTC volatility cost. BTC appreciates 40% and LPs lose ~40% in their principal value. Putting money in nbt/btc liquidity provision for a 7% per mon compensation is a money losing deal in the long run. This hasn’t included the time spent tending the ALP client which crashes once a few days.
Even ignoring exchange risk, most forum posters care about where Nu is going beccause they are shareholders. LP profit is chicken feed compared with their share value. Those LPs who are not shareholders just packup their money and go to somewhere else and won’t spend time arguing.
You don’t know all this because i think you never fight in the front line as a pool namager or an LP. Now it is pay back time.
Where was your guidance before May? There was strong resistance against selling NSR. What did you do? Be thankful not everyone is as smart as you are, or you will be a no-body.
Before the crisis, how many Nushareholders queried the liquidity engine model of Jordan? How many knew how to do business? How many had basic accounting knowledge? Seldom! A voting system is worthless if majority of shareholders are dumb.
“smart majority in a community” better than “a few smart leaders + stupid majority” better than > “stupid majority in a community”
I still believe majority of Nushareholders are not smart enough to be successful businessmen.
And maybe you have a point here. Shareholders are shareholders and not necessarily a board of directors or practical in operations. The Shareholder voting might need to be separated from the business operations voting, however our current voting system doesn’t allow that. So we get a very diverse mix of proposals only few can follow.
I think Shareholders should only vote for or dismiss Board of Directors, performance related items/salaries for that group, dividends, share buybacks and larger investments/developments/business cases.
Operational issues (e.g. gateways, daily operations, website, forum, marketing) and ongoing expenses should be voted for only by board of directors.
More I think about the situation, more determined I become that our current peg failure, share price plummeting and share redistribution happened because of this motion not passing:
it would be great to see what kind of voting was happening for this and competing motions, I remember that JL’s motion had votes with a lot more share days destroyed than competition, yet it couldn’t pass. MoD’s motion passed first, then 4 days later, on 25th of June, JL’s.
it seems that being unable to talk people on the forum into voting for tighter spreads and having no sufficient resources to force this motion by “shareholders” made the peg failure necessary to prove the point and get cheap shares for “shareholders”.
The problem with a white list is that it punishes assertedly evil actors (and accomplices) as well as inactive shareholders.
At least if you make a white list based on votes since phoenix was born that were not voting for phoenix’ motions or grants.
It would be a hard cut, but would likely segregate active and opposing shareholders from the rest of the madness that’s going on here.
The number of shares and the difficulty of the hard fork would be below the (maximum) difficulty of the other fork.
It could be hard to communicate this and be accepted as the “real Nu”.
If you issued a warning and announced a window, in which votes were to be inspected, you’d allow evil actors to adjust and blend in.
It’s only possible to make this segregation with votes that already happened and ideally with the most controversial/“malevolent” motions and grants.
The choice of window and motions/grants will be of great importance.
It won’t be easy to get this hard fork done (not only technically), but it’s one of the few options that seem to have a future with shareholders that care for a reliable business with revenue (visible by voting participation and choice of votes).
…a future that will leave a lot of shareholders behind…
The way I interpreted the idea, a new blockchain (client, name, website, etc) could be birthed in a similar fashion to the way B&C blockchain came into existence. Coins would be ‘air dropped’ to the active shareholders who were trying to fight off the power grab, but ignoring ‘the Phoenix list’ and apathetic shareholders/exchanges. Fork of the code, not the blockchain.
(I assume at least Polo doesn’t mint, which is why I excluded them)
I think it would be very easy to make the case as to why we took this action, even if it is a minority of share ownership.
That would not make the distribution very wide, I fear.
And wide and fair distribution is the major issue with PoS networks.
While it would solve some problems (for those who do the fork and have shares in it), it introduced new problems that need to be taken care of.
Maybe you reduce the shareholders by selecting the active and ‘ignoring phoenix list ones’ effectively to a kind of board of directors.
One of the jobs besides working on a reliable accounting and sound revenue scheme would be share distribution to make the PoS more secure.
This share distribution would have to be transparent and fair.
But how to make a fair and publicly verifiable distribution - if shareholders want to stay anonymous - and fight sybil attacks at the same time?
I have no answer for this and there should be an answer, before you spend efforts on such a hard fork.
Without an answer to it, you could end up in the same situation too early.
So you believe that the distribution was never compromised from the very beginning? Instead, shareholders would not listen and implement the 1% spread motion, so instead it was decided to collapse the system in order to plummet the NuShares market cap so that enough cheap NuShares could be bought in order to go around shareholders and implement the correct motions?
Another way to separate the shares could be to create shares on the new blockchain when NuShares are burned to a specific address on the Nu blockchain.
Could you make only a set of addresses eligible for that burning?
What’s the benefit of ‘air dropping’ shares of the forked blockchain ‘B&C Exchange style’?
I would say that the actual community here with a similar vision would already have a stake in the new DAC and would still be able to “hope for a miracle” with JordanShares.
I think requiring to burn the NSR would hamper the far and wide distribution issue you mentioned. We also do not know for certain that JordanLee used the entirety of his shares to pass his motions.
Perhaps this idea deserves it’s own thread. Then again, look at the OP.
Yes but the idea behind the burn is also to make that blacklist not necessary. You can probably expect that shareholders who like the current Nu will not burn their shares.
