not all humans. I agree that greed is the strongest driving force in crypto publicity but these algorithms only exist because of people with entirely different motivations, so I am not alone.
To see what happens in those very unique game theoretical situations here.
I have BKS, need to communicate with my debtors because BKS holders have 120,000NBT.
I think 100% reserve is too much.
I would be much more comfortable with 50% reserve.
As for the temporary cap on the NuBits money supply, I understand why you d want to set it. Because you want to limit Nuâs liabilities as long as the peg is not restored.
But in any case, the reserve ratio questionâs answer depends on the following question, I believe: Do we really want to still peg via NBT/BTC only?
I think this time we really need to develop ways to peg via NBT/USD too.
Maybe we can start with 50% peg via NBT/BTC 1), 50% peg via NBT/USD 2).
In each case, the necessary ratio of reserve should be different.
2) ratio should be typically much lower than 1) ratio since 2) is not exposed to BTC volatility.
As for the cap, in case we find ways to get revenues (and I think this time we must do so) (ex: NuCost API, some kind of burning mechanism to make NuBits holders pay for the privilege of using NuBits), probably we would not need to set a cap because the NuBits destruction would counterbalance the inflation, though I feel it would be safer to do so at the beginning, in any case.
Could you elaborate it? Why couldnât B&C achieve one million USD trade volume per day??
After your âburnâ motion passed, If I just keep 100NBT in my local wallet and donât park, 1 year later, how many NBT do I have? Only 10NBT??
@Sabreiib, when @creon appeared here on our forum for the first time we had troubles and he developed a solution that works until now and even he did this without any compensation.
@creon will save Nu for the second time.
@Sabreiib, what did you did for Nu?
Edit:typo
I suggested Nu to find a decent revenue from 2014, and I had given out some model to avoid high expenditure, but seldom are interested in it, and after nearly 2years, you return to the original point with tons of debts.
BtW, could you image BTC miners vote to decrease BTC holdersâ balance? This kind of motion cross the red line. Just my two cents.
@creonâs proposal is simple, brilliant and works.
What is your proposal? Please, explain something that works. (Without suggestions to find ⌠and bla, bla, bla.)
My proposal was there in Sep. 2014 :
Have you ever noticed?
I donât see big difference from current model?
And most important, I like automation. I hate to be dependent of peopleâs decisions.
My proposal was â100% reserve, spread pegging and pledge NSR to borrow NBTâ. That was in 2014.
Of course if B&Câs revenue is quite big, 60-80% reserve is also OK.
Thats all relative.
That s certrainly not the kind of wording I will use
Even if @Sabreiib might not be as clear as others I appreciate his participation in the discussion.
I believe Creon is talking about the fact that B&C is much slower than a normal exchange due to the use of a blockchain. That may be true, but itâs really built for people who prefer security of funds over speed of trades.
@Sabreiib also believes there may be a way to make B&C use off-chain instant trading, but I donât completely understand how it works.
Because it is too slow for hedging or even moderate frequency trading, which is where most volume is produced. That plus the cumbersome actions that are required to use it (e.g. buying BKC beforehand on an actual exchange).
Really? You canât do the math? Its 100 * (1 - X)^12 with X being the burn rate. So assuming the burn rate to be 10% per month, then after one year you would have 28.24 USD left if you never parked them. With JLs proposal you will have 10 USD at day one. Its really surprising that you have no issue with denominating 1 NBT to 10 cent (which mean decreasing the balance of all holders by 90%) but see a big problem with asking for a fee for usage time (now 10% per month, ideally around 1% at most).
Spread is not a revenue model because your own customers will compete with you (i.e. if you provide NBT at 3% spread then people will come and offer a lower spread as long as it is profitable).
Borrowing is exactly what a coinage dependent fee realizes. Borrowing without any blockchain relation will require a lot of legal work and risk assessment and your post there clearly didnât give any of those and further doesnât describe any method to actually do it.
me neither and I also donât want to play anyones Commander of Liquidity.
So your plan is to defraud NuBit holders of their value unless some one else comes up with a plan you are unable to characterize except to say that it has to make money? You think this is helpful?
Sheer stupidity. You betray NuBit holders. Some shareholders and even more liquidity providers thought they could betray and destroy NuBit holders and emerge in fine shape. The stupidity of this attitude amazes me. The system was well designed to place NuShare holders and NuBit users in the same boat. If NuBit holders sink to the depths, so will NuShare holders. NuShare holders, you have lost 85% of your equity value as you have abandoned NuBit holders. The only way up is to start supporting your currency while boldly rejecting all who wish to destroy NuBit holders.
Have you had enough of experimenting with destroying NuBit holders, or would you like to continue sending the NuShare price to zero? Can you not see the effort has been disastrous?
JL, nobody gives a shit anymore about anything you say. Better post those fund addresses and pass the coins over to someone responsible.
Also, you should know that officials are already looking for you.
@creon @Phoenix , the negativity in your comments only worsens the situation. I think anonymity should not justify disrespect. I hope you understand that.
The notion that the liquidity engine is not efficient compared to holding reserves is plainly false. Reserves are incredibly costly. One excellent way of explaining the new low NuShare price is that it is an adjustment taking into account the tremendous expenses Nu now faces in the form of building and maintaining a reserve. A liquidity engine, when used, functions at a small fraction of the cost of maintaining reserves. Cost savings is the most compelling reason to use a liquidity engine. It is very efficient. However, it is worth noting that there are decentralized liquidity engines and more centralized ones. Decentralized liquidity engines are not only much more expensive than somewhat centralized ones, but also lack the ability to make competent decisions at this scale (less than 1 million NuBits). It appeared to some observers that our underpaid and highly distracted decentralized liquidity providers (distracted by things like real jobs) could understand and manage the basic operational principles of the liquidity. Chief among these principles are that the peg must be maintained and that NuShares must be sold if the buy wall gets thin at all. Apparently notions like these were too much for our amateur liquidity providers. So, we need expert management of liquidity operations. This is all very awkward because most active forum participants are these amateur liquidity providers. So the community doesnât like to hear that our decentralized liquidity operations demonstrated profound incompetence, but yet those are facts and we must face them in order to provide an appropriate remedy. If donât define the problem accurately, the solution prescribed will be inappropriate.
I donât see a consensus emerging that the liquidity engine is inefficient. This seems improbable considering the clear facts that it is much more efficient than holding reserves.
To raise a100% reserved peg, the reserve has to increase at the same rate.
Plainly false? Not with this evidence. The low NSR price is because itâs difficult to build a reserve, because that means earning Actual Moneyâ˘. Maintaining a reserve is a completely different task.
Youâre saying this is the same:
Not quite the same. 