Right, thank you for clarifying. I think that fact makes it even more important that team members are identified. There aren’t many people the network should trust with a 40,000 NBT blank check.
It’s actually a 4-million-dollar check. The fee is mixed in with the funds, and the trustworthiness of the recipient(s) enforces the separation.
This could happen.
But here’s another scenario:
the peg is in danger to get lost because of a demand for NBT that is so high that it can’t be supplied by the funds that were granted.
The reason for the demand is not subject to this scenario but for easier understanding one might assume that a crashing BTC price (due to some real reason other than pump&dump activities) caused this demand.
People might prefer losing some percent (compared to losing even more holding BTC or trading BTC for another volatile coin) when buying NBT for over $1. They might prefer biting the bullet and buy NBT for $1.05, $1.15, $1.30 or even more. Trading the BTC for USD would in some cases be an alternative, but not if the traders want to cash out or move the money to other exchanges easily and quickly. For the latter reason NBT is perfect, although it is not yet widely adopted by exchanges.
In that scenario the price of 1 NBT could easily rise (far) above the peg once the demand for NBT was way higher than the supply that is still mainly provided by the custodians, because the total supply of NBT outside the hands of custodians is even more limited than the supply provided by custodians. And this might stay true for some time.
That’s the reason I feel comfortable for having this proposal. I’d prefer to call it insurance (rather than a (blank) check) that can buffer the next 4 million NBT hoping that this buys enough time to get a custodian vote through.
I don’t feel comfortable with signing any blank checks. But this is no blank check. The grant is to be created for a reason. If I did assume that the grant would be embezzled, I couldn’t solicit voting for this proposal. But I couldn’t solicit voting for any other custodian proposal, either.
If you give someone control you need to trust this person up to a certain degree.
I can only speak for myself, but I trust @JordanLee and his judgement and I feel the need for this kind of insurance named strategic reserve.
I mean, if someone would want to make a scam there would be easier ways that allow ripping off more money with less effort in a shorter time. I might be wrong, but my common sense tells me that everything is fine.
My intention is not to oppress a controversial discussion of this matter by implicitly saying people who voice their concerns don’t trust @JordanLee!
I think it is very important to discuss these things openly and to hear different opinions.
I just wanted to voice my opinion 
Just to clarify my thoughts, I do trust Jordan to a great extent. It is more difficult to trust the people who he/she trusts. I would appreciate to have at least anonymous aliases in the forum as we did with the custodial grants. Also having an understanding of the number of people involved in the multisig grant would provide me with more confidence.
I appreciate that given the nature of this fund it is hard to do this trustless (as in driven by rules in protocol) and swift responding on relevant events.
We might need to start thinking about protocols to do this though as I don’t think it is sustainable when more less informed shareholders join us.
For now, as I think there is a need to establish this emergency fund and there are no better options at this stage, I will vote in favour of this anyway.
I think we need to clarify the performance of the peg we promise.
The daily trading volume is $45M for bitcoin and $6M for litecoin now. If 10% of them want to get into Nubits as a safe harbor in a medium market crash, the NBT4M reserve will be consumed in less than a day. In a major crash such as the one last February, daily volume was about $100M, $4M were traded in a matter of minutes in BTCUSD. It could have been BTCNBT if Nubits were there. We would need enough reserve to avoid a scenario of price breaks the peg upward -> perception that there won’t be enough NBT -> panic buy -> price going parabolic -> over bought -> correction -> sell off -> possible price breaks the peg downward … How much reserve is enough? I see to clear figure. This leads me to think that promising absolute peg is bound to cost us in credibility. We have to consider that NBT price on third party exchanges (e.g. allcoins and poloniex) do break the peg often as there is no bots. So the price IS floating anyway.
So I think we should first set a realistic expectation of pegging performance, and improve it as NBT reserve increases. For example we can set expectation (basically a public disclaimer) that with bots the peg is on all the time when the LPC reserve (basically what KTm and Jamie have now) is available, the peg can be lost for no more than XXmin when the Strategic Reserve is available, the peg can be lost for no more than Y days to replenish the Strategic Reserve as shareholders vote.
Under that framework, we can take time to adjust the number of tiers and fund of reserves. I think we should have at least two tiers of Strategic Reserve, one is able to act within 1 hour, controlled by 4 persons, controling $2-4 M, and another tier of $20 M, able to act within 8 hours, controlled by 8-10 persons. When we gain more confidence in the setup, we can adjust the numbers.
There should be some action plan/procedures and transparency for these reserve. The proceeds for selling reserved NBT should mostly remain within the control of the reserve so that when the market swings to the sell side, the reserve has the ammo.
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Warning: essay incoming. Although I think it might be worth reading it, here’s something:
[tl;dr]
The strategic reserve creates a risk for losing a large amount of NBT.
Not having the strategic reserve creates the risk for losing all (by losing the peg).
[/tl;dr]
I think this is a good suggestion to expand the flexibility for NuShares holders to react to different circumstances in appropriate ways:
And there will be lots more to do. Currently the discussion about custodians, park rates and motions is held in this forum here. I don’t want to imagine what happens if this forum gets ddosed in a time when action would be necessary. Even cloudfront protection can be broken.
Park rates can be adjusted individually without agreeing on a certain amount - the protocol evens the different “opinions” out.
But how to vote for a custodian if you don’t know the address?
How to vote for a motion if you don’t know the hash?
That is rather something for a separate topic, although it’s related to my pleading for having this kind of strategic reserve because the strategic reserve will be here for protecting what will on a large scale determine the base for success of NuBits: a stable peg.
I suggest taking the risk of granting a large amount of NBT to people that can be trusted (just because of their position and their role) if it creates the chance to react quickly in case of total mayhem. This will not provide ultimate protection, but additional layers of protection.
I think that the people that will be trusted with the grant might be from the ones who have much at stake, because I need to assume that they are holders of large amounts of NuShares. This is another reason for me to believe that - like @JordanLee said - their interests are aligned with the interests of shareholders; they are shareholders themselves!
Thank you @mhps for doing some math about the trading volume. This underlines what was so far only my gut instinct.
And I like your idea of having a two tier (or maybe even three tier) model to protect the peg very much. The increasing number of people that is needed to access higher tier levels of strategic reserve is a good idea, because it transports a kind of more complex consensus system to the control over the grant.
As much as I’d like to have control directly in the hands of the shareholders I understand the need to operate with delegates in special cases.
I understand your idea of giving a kind of service level agreement for the peg. But I think it will be hard to give reliable information about the time the peg can be kept if we don’t know by whom, when and why the peg might be in danger.
So we can try to make a more specific guess but in the end it sums up to:
Nu will push the envelope to keep the peg of NBT - even if it requires drastic action such as creating a strategic reserve (or whatever is to come).
Time is on our side. The longer NBT is successfully on the market and gains adoption the more NBT will be in circulation and the less important this strategic reserve will be for maintaining the peg in special situations.
But we need to pave the ground for NBT to get there. A multi tier strategic reserve is a great instrument to achieve that!
As far as I understand the grant can be devoted to other things my motion vote. So there’s not much to lose compared to a standard custodial grant, but there’s a lot to win: an insurance for the peg.
As the NuShares holders are in charge for keeping the peg I think it’s right to let them take the risk that is associated with the large amount of NBT that is put into the strategic reserve.
And I think the risk for creating the strategic reserve is on an acceptable level (considering the trust level and the motivation of the people that will have the keys for the multisig address) compared to the risk if not having something like the strategic reserve.
Although it repeats the tl;dr section I want to sum it all up to:
The strategic reserve creates a risk for losing a large amount of NBT.
Not having the strategic reserve creates the risk for losing all (by losing the peg).
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It’s fallacious to equate volume with demand. For example, if I buy a BTC for $240, sell it for $260, buy it again for $255, then sell for $245, all in 24 hours, I created $1000 of volume with my money, even though it’s impossible to buy $1000 of NBT with that money.
You can’t lose all by losing the peg to the upside. “Oh, no, my NBT are worth too much! I guess I’ll… sell them? I guess I won’t buy more?” And the problem fixes itself, because the buy walls at $1 remain. You can lose some reputation and volume in this way, but the system returns to $1 eventually, not to $0 as could happen in the case of losing the peg to the downside. Custodial buy walls are strongest when the peg breaks out upwards, so that’s the moment when the risk to “lose all” is least.
This could even bring more publicity to NuBits, if spun the right way. Imagine the headlines: “NuBits fails by being too successful!” 
Again, I’d be interested in custodial data on this. Has anyone been collecting getliquidityinfo over time, so we can see a graph of custodial liquidity and what size of relative shock would be needed deplete our reserves?
Also, as several people have mentioned, would Jordan be willing to make public the total number of multi-sig key holders?
I agree that losing the peg in the other direction, being unable to sell (from customer perspective) a NBT for $1 but for less would be much worse.
But I tend to disagree with your conclusion that you can’t lose all by losing the peg.
NuBits claims to provide a stable peg to the USD of 1:1.
It might not play much of a role why the peg was lost and that it was lost into an unproblematic direction (being above 1 USD per NBT).
It might be recognized as NuBits failed to keep the peg by those who don’t spend much time trying to understand what went wrong and why it wasn’t that bad at all.
Plus it will be displayed by competitors that NuBits failed to keep the peg.
It might be fallacious to equate volume with demand. But it’s fallacious to assume that there can’t be that much demand as well. Not long ago 30,000 BTC were sold. Imagine they had been sold for NBT instead of USD…
Not keeping the peg may cost enough reputation to ruin the whole experiment; this is my conclusion.
That is true in general. Are there data to show demand change after major bitcoin crash?
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This custodial grant proposal has passed.
Isn’t 40,000 nbts a lot of money for just transferring some liquidity?
I can’t find the address BhCnQrYrA5LZm871dtMQEXeU93gmqbhdrC in the proposal using any of the two explorers. Is this because the address is multisig ?
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Time is not free. Liquidity providing isn’t necessarily a one-time thing. If the shareholders didn’t agree with the requested fee, they should not have voted for the proposal.
Thanks. Was it because of the glitch ealier today that I couldn’t find the address, or something was fixed?
I didn’t make any changes to the explorer, so I’ll go with “glitch” 
oddly this also says unseen address https://svr1.nubitsexplorer.nu/address/BhCnQrYrA5LZm871dtMQEXeU93gmqbhdrC
That explorer may not be configured to handle multi-sig addresses, yet. @Cybnate would have a better idea of the status. I know it’s pretty bare bones (no NSR tracking, etc.)
It is barebones indeed but should see all NuBits transactions. Have raised an issue with Matthew about that. I suspect NuNet is using some special trick to handle multi-sig addresses.
I am not advocating ignoring the cast votes of course