[Passed] Motion to establish Reputed Signers Operations Team (RSOT)

Good, agree with lump sum proposal. Still can be split in e.g. 50% upfront and 50% on successful delivery.
Similar to the NuDroid contract.

Anything appears to be better than handing over the dev funds to @Phoenix who doesn’t seem trustworthy considering the shady renaming from @JordanLee to @Phoenix.
Even trusting @Sabreiib with the funds would create less uneasy feelings.
Moving the funds to RSOT multisig should clearly be the preferred way to go for shareholders.

Make sure to make the multisig 4 of 6 to require a majority of members to move the funds - just in case there are controversial decisions, consensus on RSOT level is required.

Btw. the dev funds are held in NBT, right?
Does NBT support multisig with 6 signers? I think I remember that FLOT had 5 signers. Was that due to organizational or technical reasons?


After careful consideration, I think such a multisig wallet is reasonable.

We would not have the same problem of “action slowness” that FLOT underwent for liquidity operations.
If it is not efficient enough, we can always adopt @Phoenix s proposal.

I’m baffled that this hasn’t past, can any shareholders that oppose this motion clarify why they haven’t voted or what they would like to see changed? After all that has happened it seems paramount to me that we get the developer fund under shareholder control as soon as possible.

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I am opposed to the formation of RSOT. The main reason is that I don’t believe the community has enough qualified signers right now. I would like to see a 3 of 6 group, but 2 of 4 might work. However, I can’t name 4 signers I have enough confidence in who have also indicated a reasonable commitment to being a signer.

The failure of FLOT to move funds to keep liquidity operations running in June was a 2 million USD failure. With this kind of unaffordable waste and devastation in our very recent past, we need to be wary of a similar failure. I don’t think we have addressed the problems that occurred with FLOT in a manner that gives confidence in a new multisig group.

I am satisfied with the selection of reputed signers, however. Because all the signing they will do is automated, the risk of poor judgement or insubordination to shareholders is low when compared to manual signing groups like FLOT and RSOT.

In the case of FLOT, we found that signers simply weren’t informed enough about liquidity operations to function in their role. My guess is that signers that would be chosen for RSOT would be much less informed than me about issues that need to be understood to competently allocate and spend funds.

On a related topic, our problem with FLOT wasn’t that they spent funds on items they shouldn’t have. Rather, there was a consistent pattern of inaction when funds very much needed to be transferred. The problem of not moving funds when they should be appears much more likely than inappropriate transfer of funds. Accordingly, instead of 2 of 3, 3 of 5 or 5 of 8, I would like to see 2 of 4, 3 of 6 and 4 of 8. This also applies to reputed signer configurations.

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One globally distributed group of 5 of 8 signers take 6-18 hours to sign if there is complete consensus, simply because people wake up and able to sign at different hours. For a globally distributed 3 of 5 signers it’s 4-18 hours.

FLOT was formed to have one week signing requirement, as told by the architect after repeated questioning from me. FLOT members promised 24 - 48 hr reaction time and they mostly kept it.

Reaction time is not signing time. If there is no easy consensus among the members the time to sign is unknown. You can shorten signing-time-with-consensus by adding more groups. Reducing the number of members but only keep one group as

will not solve the problem. There is little you can do to shorten signing time if there is no majority consensus.

So don’t blame the FLOT and don’t repeat @JordanLee’s mistake.


I think FLOT performed beyond what was promised and to be expected. I know you see FLOT or specific actions FLOT took as being responsible for losing the peg but I strongly disagree with that notion. The peg was lost because our reserves were to small and couldn’t handle the large selling pressure that we experienced in a matter of days. Why were the reserves to small? Because we spent 555 bitcoins on an inefficient buyback program initiated by Jordanlee. You try to scapegoat the small increase in buy offset that was only done when our reserves were already next to empty (roughly 20k USD left if I recall correctly) as the reason the peg failed while it most definitely wasn’t.

Now I know we won’t agree on the exact reason and it’s been debated to many times already. Regardless of your interpretation of the perceived “failing” of FLOT I don’t see how this is relevant to a multisig team that would hold developer funds. For as far as I can tell it’s mainly about holding the funds in the hands of multiple shareholders instead of a single entity that can vanish overnight (as we have experienced). No funds held by FLOT were ever intentionally misused, stolen or lost and multiple members of that team are still around so I have trouble understanding your claim that the community doesn’t have enough “qualified signers” at the moment.


This position is untenable. We had about 40,000 USD in BTC plus 120 million NSR, valued at around 330,000 USD just before the peg was abandoned. That is 370,000 USD in assets at the time the peg was abandoned to support a money supply worth less than 700,000 USD. Besides the fact that these funds were almost certainly ample, more NSR could have been had within 2 weeks.

I understand many believe there wasn’t any liquidity in NuShares, so the 330,000 USD valuation of the NuShares was illusory in their view. It is true that liquidity would have been an issue for that large sum of NuShares, but not to anywhere near the degree some on this forum believe. There is a lot of empirical evidence on the question of NuShare liquidity, however. Let’s review it just a bit.

In 2015, there was an extensive NuShare sale program. There was ample liquidity. The program barely dented the NuShare price. We were keeping the peg, committed to keeping it, and there was confidence in our commitment to those things. So it worked.

In May, there were a lot of suicidal tendencies (self-defeating tendencies) and extremely anti-social inclinations being expressed by a lot of forum participants, which had been duly noted and condemned by Jordan Lee in advance of the senseless and anti-social default. As soon as the large sale occurred on May 27, these self-defeating and anti-social proponents captured the collective mentality of the herd against the loud objections of Jordan Lee, who maintained that there was only a need to execute carefully crafted plans endorsed by shareholders. The only thing dire about the situation was the anti-social and self-defeating behavior of gateway operators and FLOT members. There were no significant economic problems present in the network in the few hours between when the large US-NBT sales were made on May 27th and gateways operators decided to abandon the peg, without using any of our very considerable reserves and without selling so much as a single NuShare to support our currency.

Decision makers didn’t seem to understand the importance of confidence in the whole affair. They were saying things like the whole peg thing is over and in the past and NuBits would never be supported in the future. Nothing could be worse for the value of NuShares. It was this chorus of voices that destroyed the value of both NuBits and NuShares. Who wants to buy NuShares in such a scenario? I wouldn’t buy them in that context. Only a fool would.

Now let us imagine that FLOT and gateway operators had maintained fidelity to NuBits and had stated with unity and conviction they would defend the peg at any cost immediately. They immediately bring a large number of NuShares to market. The price of NuShares drop 20% immediately due to the rapid sales. However, BTC is quickly flowing into the network from the NSR sales. It is clear the sale on NuShares won’t last long, because soon the needed liquidity will be obtained and the expansion in NuBit use will continue afterward. In that context, NuShares are quite valuable. But FLOT and gateway operators didn’t maintain and create this positive, win-win environment. They chose the dystopian and anti-social world of unnecessary credit defaults. So we had something like an 80% deflation in the micro economy that spans Nu and B&C due to the defaults. Everyone lost instead of everyone winning. Everyone got angry and mad over their losses, became suspicious and stopped cooperating. FLOT and the gateway destroyed the community by initiating the credit defaults. That is very sad because there was no financial reason for the defaults. There were ample funds available at all times.

When I became Chief of Liquidity Operations, I changed the unauthorized policy of FLOT and the gateway operators and began to declare what we should have been saying all along: the support of NuBits is our highest priority. We will even perform a massive dilution of NuShares if we have to to support NuBits. What happened was we saw a resurgence of demand for NuShares and liquidity in that market. I have been able to bring the NuBit money supply down from about 700,000 to around 350,000 in just 60 days. Imagine what we could have done if we had never initiated the default. We could have sold NuShares for 300 or 400 satoshis instead of an average of around 60 or 70 satoshis. That implies we probably had funding to purchase well over 1 million NuBits in 60 days. That is more NuBits than there are circulation. My guess is we probably could have obtained 200,000 USD in the first week after May 27th if we had maintained our plans and stayed with our commitments. That is way more than would have been needed. The sale on May 27th should have been a one week event that involved a modest dilution of NuShares, zero peg loss, followed by a return to normalcy. Unfortunately, that path was not chosen. I don’t think it was malice. I think it was ignorance. It is an ignorance we can’t afford to indulge. That is why I am needed to handle funds.

If I had been at the helm of liquidity operations for all of 2016, I suspect we would have seen NuBit adoption grow steadily. I would give a 1% chance there would have been a peg break for even one day. The market cap of NuShares would likely be far above 2 million. I am worth a great deal to the network. That is why it should pay me a very large bonus after I demonstrate a little more success.

The difference in the success I have had versus the massive failure of FLOT is a very strong argument for me controlling funds. We just don’t have reason to be confident in the decisions of multisig groups due to the incredibly expensive ignorance signers have demonstrated. Using multisig groups isn’t worth the risk of destroying more value at this point.

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In 2015 when that NuShare sale program happened there was ample BTC funds in Nu’s pockets, right?
Sure you could sell NSR without having a big effect on the NSR price back then.

Lately the peg failed because Nu was recognized as bankrupt.
NSR rate plummeted, because Nu was recognized as bankrupt.
It was no peg failure that caused a drop in NSR rate. It was Nu appearing almost worthless that caused it. Who’d want to buy shares of a corporation with no assets, no cash, lots of liabilities and no revenue?

Stop trying to turn cause and effect upside down.
Nobody buys your story.

Nu can only turn the tide with revenue.
Start working on real revenue, if you want to do something for Nu.
Stop that eloquent ponzi scheme. Now!

This is nonsense. Not only are the revenue prospects for the network truly exceptional when compared to most other businesses (as they have always been), but we turned the tide a long time ago. NuBits are up more than 300% and have been way up for a long time.

I took a system badly broken from misuse that was only designed to maintain a peg. But I haven’t maintained the value of the currency. I have dramatically increased it, which is much more difficult to do. I did so with zero reserves, nothing from tiers 1 through 5, and with tier 6 at only 15% capacity after the unauthorized default. Everything that has happened indicates the power and viability of a liquidity engine. It stands undefeated and has never failed. Except when it was shut off and some poorly articulated, unauthorized strategy no one can characterize was used. We might call the strategy “hoard the reserve”, Hoard the Reservism. Whatever you want to call it, it was an extremely stupid approach.

Imagine we were selling a new line of experimental drone aircraft. We have put a great deal of effort into ensuring reliable flight of the drones. The drones do have an emergency shut off. After many successful test flights over the course of 20 months, there is a crash of one of the aircraft. The operator had activated the emergency shut off while the aircraft was in flight, in clear violation of flight protocol. This operator doesn’t want to take responsibility for their stupid mistake, so they are looking to blame the product: “This drone model is a failure. The control software only warned me three times that a crash would occur if I activated the emergency shut off. I turned off the engine mid-flight because I was worried there wasn’t enough fuel to land.” A review of the facts shows there was ample fuel to land. The problem is clearly user error, and a very stupid one at that. The defective operator continues to demand the drone model be scrapped and redesigned for its terribly unreliable performance. Others clearly see the drones are fine and that the operator was defective. Except in the case of Nu, we don’t have one operator at fault. We have many operators at fault, which constitute a majority of the active community. They all have the same interest: deflecting blame. That is why there are so many voices saying incorrect things: they all have the same perverse incentive, which is to hide their own role in the failure. In our metaphor, shareholders of the drone company need to make the right decision to blame the operator. If they fail to do so and allow the drone operator to blame engineering, the drone model will be a failure. Company shareholders, therefore, must blame the operator and gain consensus on the point. Otherwise their reliable drone model will be a needless failure. Nu’s situation is similar. There are quite a few defective operators trying to deflect blame from themselves. If we allow their story to become the accepted version, the project fails. That is why I have been so careful to eloquently explain the true nature of the failure.

@ConfusedObserver it is quite clear you have a strong motive to see the project fail. As such, you are most unwelcome here as far as I am concerned. What have you ever done to help develop our project? Nothing. You are a pesky distraction spouting nonsense. Why do you do it? I am going to speculate that if the network succeeds going forward, then it will be clear the ignorant and unauthorized actions of FLOT and gateway operators were the cause of the default in June. It seems your priority is deflecting blame from FLOT and gateway operators. That interest is at odds with the interests of shareholders and NuBit holders, which is why you don’t belong here.

So please, kindly make a change and become constructive or remain silent.

You misunderstand me and are too ignorant to listen to advice.
For the record: I’d like to see Nu succeed.

I offer you a deal: you introduce real revenue (I’m not speaking about selling currency units or NSR), create a sustainable business scheme and I remain silent.

That isn’t how our network operates. You want something done? Our open and inviting architecture gives you, yes you personally, full opportunity to propose your own revenue scheme and attempt to get support for it from shareholders. I haven’t seen anything like that from you.

Your demands are not my priority. You get to decide if your own demands are enough of a priority to you to make an effort to see them addressed. Any organization can always use more revenue. No doubt the goal is a good one. The question is whether you, yes you, want to make the goal a priority in your life. It isn’t a priority in mine.

In one word disappointing. Organizations with shareholders should strife to make profits. During the startup phase high investments may offset those profits but eventually profits will need to be made. I have proposed a model which that can be done with. No doubt there are other ways. Unfortunately you don’t support that and fail to show any other path towards a profitable model not now or in the future.

Just selling more a more shares against lower prices is not a sustainable and valid profit model. Unless you are able to establish the peg and burn the over 500.000.000 shares you created in the last 3 months, I would call your system successful. Until then it is just extracting less and less value and diluting shareholders until even the biggest risk taker doesn’t see any chance of winning any more.

I believe there is a value in a pegged product. However you failed to present a valid cost-benefit model which doesn’t involve creating more shares while keeping the peg in the long term. Anyone with some business acumen can see that there is a cost of holding a peg. If that is not offset with a charge to those who benefit from the peg the model will be unsustainable and always fail sooner or later.

It is a pity that you refuse to see this as I really wanted to have this succeeded. Worse is that you also take down a potentially viable and profitable B&C with your actions.

I still hope against any rationale that you listen to all those voices including Dhumes and mine that you will have to change your quest and that you are really on a dead end road with your actions and that these will eventually have serious financial consequences for yourself and others.

Please think again…


One simple conclusion is that revenue strengthens the confidence of pegging, I guess both sides admit it, right?

  1. Finish B&C, then we pass a motion to arrange a protion of B&C revenue to Nu.
  2. Clone lightning network when Bitcoin’s version released, and provide online micro payment service of NBT.

Future will be bright if we accomplish these above.


That is a key point for B&C situation.

Can you address the key point above? We are not talking about letting RSOT taking over daily liquidity ops here.

Which decision maker said that?[quote=“Phoenix, post:41, topic:4362”]
I have been able to bring the NuBit money supply down from about 700,000 to around 350,000 in just 60 days.

No. Most of the apparent reduction is due to that you removed B&C dev fund in JordanLee’s hand and NuLagoon’s fund in the figure. I do give you and @jooize credit for removing ~170k NBT.

So where were you between January 2016, when increased spread was tried, and mid May, when reserve was going fast, increased spread looked working, and shareholders pressure against selling NSR was high?


I want nothing done. I have no reason for that. I just try to support, because I find this project interesting.
I proposed a revenue scheme. You chose to ignore it.
If you haven’t seen anything from me regarding revenue, you are not only stubborn, but blind as well.

This is what I proposed more than once:

And guess what?

But you can very well go on with your revenue free ponzi scheme.
Just don’t say you hadn’t got some advice.


There is still a high risk of funds being used sub-optimally, just as FLOT funds are currently being mishandled. The recent proposal supported by some signers that would use FLOT funds in an unfair manner is good reason to be wary of managing B&C funds with multisig. I have demonstrated a superior reverence for proper, fair and compliant actions. I also understand much more about the details of how funds should be spent than members of a multisig group would. I can provide more informed and responsible decisions than a multisig group at this time.

The 350,000 figure does include NuLagoon NuBits. I would still like to know from @henry how many US-NBT NuLagoon currently holds, but I am going to give a quick estimate of 70,000. It can be gleaned from nulagoon.com if someone wants to take the time. I’m not sure why you don’t want to give us credit for buying back B&C NuBits, but even without those it looks like liquidity operations has still removed about 230,000 other US-NBT from circulation in the last 60 days.

I stand by my claim that liquidity operations has removed fully half of all US-NBT in circulation in the 60 days I have been Chief of Liquidity Operations. That is an impressive reduction. Imagine what we could have done without the default. We wouldn’t have needed to remove anywhere near half the US-NBT money supply. My guess is we would have kept growing demand for US-NBT and brought the money supply to an all time high.

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If you have ideas for additional profits, I would like to see you move forward with those. Of course I would support any reasonable plan to increase profits. What I remember about your proposal was that it burns US-NBT that customers paid money for, without their consent. I was opposed to that.

The question is whether you and other community members are going to take any action to make this happen rather than doing so much to prevent it from occurring, as has often been the case. What are you doing to help?[quote=“Cybnate, post:46, topic:4362”]
you failed to present a valid cost-benefit model which doesn’t involve creating more shares while keeping the peg in the long term. Anyone with some business acumen can see that there is a cost of holding a peg. If that is not offset with a charge to those who benefit from the peg the model will be unsustainable and always fail sooner or later.

Two points. First of all, the number of NuShares will certainly go down if there is even modest growth in demand for NuBits.

Second, many posters here seem to be in denial about the well demonstrated and proven capacity blockchain networks have to continuously dilute their coins or shares while enjoying robust price growth. More than 100 networks have demonstrated this in recent years. Bitcoin keeps creating Bitcoins from nothing to pay for network expenses, yet Bitcoins are very valuable and Bitcoin is not bankrupt. The same is true for nearly every other coin (there are only a few exceptions, such NXT). Why do people think our network works any differently? Of course we can create NuShares to pay for network expenses, and we can do so forever. If you apply @Cybnate’s argument to Bitcoin, you can see it is incorrect.

However, with proper management (which I am doing a lot to provide), I believe the likelihood is that we will see a huge reduction in the NuShare supply over time. That is my goal and expectation.


Nearly 16million BTC now, and the next 50 years there will be only 33% extra BTC to be created. Our PoS minting is similar. Obviously the crypto supply inflation(PoW or PoS minting) can support network security. We all agree with this.

However, the decentralized liquidity providing in last two years we spend extremly high on it which is more than 100% annually. Did we pay more than 10% per month to LPC?

This means our crypto(NSR) has much more supply inflation rate than most FIAT if we only reply on selling NSR without any other revenue. Would people like to hold this kind of “share”?

In real world, the debt-equity swap is usually played by the companies on the verge of bankrupt. Who raised the stupid NSR-NBT shift idea in 2014? @Benjamin ? I hate him if this shit idea provided by him. Hope @Benjamin never come back here. @Benjamin poisoned Nu.

Here is the very improtant thread where @Benjamin and @JordanLee, and other VIP in our community discussed about reserve ratio, negtive interest rate etc.

Very interesting reading after 18 months later.

F A Hayek told us that the success of private currency relies on the willingness of people holding it while Benjamin argured for negtive interest which is a much more obvious robbery than FIAT’s inflation. And he likes zero reserve ratio, so why not come back @Benjamin? Do you feel shamed? What’s your solution for today’s situation? Because we didn’t follow your suggestion to maintain the NSR/NBT cap ratio at saft level? Did you know NSR collapsed after NBT pegging broken? You are building on quick sand.

I respect @Phoenix for his effort after crisis but I disdain @Benjamin because he left some shit idea and disappeared.

I still hold my opinion in Dec 2014. Revenue can reinforce the pegging confidence.

I strongly disagree 0% reserve, and 100% reserve will defintely benifit NBT pegging.

NBT pegging depends on NSR, that’s ok, but don’t forget NSR price also depends on NBT successful pegging. That’s arguement in a circle…

If NBT pegging in danger, the NSR price will probably plumb. Money, is essential credit, the confidence people have in their mind that sth. can be used to store value, exchange goods.

If reserve ratio is low, people don’t trust NSR at all, NSR=shit in a insolvency situation.