We have been paying LPs 80% p.a. to put their funds in the walls in the last year. I don’t see park rate, which Nu pays for someone to put funds out of circulation, reaching 100% for a while a sign of disaster. It is rather unsustainable, however.
How come there are many POS coins with less features than Nu – no voting, no duality, no parking, no pool infrastructure, no FLOT – have non-zero value? Shouldn’t PPC have died a long time ago? It’s traded at ~$0.5. Or let’s ask this question, if a coin acquires the above functions and form a supporter’s community, can it not rise to $1 ?
I would also be comfortable with a declaration about the conditions under which we give up protecting the peg. If this hypothetical situation exists as a potential future, as the white paper so clearly spells out, then what is the condition for it? What does it look like? If we don’t know the answer to that question, how can we avoid it?
If the reaction to the ultimate emergency situation is ‘every man for himself’ then we are already there. A PoS blockchain requires continuous human consensus and validation to exist, and as long as it exists it has value. This motion leverages that value on a periodic basis in time; existence through time is precisely what gives the blockchain its initial worth at a fundamental level. It then attempts to define a particular scenario in which Nu will seek to maximize the effects of that leveraging.
I don’t necessarily agree that shareholders will blow up park rates to infinity in any scenario. I don’t disagree with the triple digit numbers, but I’m unconvinced it will go much beyond that without drastic action being taken.
I’d be comfortable removing specificity from the motion in favor of more general text, however I would like there to be a declaration in our covenant about when Nu will give up on share dilutions as a means to protect the peg. And when we mention that, we need to assure our Bit users by telling them what happens. If we decide to simply drop the peg without devaluation, so be it, but let’s say that. Attempting to have these kinds of discussions in extreme circumstances just begs for manipulation and political corruption.
In my opinion, now we’ve talked about it at the very least. I also disagree that a well thought out monetary policy would harm the value of NuShares in the long run.
Unsustainable, in other words the road to disaster…
The rates for LPs also have benefits for Nu, so I’m ok to pay premium for that. e.g. advertising volumes and people getting interested as response to that. Not so for parkrates, will try to pay the absolute minimum and hoping for a bargain with a lot of keen people parking
I want to add a clause that says FLOT will be provided with 50,000 NBT to be replenished each quarter, but I’m still thinking about what exactly I’m trying to say there.
Just as much as you need NSR to support the peg on one side, you need NBT to protect the peg on the other side.
The main reason why FLOT controls reserves in the first place is that FLOT is more agile than voting on grants is.
Replenishing FLOT NSR reserve is already part of the draft:
Doing so with FLOT NBT reserve can be derived from that thinking.
FSRT singlesig:
Balance of BFTnCyMX1nsTNp6X7Bcm1qVocvShdbwtMi is 151500 NBT
JordanLee singlesig:
Balance of B5Zi5XJ1sgS6mWGu7bWJqGVnuXwiMXi7qj is 150000 NBT
JordanLee singlesig from liquidity ops
Balance of BT9AWq9r1i6kghZc6LtrvNb2wRFh7JLCdP is 31553.044 NBT
But as these are singlesig, the amount of NBT on these addresses should be reduced rather sooner than later, leaving NBT funds more or less only to FLOT.
Right but currently the plan is shareholders just keep printing nbt with no regard. So if i stick a limit there it naturally begs the question: what happens if FLOT runs out of nbt and shareholders refuse to go beyond their obligatory grant? For nsr the answer is network spread. What is the answer for nbt?
I don’t think there’s anything anyone can do to keep the price down if shareholders refuse to print nbt and total demand exceeds total supply. We could do something like beg BCE to sell their nbt i suppose. Try to reduce demand by liquidating central bit owners.
I don’t understand that.
If NSR reserves are depleted and park rates don’t suffice, the USNBT price will fall below $1.
If NBT reserves are depleted and no other means to reduce NBT demand is available (I know of no other) the USNBT price will rise above $1.
So spread is the answer for both - albeit in different directions.
I don’t know a good reason for doing that. But a grant might be too slow if USNBT demand surges unexpectedly.
You can mitigate that risk by increasing the number from 50,000 USNBT to, say 250,000 USNBT.
The only problem with those USNBT is that they could get lost or abused. They are not prone to volatility risks.
At the moment over 500,000 NBT are on multisig or singlesig addresses and can be used to support the peg.
No it’s not. Spread is a means of getting mor bang for our dwindling buck. If NBT runs out, how can we sell nbt at a higher price? We don’t have anymore! The difference is that when the nsr reserve runs out we still have other buy side liquidity to leverage.
We should split it into two funds. One is operational and the other is for the peg. For example, if we run out of nbt for the peg we still need nbt to pay NuLagoon on contract.
If there are no reserves left to support the buy side (wouldn’t other reserves be depleted before excessive NSR sale starts?), NBT price moves down.
If there are no reserves left to support the sell side, NBT price moves up.
Before the reserves are dry, you can increase the NBT sale price (USNBT > $1) to support a weak sell side or increase the BTC sale price (USNBT < $1) to support a weak buy side.
In both cases Nu can only sit and watch once all reserves are empty - or grant NBT or NSR to support the drained side.
Separating funds into peg support and contract payment would be great; either by forming another group in addition to FLOT or by splitting FLOT funds to different addresses for different purposes (to make accounting easier or possible at all).
No, that’s the entire purpose of the standard and core motion. If we run out of btc the peg is lost. We start leveraging nsr before we run out of btc. When we run out of nsr we start leveraging nbt price to avoid running out of btc. Never run out of btc, it is our core.
Making declarations like this is a recipe for disaster. Nbt supply can be recreated and sold at the drop of a hat. This problem is fundamentally different from nsr dilutions.
Only in the event of buy side running out should we institute additional network volatility. It is not a solution to the inverse event.
That’s not true, that’s the whole point of this discussion. Ive already mentioned two ways to combat, network spread and asking our sister company for help.
Having an additional fund for operations gives us another avenue to leverage with special rules and conditions, like network spread.
Yes it does. That’s extra liability. Without a clear indication of where it is going and why and when it is unlikely to be transparently accounted for. This is about who has the keys to the kingdom: FLOT or shareholders.
Maybe I’m just not sensitive enough for those matters after having experienced FSRT with 4 million NBT under direct control and seeing 300,000 NBT in two singlesig addresses.
I for one wouldn’t have second thoughts seeing FLOT with 200,000 NBT to support the sell side.
Shareholders always have the keys in a way that they make the rules for how to use them.
Doing all what FLOT does with grants is close to impossible and for sure only rarely possible in a timely manner.
While it might be possible for NBT related tasks, it’s not possible for BTC related stuff as long as there are no seeded auctions that tie NSR to NBT.
More rules make the job of FLOT easier, because it removes the burden of making decisions and brings FLOT more and more in a rubber stamping role - a multisig group acting based on rules; pretty much like reputed signers, although the reputed signers’ set of rules is the BCE protocol.
2 things here. Firstly, granting nbt is giving away keys. To treat it otherwise is to upend the entire concept of nbt ownership. Granting an excessive amount means the keys are no longer in shareholder control. You are correct that shareholders did not really have control of the system when fsrt had 4 million nbt.
Secondly, this motion is making those rules. This motion recognizes that decentralized bodies act most readily when questions of governance and expected response have been previously thought out and agreed upon.
Why not just have a pledge to replenish once it goes under a certain threshold any time? At least some flexibility. Personally I don’t like that too. When NSR reserves are starting to run out they need to be topped up OR other measures need to be taken. By the time this happens Shareholders can take the necessary decisions. Would a 10-day response time for a motion be too long? Then certainly 3 months is too long. I believe that those 25m wouldn’t be sold at once, but following a trend over a period leaving shareholders time to act.
These are spelled out. Basically, when we run out of nsr we use txn fees to impose RNA and we use T4 network spread to get more bang for our dwindling buck.
To make a shareholder pledge to endlessly dilute is irresponsible for a PoS blockchain that depends on the fair distribution of shares to function.
Unfortunately yes, which doesn’t leave much room to move. How about withdrawing from BTC/NBT support before getting in such invasive measures? And maybe in a few weeks time some else comes up with even better ideas depending on the situation at hand. What are the threats and what are the possible responses? There is no ‘one rule fits all’ in this world.
I’m fine to provide some guidance on options and possible response we have, but spelling things out like this and making them law without ability to adapt only leads to disappointments as they won’t/can’t be adhered to in the future when the network is really under pressure.
