Another detail I would prefer to see is rather than using the funds as buy side liquidity, simply have NuBits purchased and burned using a transaction that is publicly revealed. Placing BTC on the buy side requires ongoing action. It is easier to just spend the BTC on NuBits and then burn them.
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I picked a fixed volume limit because it is far easier to implement and gives the same idea: the sale should take at least 10 days.
The intent behind this is quite sensible. It reminds me that minimum purchase sizes are preferred to lighten the workload. May I suggest $1000? People who want less can get it on the open market. The restriction suggested may complicate the sale. A queue would need to be formed and probably only one sale could be completed per day. It is certainly true that sales like this cause the buy side on the open market to disappear. Perhaps the best approach overall is to sell only small sums that will likely be sold in a single day so that the disruption to the market is very brief. Perhaps 4 million is good for that reason: it won’t disrupt open market trading very much.
That works and we can comply with that. Can we set a minimum purchase of 400,000 please? That would be the functional maximum as well. With this design a queue will form which means only the first requests to purchase placed in the first minutes or hours after the auction opens will be filled. It may make sense to prohibit multiple orders as a result. This design basically means the first ten requests get filled.
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I feel the way this motion is phrased, you can set whatever minimum bid you want: you could do 133,333 each day on the open market at variable volume orders, or clump them into one day auctions of single 400,000 bids spaced by 2 days (which you clearly seem to prefer). You will have 15 days to distribute information about your plan after the motion passes.
I would like to see a few more of the details in the motion itself, but I’m supporting it in principle given the already high interest rates for a longer period of time which are clearly not solving the apparent oversupply we have. We have to try something else.
Right, restricting the volume has major drawbacks. But its just so easy to manipulate the NSR price. Taking the Poloniex market as reference, a 40 BTC buy (~ the amount we want to encourage) would lift the price to 1430 SAT. A sell of 1 million NSR would already push the price down to about 750 SAT.
So, for example, if we attach the price to the market price then anyone with 1M NSR can simply sell the NSR to create a price around 800 SAT in order to buy four times the amount at this artificially lowered price. This was nicely solved by the blind auction model, but since we are aiming for another strategy here, we should reconsider these things.
One model I know from my small repertory of financial instruments is the fish market idea: On day one Jordan offers to sell NSR at a fixed price of 0.4 cent and decreases the sell price every day by 0.05 cent (example). Everyone can take the offer every day, or gamble on a future lower price while knowing that all NSR might be gone by then.
@Nagalim Maybe we should think about selling even more. At auction price the 4M NSR would give us 8,000 NBT buy side liquidity, with 0.25 cent (larger than current market value) it would be 10,000 NBT. Selling around 5M NSR would make it more likely to approach the 10k I think. Or we show faith into Jordan’s trading skills and simply say that he should sell any amount of NSR within X days until we received Y NBT, at best price of course.
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I will increase it to 5mil.
500,000 every 3 days.
Day 1: auction; any offers over $.0025 will be collected. NSR is awarded at the end of the day to the highest bidder.
Day 2: fishing; NSR price will start at .0035 and be lowered semi-hourly until $.0023 is reached after 24 hours. This will be done on exchange or via auction, at Jordan’s discression.
Day 3: open market; NSR must be sold on exchange within 24 hours at the best price possible.
Rinse and repeat. If NSR are sold on day 1 or 2, the remaining days in the cycle turn into dead days to give downtime between auctions.
I hope there is enough awareness and participation among traders to make the day 2 approach work on an hourly level. What do you think about enlarging the “day 2” procedure to 5 days (i.e. a 7 day cycle in total) and make it a million NSR?
EDIT: And let’s not call it fish market method 
I call it this way because I learned it when I was 10 years old and my father took me to a Dutch fish market. The scientific community most likely adopted another terminology.
Why do you prefer day 2 over day 1, and I’d be super interested in your thoughts on the lower bound on fishing and how long we should hold it for.
There are advantages and disadvantages. The blind auction allows for an arbitrary large price in theory, while the price decreasing method naturally has an upper bound which must be picked carefully. On the other hand, the auction model also allows all NSR to be sold at the minimum bid (again, at least in theory). It allows for more speculation and market manipulation, because suppressing the price might lead to an overall lower auction bid and could give me an advantage. This all is not possible if the price is adjusted top down.
I was thinking I was calling it ‘fishing’ because we’re slowly lowering the price, waiting for a bite. Funny that you were referencing your childhood though.
How about 1mil lowered from .004 to .002 over 4 days, hourly? How are you imagining prices are announced? Were you imagining this taking place on exchange?
We should wait for some other opinions on that, but yes in general this sounds reasonable to me personally. The price announcement actually could be made one time, because its determined by your protocol. If, how, and with what accuracy the remaining amount of NSR that will be sold during the current epoch will be announced is an important questions, because this is the random variable people mostly need to speculate on.
An exchange would provide us with all the infrastructure needed to do this. Looking at the NSR market movements I think Poloniex would be the only option. Maybe we can get into contact with them and ask to give Jordans API key a discount for NSR, it would be a nice compensation for the hours I spent to make their API nonce work 
We can also do both, Bitmessage/email bids + exchange.
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I have updated the motion and await additional feedback from other members of the community.
Also, I don’t know how to notate a bitmessage address or what it should be.
At first sight the cycle of different ways to sell the NSR seems complicated, but in the end it’s quite simple from buyer’s perspective.
It looks like the different ways aim to maximize the income and try to keep the impact on the market capitalization as small as possible.
I wonder whether selling the 5 million NSR should be advertized in any way beyond the motion here in the forum.
On the one hand it might look desperate, on the other hand it creates awareness for Nu and how Nu evolved.
I bet a lot people didn’t follow how Nu was improved and might still perceive it as the ponzi it was called by Dan L. - built on nothing else but parking rates.
But the NBT burning changed the game radically.
By voting for the burn motion the NSR holders already declared that they rather take a hit in the value of their property than let the whole Nu fail.
But that was only a declaration of intent.
Now it’s happening (assuming that the final version of this motion passes) and not only a lip service.
In combination with the public burn transaction of the NBT it can very well be marketed as “NSR holders taking appropriate steps to keep the peg in a sustainable way” or something like that. I bet @tomjoad could find the right words.
And now to something completely different - Bitmessage offers a way to communicate end-to-end encrypted in a quite convenient way.
Funny enough, this is the classical definition of a “Dutch Auction”.
It’s also worth pointing out that the expected revenues in Dutch auctions (with risk neutral bidders who do not have access to other bidders’ information, as would be the case in a NuShare auction) would be exactly equal to Jordan’s original “First-Price, Sealed-Bid” auction. This is the basis of the revenue equivalence theorem verified at different points in time by economists Vickrey, Riley & Samuelson, and Myerson.
I would favor making the auction as simple as possible for Jordan or the elected representative, and sticking with “First-Price, Sealed-Bid” as we’ve done in the past. There is no financial advantage to shareholders to make the auction process more complex than required.
I really do think sell orders act as advertisements in and of themselves. Forcing a small window with a high bid minimum for blind auction gets everyone that’s serious about it. Then, slowly lowering a sell order catches any opportunists who think they can make a quick buck as well as those who watch nsr via no channel other than the order books (I did this for a while, so I know those people are out there). The final selloff day insures that the nsr are sold and we put our shares where our mouth is.
The most complicated part is binning the orders and bids by the hour. I’d be willing to bin by a larger time (I was originally considering semi-hourly) if the technical challenges are too difficult. Note that someone could give a standing bid early to trigger if the sell order makes it to a certain point, or just put up a buy order on poloniex, they are equivalent (other than the exchange fee).
Last requests for parameter changes before hashing?
The hourly sell price reduction requires a lot of effort from Jordan, and I don’t see it as necessary. I think a daily reduction would be sufficient.
Except from that see this motion as a very good way to support our buy side in short term such that people start parking to help us achieving our long term liquidity goal.
I agree. Adding overhead to the effort without a verifiable ROI doesn’t make sense. The easier, the better, because it makes reporting the end results that much more transparent.