That is a good point, Someone has to pay attention however. The onus is on Nu and Nu has to pay 1% for it per month. Can you promise to remind Nu if collateral value is getting too low than a certain value?
Sorry to bring up @ttutdxh again. It should be a separate issue from your proposal. In my eyes your proposal is ok except for collaterals (and an intransparent confidence that you can somehow manage exchange default risk).
Sorry to allow me to go on a little to make my take clearer. You said @ttutdxh’s proposal
In the proposal you not only get your own BTC back, you also increased NBT money supply. But the increased amount is not wild – it is burnt and cannot come back to hit the buy wall. In the mean time T4 increases its reserve for the NBT sold to you according to the 15% rule. So the T4 reserve for all the NBTs that CAN hit the buy wall increases above 15%. That is the value of the scheme. Consider this extreme case – if 15% of all NBTs money supply are in @ttutdxh’s scheme, they can pay all T4 reserve that are needed. Nu doesn’t need to hold its fund in T4 any more. And these T4 reserve can be all distributed in USD (some have to be in BTC on call but you get the point).
I have updated my proposal, a weekly report of perceived collateral value from my side is added. Also I have changed the fee to a static fee. With this I would like to give shareholders the opportunity to vote for how much USD they feel comfortable hedging with my proposed collateral. I’m comfortable hedging up to a maximum of 50.000 USD.
Having a static fee means there’s a tradeoff for Nu, a bigger hedge equals a lower fee when calculated percentage wise but a greater risk of a strong decline in collateral value not covering 100%> of the hedge anymore. Although my opinion is that my collateral should suffice to cover 50.000USD several shareholders disagree. Thus I urge shareholders to vote for what option they feel most comfortable with. I will update my proposal with the option that seems to have the highest preference among shareholders.
Also @tomjoad has mentioned Tether as possible solution for hedging our T4 BTC reserves. I encourage a shareholder to research this option and make a proposal if deemed valuable. This could be part of a diversified strategy of several methods to hedge our T4 BTC or a replace Nusafe in the future.
It’s not a step back. The alternative is basically doing nothing, keeping the status quo, where even a good centralized Tier 3 is not available. A decentralized Tier 3 on par with ALP has never been available before, but can be realized in the coming months, especially when B&C exchange launches. To do work now means to work our way through to build a infrastructure to prepaare for that; even when BCE launches, the interface between tier 3 and tier 4 will not happen overnight. We are just making the building blocks and fitting the pieces together. Moreover, even if we have a less decentralized tier 3, exchange default is still taken out of the picture, so it’s not the same as the original tier 1 custodians.
Or it can just be stray NBT held by somebody who feels he wants to do something with the money. Kind of like what you want to do with BKS. It can either be parked (if there’s a positive interest rate), or be used for this USD liquidity mechanism. Also, if indeed there’s a decline in NBT demand, NBT shouldn’t become more expensive - if anything there should be a big wall of NBT that can be bought up at once, so I don’t see where your $1.10 came from.
The core of the process can then be: I burn 10k NBT, I deposit 1k NBT worth of BTC to tier 4, contract to bring 10k USD to the market for say 3 months, I receive 10k NBT + 1k collateral + interest at the end of the contract, all in NBT.
It makes sense if the interest is low, because ALP using NBT/BTC is expensive for Nu (and has some risk for the provider), so is holding BTC in tier 4.
Two weeks is pretty long. I still prefer being reminded as soon as there is a situation.
It’s just technicality of a dummy variable. Instead of being burnt the nubits they could be put in a no-exit address. The net effect is like 1) you buy a contract to hold Nu’s T4 fund in USD and be ready to turn it back. The price of the contract is the 5k nbt in the above example. The return is 5k plus fee. and 2) you commit your money to reduce Nu’s liability (buy nubits) for the full amount first.
To me it sounds like your arguing that we should remove Tier 4 or at least the buy side of Tier 4 and reshape those funds to be the new Tier 3. My proposal is not aimed at such a change in infrastructure, it’s a very simple hedge of what currently are Tier 4 funds to shield Nu from BTC volatility. I urge to take this proposal/idea into a new topic or a topic relevant for such a proposal.
Again the first step is NOT burn NBT its BUYING NBT, I’ve been repeating this for days now. If you take into consideration that the person that wants to burn NBT has to acquire NBT first it means 2 things.
He buys them from Nu (directly through a private sale with FLOT or Jordan, or indirectly through T1-4 workflow) and thus resulting in his BTC ending up in T4, with a net result of T4 increasing in BTC due to it now also being responsible for 5k USD worth of BTC. This INCREASES our exposure/risk to BTC volatility.
It is someone already holding NBT (aka what you call “stray” Nubits) when those NBT are burned and we repay him with BTC he is effectively just selling the Nubits back to Nu. This is NOT hedging our T4 reserves but a defacto decline in demand (Nubits in the wild) and thereby decreasing our T4 reserves. This is what happens when there is a decline in demand ----> Nubits sold back to Nu —> Tier 4 decreasing.
How would this work? First we would need to fine someone who is holding a large amount of Nubits and then have that person be willing to pledge those funds to liquidity provision for Nu for a long period of time. Now why would someone do this instead of just using his Nubits in an liquidity pool? What happens when shit hits the fan and we need that liquidity (since we’ve effectively decimated the amount of T4 we hold ourselves to the 10% collateral) and the person doesn’t show up? Then all we are left with is the 10% collateral, how are we going to rebalance T1-3 then? In @ttutdxh’s proposal he even suggests only a 1% collateral needed.
Now what @ttutdxh is proposing can only be done by first finding someone who is already holding a large amount of Nubits (since if he just buys them our T4 stays the same, increases even due to now also holding the collateral). Then Nu giving him a better deal than that person joining an Liquidity Pool and to top it off if that person doesn’t show up Nu is truly fucked and needs to resort to selling NSR to rebalance T1-3, great we have 1% collateral in an emergency situation where we need to resort to our T4 reserves…………….
Now do shareholders really feel that a small amount of collateral (1% as @ttutdxh proposes) and a “promise” to use xxxx amount of USD for buyback when Nu needs it is a sufficient replacement for T4? That is of course beside the point where we could actually find these people holding all these “stray” Nubits. If someone is holding a large amount of Nubits he probably has a reason to do so, we’re essentially asking them to dump our Nubits for USD. Not sure if the best business model when trying to sell a stable pegged crypto is to incentive your users to sell them for USD.
Let’s set it at 1 week then with the added notion that sooner is better than late, If I see it happing before the weekly report I’ll notify nu as well.
The only reason to “burn” the NBT is to proof that you’re actually holding enough funds right? I mean there are far easier ways to do the same without having to go through the trouble of buying and burning Nubits.
Now we’re getting to the core, which is essentially someone pledging to use XXXX USD as buy side support to Nu when shit hits the fan, with Nu taking a small collateral as insurance. While this is all nice and good it doesn’t actually do anything to hedge our T4 funds, as a matter of fact by stating we hold XX USD as collateral in T4 we’re actually increasing our T4 exposure/risk to BTC volatility.
No. Be careful with who “we” is. T1 pays that “someone” for the amount. T4, sensing an increase of NBT demand sells 15% of the amount NBT to T1. T6 is ultimately responsible for the full amount but for this discussion it’s besides the point. “We” is not T6. “We” is T4. Now T4 has 15% of the amount increase in BTC. T4 will give the full amount minus collateral to “someone” because his nubits of the full amount will never come back. It’s all about dynamics between T1 (private funds) and T4. There is no single “we” (or “Nu”).
Yes that is my intention, personally I’d like to see the full 15% that is T4 reserved for buy side support to be 100% in USD. Essentially guaranteeing regardless of BTC movement that we can buyback 15% of all outstanding Nubits in case demand decreases, ALP fail, loss of interest from liquidity providers, etcetc.
In the meantime the “excess” funds (BTC) in tier 4 are actually used actively for balancing T1-3, buybacks etcetc. When we use up all those funds that are now essentially held in T4 in excess of the 15% norm we start having to resort to liquidate funds that are “ideally” safely stored as USD by Nusafe and / or other proposals.
Alright not sure if I follow you 100% but I think you mean that when we sell say 100k Nubits we only backup (with T4 reserve) 15% of that right? And also the person “burning” is not actually burning but sending it to a no return address so the outstanding money supply (nubits in the wild) stays the same. Alright let’s see what happens if we do @ttutdxh’s proposal using these assumptions.
For the example the situation is as follows: Outstanding Nubits (NBT in the wild) 700k, our T4 reserve is 15% so 105K. In his example I will use @ttutdxh’s spreadsheet, the first row that is an investor offering to hedge 100k liquidity with 1% collateral surplus required.
Someone offers to hedge 100k USD worth of T4. For this example I will assume he doesn’t hold Nubits so he has to buy them.
He buy 100k Nubits (with BTC) from Nu in either a direct trade with T4 (FLOT/Jordan) or by buying up 100k of our sell walls. Eventually this results in the funds (his BTC) ending up with T4.
This results is an increase in the outstanding Nubit supply from 700k to 800k, this requires us to increase our T4 reserve from 105k to 120k USD in BTC (we end up with more than 15k BTC worth in USD but we use those for NSR buyback/dividend etc so consider them gone).
The person offers to “burn” them but not actually burning them (since that would remove them from the outstanding money supply) but send them to a what you call no-exit address, so they cannot be reused but are still counted to the outstanding Nubit supply. So he sends them to this no-exit address and gives us proof his Tx so we know he “burnt” the 100k.
Then we repay him (this comes from @ttutdxh’s spreadsheet) roughly 99k USD back in BTC and hold 1% roughly 1k as collateral.
This results in a net decline of our T4 by 99K from being a 120k before so we end up with 21k USD worth T4 in BTC and a “contract” for another 99k USD liquidity.
This person gets paid interest every month (which is unclear to me how much since it says 0.50% over the USD liquidity but later on it says 30.50% of the locked collateral).
Now If I understand correctly this is what @ttutdxh proposes (assuming the burnt NBT are still counted towards the money supply aka Nubits in the wild).
Now imagine this person not showing up with the USD when we need him to. He could either have lost the money (theft, seized, spend, etcetc) or be to slow with responding due to whatever reason (sick in real life, on vacation, his internet down, etc). Or perhaps he invested the money in something else that’s been very profitable, say in the meantime he invests in whatever and has seen a 4% net result of that investment and he expects it to go up more. Do you think he will care about the 1% collateral? Essentially if he doesn’t show up Nu is literally fucked. Oh sure we have a net profit of roughly 1% since we have his collateral but in the meantime the peg breaks since we don’t have access to the 100k USD we were expecting to have……………
Of course above problems are also true for my proposal and me not showing up. But at the very least Nu then still has a sizeable amount of collateral that should cover the amount that was hedged. I really don’t understand how me putting up roughly 150% collateral is seen as more risky then someone holding a significant amount of our reserve (even if the “net” result is a gain due to the collateral we hold) for a low amount of collateral to abide him in fulfilling his contract.
Are shareholders really prepared to replace T4 reserves with “contracts” for people to show up with USD liquidity when needed when all we have to hold them to their contracts are small amounts (a few %) of collateral? Now that to me seems like an incredibly risky way to manage T4 backup funds.
That is of course if we can even find these persons holding large amounts of Nubit/USD willing to take up such a contract.
Because you don’t seem reallize that in your example he had already reduced Nu’s liability of a solid 100k with his own fund even before he took T4 fund.
[quote=“mhps, post:96, topic:3169, full:true”]Because you don’t seem reallize that in your example he had already reduced Nu’s liability of a solid 100k with his own fund even before he took T4 fund.
[/quote]
Regarding the example I’m not worried about the 100.000 Nubits he has “burned” (well not burned but you get what I mean) but about the other 700k Nubits in the wild. Where we first had 105k BTC in our T4 reserve to cover 700k outstanding Nubits we now only have 20k to cover these 700k + 1k collateral and a “contract” where the contractor promises to use 100k worth of USD for Nubit buyside when we need it. If he defaults great we have a net 1k profit (or 990.10 according to the spreadsheet) unfortunately we are then also suddenly faced with a 100k USD deficit of T4 funds. Seems like quite a drawback to his proposal, or do you disagree?
Honestly I rather have us stay 100% in BTC for T4 then a “contract” with 1% collateral with which we replace T4 buyside.
This is of course still ignoring the point of where we are going to find someone willing to provide this service. I doubt there are many people having that kind of cash or Nubits lying around. Sure he can reinvest the money in something else but this only increases his incentive (if the investment is profitable) to default the contract, leaving us with an unexpected deficit in T4 buy side funds. Funds by the way that are to be considered a reserve, something which we want to have secured as tightly as possible. Not funds where we are depended on contractors to fulfil their “contract” to us on a 1% collateral basis. Seems like a very risky way of handling a reserve……
However I think enough has been said about @ttutdxh’s proposal especially in this topic, this topic is now so cluttered with walls of text it might be off putting to shareholders trying to inform themselves about my proposal. I will post a new topic when I arrive with a final draft for voting since this topic has been more about discussing alternatives then my actual draft.
And place an vote for the option you fine most desirable, even if you will not vote for Nusafe else I have no way of know what the consensus about amount hedging vs collateral is.
It is clear that you haven’t understood the proposal in detail.
Locked funds (deposit) are only $990.10 and interest is $301.98, so you gain 30.5% each month. That alone is a game-changer.
Your assumptions make two differences to the DR proposal:
Number 1:
When I say burn is actually burning, so supply is unbalanced by -100k USD (circulating NBT are now 600k), so in event of a default, generating and selling 100k USD (circulating NBT back to the original 700k) is not actually a change in the capitalization/value/offer/demand on the network.
Number 2:
Nu is “fucked” either way in that case. It is not because because of distributed reserves held.
Let me explain with the two situations:
In the scenario you describe, circulating NBT are 600k (and you say Nu needs the USD, so demand is still lower than 600k NBT), T4 is temporarily 5k (because of the default you refer to) and we need 100k USD to rebalance liquidity, well we only have $5k, PEG breaks temporarily, right.
Suppose the contract is not made and T4 is not distributed, circulating NBT still is 700k, T4 still have $105k. Your scenario assumes a point that with 600k circulating NBT we still need $100k (of the DR reserve not beign available) for balance the peg.
So demand of circulating NBT is now less than 600k NBT, that means that while reaching that point 100k NBT have been bought by T4 to rebalance liquidity (unbalanced by that 100k excess into sell walls). So at that point in time we stand at 600k circulating NBT, and $5k, exactly the same as with a defaulting investor in your example.
The diference in this case is that we also have that small 1% collateral, so Nu is able to grant those 100k NBT and sell them with an attractive 1% discount at 0.99 USD each without actually losing money.
The key here is demand, Nu relies on it being higher than circulating NBT less funds owned by nu to rebalance (T4?). If it is less than that, Nu will not be able to rebalance liquidity and the peg breaks.
If that happens, we have created more currency than demanded, and the only solution is to devaluate NSR granting them and selling in the open market to raise required funds.
Also:
First of all, he loses reputation (that alone could make complying worth it).
Second, the money in his power is the deposit less the collateral (99.009 USD). Plus the 4% he wins over that totals 99009*1.04 = 102.969 USD less the inital 100$k investment amounts to a gain of +2.96%. And remember, this is monthly and with a really low risk (since you control the money).
This is easily solved by reality (Good luck finding a 4% monthly investment with that level of security, in which case you don’t invest in this in the first place), or with a higher collateral requirement, which instantly breaks the profit in the math.
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:99, topic:3169, full:true”]
It is clear that you haven’t understood the proposal in detail.[/quote]
Before assuming this if you had read all the posts you’d have noticed that I was responding to @mhps who stated that the Nubits were not actually burned but still counted toward the money supply. Hence I made the above example with that assumption. So @mhps did not understand the proposal and I went along with his version of it to demonstrate that it was still a bad idea.
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:99, topic:3169, full:true”]
Locked funds (deposit) are only $990.10 and interest is $301.98, so you gain 30.5% each month. That alone is a game-changer.[/quote]
Ah looking at the spreadsheet again, I got what you meant its 0.50% interest of 100k which results in 500 of which 198.02 is fee and 301.98 is het net received interest. What fees btw, transaction fees for moving around NBT/BTC or?
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:99, topic:3169, full:true”]
When I say burn is actually burning, so supply is unbalanced by -100k USD[/quote]
Yes that is what I thought you meant as I stated in earlier posts, I was merely replying to @mhps who misunderstood your proposal.
Exactly this is what I meant by saying that your proposal is essentially just what happens when there is a decline in demand. Demand declines from 700k NBT to 600K NBT which would correlate to us buying back 100k Nubits and thus lowering our T4 from 105k USD worth of BTC to a mere 5k, similar to your proposal.
No we’re getting somewhere.
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:99, topic:3169, full:true”]
Nu is “fucked” either way in that case. It is not because because of distributed reserves held.
Let me explain with the two situations:
In the scenario you describe, circulating NBT are 600k (and you say Nu needs the USD, so demand is still lower than 600k NBT), T4 is temporarily 5k (because of the default you refer to) and we need 100k USD to rebalance liquidity, well we only have $5k, PEG breaks temporarily, right.[/quote]
So you agree with me that in the case of the Custodian not showing up we are left with only $5k reserve + the $1k collateral while we are in need of a 100k and thus breaking the peg. The peg breaking even temporarily is not a good thing. It could cascade into a further decline in demand due to loss of credibility resulting in a negative spiral that in the worst case scenario bankrupts Nu and destroys our product. In the real world a similar thing happens when a “bank run” occurs.
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:99, topic:3169, full:true”]* Suppose the contract is not made and T4 is not distributed, circulating NBT still is 700k, T4 still have $105k. Your scenario assumes a point that with 600k circulating NBT we still need $100k (of the DR reserve not beign available) for balance the peg.
So demand of circulating NBT is now less than 600k NBT, that means that while reaching that point 100k NBT have been bought by T4 to rebalance liquidity (unbalanced by that 100k excess into sell walls). So at that point in time we stand at 600k circulating NBT, and $5k, exactly the same as with a defaulting investor in your example.
The diference in this case is that we also have that small 1% collateral, so Nu is able to grant those 100k NBT and sell them with an attractive 1% discount at 0.99 USD each without actually losing money.[/quote]
This is very true the only difference being that without your proposal we still had 105k in the bank so the speak when the decline occurs. This buys us time to uphold the peg while we sell NSR to cover the decline in demand.
In my scenario Nu has my collateral to cover the funds I lost. Now would you rather have us having to immediately resort to auctioning off NSR at presumable cheap prices or would you rather have Nu auctioning off my collateral instead? As a shareholder I’d rather take option 2.
Now what your proposal effectively really does is trade in T4 reserves for a small collateral and a “contract” that is now being counted as T4 reserve instead of an actual reserve. The problem is that when the 100k Nubits are bought our T4 increases by the 100k worth of BTC. So in our example the funds we have go from 105k to 205k then we “repay” the one who has burned the 100k Nubits 99k USD worth in BTC resulting in our T4 going from 205 to 106. Effectively nothing has happened except now due to the “contract” we hold we now count that 99k held by the contractor as secured liquidity to be used in our T4 calculation. Resulting in us effectively on paper having 205 in T4 since we only require 15% we are then free to spend 100k worth of BTC from our T4 and only hold onto 6k worth of BTC ourselves
Instead of your roundabout with the whole Nubit burning the exact same thing would happen if we just let someone prove they have 100k worth of BTC (there are simple means for doing this without buying and burning Nubits) then have him send us 1k worth of BTC to us and tada now we have a “contract” requiring him to pledge 99k USD worth of BTC to our cause when we need it. In the meantime we are free to spend 100k USD worth of BTC since our T4 is now held by the contractor. In what universe does this not sound incredibly risky?
So effectively we are trading T4 for a contract with 1% collateral. Sure if he defaults we have made a 1k profit, the problem is that in the meantime we have spent that 100k which we otherwise would have kept as reserve and thus endangering our peg. That is why this is a terrible idea it makes us completely depended on the contractor if he doesn’t uphold we are fucked.
Not saying my proposal is perfect but at the very least if I default or don’t show up Nu has assets evaluated at 100>% of the amount of funds we lost. It is in my opinion far less risky than your proposal.
That is still beside the point of where we are to find this person that has significant amounts of cash lying around willing to invest them in your proposal. Sure it might be possible to find lots of people contributing small amounts but that will make it an administrative nightmare. Are you contributing funds to this? Have you got messages from people interested in investing in your proposal, on what time frame do you think this will be realized? Nusafe could be operational tomorrow and I would urge others to make a similar proposal.
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:99, topic:3169, full:true”]The key here is demand, Nu relies on it being higher than circulating NBT less funds owned by nu to rebalance (T4?). If it is less than that, Nu will not be able to rebalance liquidity and the peg breaks.
If that happens, we have created more currency than demanded, and the only solution is to devaluate NSR granting them and selling in the open market to raise required funds.[/quote]
NSR sales to maintain the peg are a last resort option and the more time we have to slowly auction them the more likely we are to get a good price for them. Your proposal would result in less time for such an NSR sale increasing the danger of us not getting enough funds quickly enough to maintain the peg. I argue that it is inherently more risky then my proposal. Let alone if we can actually manage to get yours up and running. If you are so confident in your proposal why not develop it further and get it running? In the meantime we could run Nusafe and have an effective USD hedge the moment its voted in. We can have DR take over whenever its ready and shareholders concur that it’s a better idea then Nusafe.
The point is that if the investor is free to do with the money what he wants he’s very likely to go investing with it right? I mean who lets 99k USD just sit in their back accounts? Especially since the only ones likely to see your proposal are people who are interested in crypto’s and thus already are more likely to invest anyway.
The problem is the following if he invests and the investment is turning out successfully he’ll be very reluctant to sell that investment and use the money to support the Buy side instead. If the investment is a failure it’s likely that he might not be able to fulfill his contract anymore. By doing so he already loses the interest and collateral so why would he even bother?
No I don’t. The $100k is still fully in Nu reserve, in form of custodian debt or burned NBT, in your case a unknown value BKS collateral, worth who knows how much, is the only amount left.
I don’t see why executing a NSR auction would take more time than executing a BKS collateral.
That is fundamentally false. There is no difference, only the certainty of the value of the collateral.
In DR the debt is from the custodian to Nu and the collateral is burned NBT that is worth exactly 1% more, and can be recovered safely.
In NuSafe the debt is from you to Nu and the collateral is BKS+NSR worth who knows what.
He is being paid for that. He should take his own decisions. He risks losing the interest and the collateral. Nu don’t care.
If he took that risk he will pay the consequences, only he will lose money. Nu won’t.
I think this discussion is being extended too much around the same edges. It is a matter of perception.
Even with all this talk I have yet to see real world numbers about a DR scenario being negative for Nu, which would have not occurred not using DR in the first place, but maintaining the same external circumstances.
It should be 600k above. You still forgot that 100k from the 700k in the wild is now locked up.
T4 not only has a contract, it now has 1/7 less NBTs that can hit the buy wall. (It will sell 100k x 15% NBT to T1 later, though)
It looks bad only because you in your example assume T4 will chose one person to take 100k, while in reality T4 will likely e.g. choose several people each taking 20k. They are very unlikely to all give up the profit.
Note that Tier 4 is formally supporting NBT in circulation with 15% reserves, so a one-to-one trade with tier 4 shouldn’t happen unless it’s under rather specific circumstances. This means, if we choose the absolute safest option for Nu, it is to require a very large amount of collateral - you burn 100k of NBT to get 15k from tier 4. Only this is truly equivalent to the full theoretical strength of tier 4. Anything below that requires broader consideration, such as the form of collateral, the interest rates, and other risk-mitigating factors. 1% collateral is a small price to pay for someone to short NSR, so I won’t support it as-is.
That would be the problem with one single large custodian holding $100k (a very large portion of T4), and it would happen in either case (DR or NuSafe) only when all other things go wrong.
As @mhps pointed out:
An even if it happens and things go really wrong, we should have some spare BTC or PPC in FLOT addresses so the NSR short/collateral execution does not happen right away. Attack vector for the custodian goes almost to 0 with the sufficient number of custodians and reasonable % of T4 for each one. Again, this apply to both systems, DR or NuSafe.
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:101, topic:3169, full:true”]
No I don’t. The $100k is still fully in Nu reserve, in form of custodian debt or burned NBT, in your case a unknown value BKS collateral, worth who knows how much, is the only amount left.[/quote]
Sigh….no all your proposal does is show the contractor has the funds to burn and buy xxx amount of Nubits (for which there are far easier methods), this proof of capital is enough reason for you to repay him 99% of what he burned and then give him a contract on a 1% collateral bases to pledge the funds he regained in BTC to Nu buyside support when Nu needs them.
Like I said you are replacing the 15% reserve we have to support the peg in dire situations with contracts on a 1% collateral basis.
Having a net 1% “profit” and effectively no reserve when the custodian doesn’t show up is not an reasonable tradeoff. It’s incredibly risky and such a strategy weakens the security of our peg. I cant imagine most shareholders taking the time to actually understand your proposal agreeing with it
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:101, topic:3169, full:true”]
I don’t see why executing a NSR auction would take more time than executing a BKS collateral.[/quote]
The difference being that when we auction of my BKS the loss of value due having to auction them in a rush will not be Nu’s loss but my loss. Unless we are forced to sell BKS for so low it actually doesn’t cover the hedge anymore, this is the only risk Nu has in my proposal. This contrary to auctioning off NSR which will be shareholder loss and the first line of peg defense when contractor doesn’t show up in your proposal. I know you have 0 faith or maybe I should say minus 34983498348 faith that BKS actually has any value but we’re not going to see eye on eye on that one.
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:101, topic:3169, full:true”]
That is fundamentally false. There is no difference, only the certainty of the value of the collateral.
In DR the debt is from the custodian to Nu and the collateral is burned NBT that is worth exactly 1% more, and can be recovered safely.[/quote]
Having burned Nubit as collateral in a time where Nubit demand declines is inherently useless. What do you think our customers will say when they try to sell their Nubits but there is no backup fund cause your contractor didn’t show up.
Hence why the collateral is 100>% shareholders can even vote on what ratio they are most comfortable with.
Or we could just trade our T4 for a contract on a 1% collateral basis instead because clearly that is a risk free strategy…………….
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:101, topic:3169, full:true”]
He is being paid for that. He should take his own decisions. He risks losing the interest and the collateral. Nu don’t care.[/quote]
Your kind of forgetting the part where we actually needed those funds to prevent the peg from braking, but I guess Nu doesn’t care about that either. Hey it’s not like a broken peg would maybe hugely negatively impact our business now would it…………………
[quote=“ttutdxh, post:101, topic:3169, full:true”]
If he took that risk he will pay the consequences, only he will lose money. Nu won’t.[/quote]
Yes a 1% profit is a clear and obvious desirable outcome for Nu, I mean it’s not like the RESERVE is actually important right? Doesn’t really matter whether it decides to show up or not if it doesn’t we get that sweet 1% profit instead of the emergency reserve fund that we had earlier. Obvious win for Nu………….I mean who cares about the peg anyway.
Maybe it’s time you start considering the actual purpose of our T4 reserve, if you cannot understand that its meant as backup to prevent the peg from braking in times of declining demand in Nubits then it’s pointless arguing with you.
How about you find these persons first before we are actually considering DR. How about this why not support Nusafe (which can be operational today) and then when you have actually found liquidity providers for DR + it gets shareholder votes we can replace Nusafe (which can be terminated by shareholders at any given time) with DR.
Heady stuff