B&C signer voting watch


#82

@sigmike, personally I love the federalism than centralization system because the former is more active. Do you know why Japan outperforms China since 1000AD? It seems off topic but actualy relavant. My opinion is relative loose system has more freedom to compete and “trial and error”. Something like biological evolution: a species with more gene mutation will evolve better.

If some shareholders want to add Ethereum Classic, some may disagree and perhaps motion stopped at 40% supporting. Why not build many isolate rooms and let some people try. The competition among rooms will provide versatile assets and lower fee for our customers. Ultimately leading to a flourishing B&C ecosystem.

Room1: 15signers, BTC, LTC. XPM, ETC… 0.1%fee
Room2: 9 signers, ETH, DASH,BTC… 0.08% fee
Room3: 12 signers, USDT, PPC, BTC …0,09% fee

Within one room, signers will agree with the fee level, crypto asset, and other things.

The first step is voting for hundreds of eligible signers so that every shareholder can be a signer.


#83

I am afraid the voting on eligible numbers are too scattered, so never overwrite the current value “4”, so let’s vote for 1,000 if you want every shareholder to be a signer.

@ConfusedObserver,please provide your B&C address(even 0 balance) and I’ll vote for you with some shares. Thanks for your contribution, our community should be open.


#84

This would make signer voting equivalent to minting – you are rewarded only proportinal to how many shares you have. If that is the case, why don’t we just let whoever has the highest number of shares be the signer if/she wants? Why waste so much devs time and voters time electing?


#85

Don’t forget Down vote, every share holder voting for himself is not equivalent to PoS minting.

PoS minting is simple, just turn on your hardware and leave it until new version released.But voting reputation is a bit complicated. Every shareholder has freedom to vote himself, it doesn’t mean actually all voting themselves. Sometimes they hate someone and down vote some bad guys in our community, sometimes they want to tip some contributors, only signer reputation voting can finish such work while PoS minting can NOT.

Could you decrease someone’s PoS minting reward? No. Could you reward BKS to some contributors such as @ConfusedObserver who have zero BKS balance with PoS minting? No

Furthermore, reputation voting is much quicker than client version upgrade when adjusting active miners reward level is concerned. E.g, SunnyKing likes 0.01PPC minting reward, but the majority of PPC miners may dislike this level, if PPC has reputation reward voting, miners have choice to modify the reward level, this is more decentralized style.


#86

Thank you for your kind offer, but I don’t think that’s necessary.
On the one hand it was not much effort to give thought to Nu and B&C Exchange.
On the other hand I don’t see a bright future for neither of both projects.

Nu is already done and has been converted to (or always been?) a pump and dump scheme lead by @Phoenix who can pretty much do whatever he likes due to the number of shares he controls and the low minting participation.
No one really cares that JordanLee has changed his appearance and now wants to be called Phoenix to evade all the important questions regarding accounting.
Of course there are people complaining, but only little action follows.
The assumption that JordanLee has plenty of BKS, because he might be one of the (or the) miraculous investors lingers.
The level of decentralization for both Nu and B&C Exchange is unclear and can be doubted.
And the formerly stable crypto currency that would have played a crucial role for B&C Exchange is (now known to be) unreliable.
The idea to make BKC a kind of stable crypto currency for B&C Exchange is in my opinion one of the better approaches to get this fixed.
Trying to get rid of JordanLee’s influence would be even more important.

As I said in one of my last posts: I don’t have anything more to contribute.
My very basic questions and suggestions for improvement didn’t have a sufficient effect.
Your offer is highly appreciated, but I don’t think I want to have a stake in this game.
I rather cut my ties and look for different activity.


#87

@confusedObserver, I am not going to give up, this isn’t my style, I’ll fight with the last bullet.

If erasing Jordan/Phoenix is a must, I and other big holders will down vote him with all our shares because he hasn’t so many shares compared with Nu I am afraid.


#88

You have something at stake, I don’t :wink:
Maybe I don’t cut my ties completely.

Nu attracted me, because it it was an interesting project, although in failing state.
From there I learned about B&C Exchange, which is interesting as well.
Indeed the latter one has better chances, because it’s not burdened with hundreds of thousands USD debt and merely has lost parts of its development fund (which still is bad, but it could be worse).
At least if JordanLee hands it over upon request it’s no total loss.

Can you tell me why you prefer signers managing the dev fund to a group like [Passed] Motion to establish Reputed Signers Operations Team (RSOT), but where the group members are voted directly?
I don’t understand the reason for relaying this to signers.
With a group not formed from signers you could leave Phoenix completely out.
With top signers managing the dev fund you can’t - unless more downvotes remove Phoenix from the top signers.


#89

If the team of RSOT has 6 members, then Jordan/Phoenix has no control on the fund unless other three signers follow him. If 4 out of 6 agree to do something while Jordan and his one supporter disagree, that’s OK, Jordan’s voice is ignored. That’s the meaning of a team.


#90

As said by someone above, certain shareholders are voting for signers, but not entering in a reward level. In this case they would unknowingly end up voting for the current signer reward. If larger shareholders were voting for a larger signer reward, those who are voting for signers but have not entered in a signer reward would be unknowingly reinforcing voting for a large signer reward when they may not want necessarily want it that large. If they are reinforcing the voting of larger shareholders, it makes it even harder for other shareholders to reduce the reward level by voting against them. If people voting for signers but not entering in a reward level counted as an abstention instead, they would no longer reinforce the voting for the large reward and those actively voting for a smaller reward would be more effective. Those were my thoughts on it at least.


#91

@mhps, as far as I understood @Sabreiib this is not meant to be a permanent situation, but with his recent posts maybe I have misunderstood his meaning.

What I understood was this was only meant to be a temporary measure taken in order to dilute the BlockShares of apathetic minters who are not paying attention and voting like they should be.

  1. We would increase the number of eligible signers to a level that would include all possible owners of BlockShares. There’s probably not more than 1,000 BKS holders, so voting for this number might be safe.

  2. We would then increase the signer reward level sky high to the point it would only take about 1 month to a couple of weeks in order to dilute all apathetic minters.

  3. All active BKS holders who are actually paying attention and voting accordingly would then vote only for themselves. Doing this would allow them to keep up with the large amount of inflation occurring. If they used some of their voting power at this time to vote for someone else or used it to down vote Phoenix, they would not be able to keep up with the inflation occurring and would be diluted along with non-minters and apathetics, so it would make sense to only vote for yourself while this high inflation is taking place.

  4. Once we have held the inflation level high enough to the point non-minters and apathetics have been completely diluted, we would start reducing the inflation level back to normal, preferably something extremely small until we are able to complete development and officially launch trading. Then shareholders would stop voting for themselves and instead vote for people that are actually campaigning to become a signer. Once these people have been diluted, PoS difficulty will skyrocket, since the majority of shares will now be with active minters. Voting should also be easier now because we no longer have to deal with apathetics.

A problem I see is that this method would not remove the influence of Jordan/Phoenix. Because of this I much prefer the following solution…


#92

It seems to me that there are people here who would like B&C Exchange to succeed like @ConfusedObserver and want to be involved, however they now see that Jordan/Phoenix also has significant control (not majority control) of BlockShares and don’t want to waste their time working on a network that has already been infected.

If we are to get everyone on board again with making sure B&C succeeds, then I see no other way than to purge Jordan/Phoenix from the network. We should all be working toward this goal in order to take back the network. What is the best way to do this though?

I don’t believe he has attained majority control over the network yet, so with help from @Sabreiib, @Dhume and other large shareholders, we could pass a large grant of BKS and then individually pass them out in proportion to how many BKS a shareholder already owns.

Anybody who voted for Phoenix would receive nothing. Anybody who voted for a signer other than Phoenix would receive the new BlockShares. Phoenix, non-minters and apathetics who didn’t vote for any signers would all be completely diluted and we would then have the network to ourselves and have the ability to try and make it successful without any negative influence.

Who is on board with making this happen? I say it’s much better than leaving in defeat and allowing Phoenix to completely take over B&C as well, potentially scamming even more unknowing users in the future. I think we have a duty to purge him from the network.


#93

If they are voting for some signers then they are not completely abstaining, so the abstention change that was planed for the protocol switch would not change anything about them.

To obtain what you want we should instead change how those who have not entered a reward level are counted. Instead of considering they are voting for the current value we should consider they abstain. And the median would be calculated from only those who entered a reward level.


#94

Does that personally make sense to you as the best action to take? I guess it depends on how many people are actually doing what I said above and how much it is actually affecting the reward level. Is there any way to find this out, or is it just a guessing game?


#95

I don’t know. I think it’s not a priority.

You can use the getsignerrewardvotes RPC. It gives detailed results about the votes including the number of blocks who have not entered a value ("vote" : null) for both the number of rewarded signers and the amount of the reward. Here’s the current result: https://gist.github.com/sigmike/48b58d14809bcee5cc498e6de221140d

What you can only guess is whether these shareholders actually want to vote to keep the current value whatever it is.


#96

He has a large enough number of shares in order to make himself the top signer, which is already causing people to doubt the future of the project. He can possibly cause problems with a 2 of 3 multisig group. We can’t afford lost confidence right now.

Downvoting him isn’t going to stop him. It wastes your voting power, which could be better spent elsewhere. The only way to truly erase him from the network is to dilute his shares. My post above tells you exactly how to do that. In addition, it gets rid of non-minters and apathetics. We would need your help though in order to pass a BlockShare grant. Here it is again…


#97

How do you know who is voting for phoenix?


#98

This is my plan

1)Pass a motion of RSOT and ask Jordan/Phnenix/Angea hand over their NBT fund to this team.

  1. If Jordan/ Angela agree, it means they don’t want to be hostile to community, so let’s cooperate. With regard to Nu’ situation, we believe both community and Jordan should apology for this crisis, Jordan of course made mistakes but the community also not innocent, how many of you disagree his revenue model in 2014-2015?How many of you vote for the NSR buyback?

After the crisis, both sides want to make the other as scapegoat, this really disgusts me. I would like to see either side‘s self-criticism rather than blaming each other. I didn’t fully agree with Jordan when Nu operated smoothly in 2014, 2015, and I will not demonize Jordan after the crisis. Therefore, I won’t start serious hostile activity towards any side until my RSOT motion passed. If RSOT motion passed and Jordan/Angela refuse to hand over their fund, I’ll become complete enemy of Jordan/Phoenix/Angela. I’ll down vote him with all my share and even help to start a new blockchain/new project if @sigmike agrees to help.

To sum up, I won’t do anything hostile to Jordan if RSOT not passed, this is my principle. RSOT motion is the touchstone for me to judge Jordan/Phoenix ultimately.


#99

Isn’t it listed in the blockchain? I assumed the answers were there and could be found out similar to the analysis @mhps did with the addresses that voted for the motions Phoenix put forward.


#100

@mhps method is not accurate, just a rough estimatation. You will mistreat some inocent persons.


#101

It’s too complicated and easy to hurt those minters whose hardware/client happen to ave problems in that month. I still think this idea is much bettter:

We can do this often and keep the pressure on.

However as JL pointed out this will turn away people who have money but little time, which BC probably need.