(2nd Version - Expanded) My Interpretation of Jordan Lee's Liquidity Engine Model & Why its First Attempt at Pegging Failed

Why Nu’s Liquidity Engine Failed in its First Attempt at Pegging

What I’ve described above is how things should go if Nu’s liquidity engine is allowed to run at full speed. So how do we compare the above ideal scenario with Nu’s first attempt at pegging and where are currently at financially? How did we get to this point? In order to understand, we can go down the timeline and point to events which caused severe disruptions in the liquidity engine, causing it to stall out. These severe disruptions negatively effected both the quality and quantity of liquidity provided by Nu.

Early Success Until Exchange Hacks Lowered Nu’s Reserve

Nu basically started out how I started this thread, by beginning to sell NuBits. It followed the same pattern I laid out above. From launch in September 2014 to the exchange hackings in February 2015, NuBit demand grew exponentially to the point we had $3-4 million dollars worth of trading volume on our various supported exchanges, all due to excellent liquidity provided at tight spreads. This was the beginning of Nu building serious momentum. The liquidity engine was accelerating in speed and gaining traction with a wide number of traders, however in February 2015 Nu was the victim of multiple exchange hackings, which lost us a large portion of our BTC reserve and caused our liquidity engine to stall out.

Premature Zero Reserve Transition Led to Decreased Liquidity & Increased Costs

In the following months, Jordan convinced us to make an early transition to his zero reserve model, since providing liquidity on centralized exchanges using Nu’s reserve funds proved to be too dangerous for Nu. Creon invented the automated liquidity pool software (ALP) in order to help along this transition to the zero reserve model. The liquidity pools however couldn’t compare to the amount of liquidity we had previously offered using Nu’s reserve funds. Nu was still such a small organization and hadn’t yet attracted the attention of people that would have been able to provide large amounts of liquidity. As a result, the amount and quality of liquidity suffered, resulting in reduced demand for NuBits from the market.

I mentioned above that this was an early transition to the zero reserve model. I personally don’t believe Nu was ready for this transition to zero reserves, because the network was not mature enough to handle it. Nu didn’t have the required amount of transaction fees by users of the network in order to cancel out the NuBits that needed to be printed in order to incentivize liquidity providers. Because of this, we were creating more NuBits as liabilities than the network could handle, which was not sustainable.

I personally believe Jordan may have only wanted this early transition to zero reserves as a temporary measure to protect Nu’s reserves from being stolen in the event more centralized exchanges got hacked. Soon after the exchange hackings, Jordan offered up his plan to fund and build B&C Exchange. This was his answer to the exchange hacks. He most likely only wanted to use zero reserves as a temporary measure for security reasons until B&C Exchange was completed. Enough damage had been done to Nu’s reserve through the hackings, so it was important to protect the remaining funds by any means necessary. Once B&C Exchange was complete, Nu would most likely be able to transition back to the reserve model and continue using Nu’s BTC reserve to provide liquidity using the decentralized exchange where counterparty risk was much lower.

NuShare Buybacks Lowered the Reserve & Failed to Support the Peg

The next mistake however came from Jordan himself. As part of the transition to the zero reserve model, he recommened NuShare buybacks in order to convert a large portion of our BTC reserve to NuShares, the idea being that NuShares would provide a backing for NuBits and could be used as tier 6 NSR sales in order to protect the peg when we hit a period of low demand and park rates weren’t enough to support the peg. Here is Jordan’s quote about NuShare buybacks…

It sounded great in theory, but unfortunately reality was not kind to us. NuShareholders sold a large portion of the tier 4 BTC reserve based on this theory of NuShares backing NuBits. However, Bitcoin ended up spiking in value because of the incoming reward halving, causing people to sell a lot of NuBits for Bitcoin. The remaining funds in our tier 4 BTC reserve ran too low and parking rates weren’t effective in bringing back buy side demand.

Loss of Confidence Due to Low Reserves Led to Ineffective Parking

I believe park rates were not effective in this situation for several reasons. First, we were advertising the wrong parking rates. We were advertising yearly APR rates rather than the parking rate for a single duration in time. APR was a scary unsustainable sounding percentage rate compared to the rates for single park periods, and later on we had evidence that people were actually confused by this and stayed away from parking because of the unrealistic scammy sounding rates…

Second, I believe we could have done a better job in advertising and making sure people knew about the park rates. Third, I don’t believe we were offering high enough rates for the crisis we were in. Fourth, pegging was broken because FLOT had lowered the buy side to $0.95 in order to protect the remaining BTC in the reserve from being bled out. This defeated the purpose of parking because any interest made would be lost when cashing out through the lowered buy wall.

And finally the most important point. Jordan was arguing for us to pump the remaining tier 4 funds into the market at a tight spread in order to reestablish the peg, so people would use the parking system. I think Jordan is right that park rates can’t be effective without a tight peg, but they also can’t be effective if the reserve was as low as ours was. People lose confidence that they will get their money back, so they don’t take the risk of parking. I agree with Jordan about a tight spread being necessary for parking to work at all, but disagree that parking would have made a difference in this situation, even with a 1% spread in place. The parking system simply can’t work with such low reserves. People need to have at least some amount of confidence in the system to recover for parking to work. We had stretched the system too far by emptying our reserve into NuShares. With such a low reserve, confidence evaporated and parking didn’t provide any buy side support for the peg.

Tier 6 NuShare sales were also announced, but rather than providing support for the peg in a time of need like Jordan expected (the reason for the NuShare buybacks) everyone frontrunned the sale, collapsing the price of NuShares. This brings us to our current predicament of shareholders facing heavy NuShare dilution. In hindsight, a company’s stock should go down if their primary product is in low demand. It’s impossible for Nu to store the value from our reserve in NuShares because the value per share will collapse in the event a crisis arises, as it did in this situation.

Recap of Events

So to recap, everything turned sour the moment our exchanges got hacked in February 2015. We were well on our way and the liquidity engine was building up momentum. Without the decentralized protection of B&C Exchange though, we were hacked through centralized exchanges and part of our reserve was stolen. We tried to keep our reserve funds safe by hiding behind the zero reserve model and using liquidity pools. This had the immediate effect of lowering the amount and quality of liquidity we provided, lowering the demand for NuBits. Nu was not ready for the transition to the zero reserve model (even though it might have been intended as a temporary measure) because there were not enough transaction fees necessary to cancel out the NuBits we were creating to incentivize liquidity provision. We were stacking up more liabilities than we could handle. NuShare buybacks were the final nail in the coffin, lowering our reserve to a point where funds were quickly depleted in a crisis and there was not enough confidence in the system for park rates to work effectively.

Everything here combined led to decreasing amounts and quality of liquidity, exactly what you don’t want if you want the liquidity engine to work properly. These things caused us to lose all momentum. Jordan also offered his explanation of the events I just talked about…

Conclusion

I believe Jordan’s liquidity engine model would have worked. We were on our way and were gaining momentum quickly. Sadly we hit a bunch of obstacles though, which stalled out the engine to the point where we might not be able to get it back up and running again. The only path forward that I see is if we were able to raise enough money to pay off all debts and start over again. Even if we were able to build our reserve up somewhat, I believe it wouldn’t be enough. It’s too hard to maintain the peg when the reserve is too small, because you have no buffer. Park rates and NSR sales will keep getting triggered every time we see a little bump in the road. The only other option is to abandon the current NuBit supply and the customers we owe, suffer reputation damage and start over with a brand new supply once B&C Exchange is released, allowing us to provide liquidity with Nu’s funds without needing to worry anymore about exchange hackings that can kill our momentum.

I also just wanted to point out once again that this is only my interpretation of Jordan’s liquidity engine model from reading what he says about it and our good experience at the beginning of NuBit’s run before the hackings. I hope @JordanLee comments himself on this to let me know if I’m correct. If I’m wrong in parts then he should pick it apart, since it would be educational for the people who want to fully understand his liquidity model. Understanding this would be the best thing all shareholders can do, that way they know which way to vote on motions in the future in order to make sure our network succeeds.

The biggest reason I wrote this is because I believe the constant criticism about lack of revenue and liquidity provision being too expensive is misplaced. As mentioned in the examples above, the BTC reserve acts as both transmission fluid and fuel in order to achieve increased demand and more sales. Basically as @mhps said, money is burned in order to make even more money. It’s ok that liquidity provision at a tight spread is costly, as long as the BTC is working to bring us even more demand and NuBit sales. It’s all about building momentum to the point where enough people are using NuBits that the system becomes self-sustainable through the revenue from transaction fees and other profit models that shareholders implement in the future. Lack of revenue in the beginning phase of the network is part of the design. Remember what Jordan said…

Of course, all of this is contingent upon the basic assumption that liquidity at a tight spread attracts even more liquidity through increased demand and sales. If true, we don’t need to figure out new ways of making revenue until much later in the process. We would just need to make sure the liquidity engine is being used the way it was meant to be used, as its the only path forward that has a chance of succeeding. We tried once, but ran into obstacles and stifled our engine until it stalled out. Let’s try again after B&C Exchange is released, but let’s do it right this time and let it run full speed ahead!

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@mhps, the expanded version is now finished. You and others can now read it. @cryptog and @crypto_coiner in case you’re interested in re-reading with the additional content.

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Really, I should have titled this thread the following, as it would be more accurate considering the explanation I gave above about why our first attempt failed…

“My Interpretation of Jordan Lee’s Liquidity Engine Model & Why we Failed to Live up to it”

I didn’t want to upset people though, since it sounds like I’m blaming shareholders, so I renamed it.

My interpretation of this model is that it would work just fine if all the shareholders and nbt users were just bots or AI and not simple human beings!

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I don’t believe that’s possible. Shareholders are needed to do a multitude of different things in regards to liquidity operations, including coming up with new profit models, passing various motions and grants just like we’ve been doing.

The main differences from what we tried to do the first time is that B&C will protect Nu’s reserve funds, allowing lots of liquidity to be provided as it was meant to be before the exchange hacks. The transition to a zero reserve model would come much later when the network is able to sustain it without creating lots of liabilities. No NuShare buybacks, unless they come from actual revenue that is generated. The reserve should be as high as possible until we can successfully transition to zero reserve.

Almost forgot to respond to this…

I don’t have an explanation for this other than to think Jordan had his mind mostly on B&C development at the time and not on Nu. There were many times that I saw him requesting information from people because he didn’t understand the current liquidity operations enough to know how things worked. I’m guessing it kept evolving too fast for him to keep up with while he was absent and working with developers on B&C. That’s my only explanation, that he had become unaware of things because of his work schedule and absence from the forum until recently.

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Zero reserve is extremely stupid, have you heard of Bretton Woods System?

Nu has failed in the same way of Bretton Woods System in which USD is pegged to gold. When US gold reserve was as low as 15% of its debts, they just cannot hold the peg, then US government gave up gold peg in 1971.

You dream the big scale of Nu business will make zero reserve possible, but that’s your wishful thinking, totally illogic. Even Nu’s business was as big as USD, the peg would probably fail due to low reserve ratio.

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You’ve spent a lot of time.
You won’t like my comments, but I find them necessary; you focus on the wrong parts.
I’ve spent some time for my answer as well.
I hope that helps you stomach my comments :wink:

[quote=“Sentinelrv, post:1, topic:4114”]Most of what follows depends on the basic assumption that providing high amounts of liquidity at a tight spread will attract even more liquidity through increased NuBit sales
[/quote]
Are you sure this assumption isn’t flawed? High amounts of liquidity can attract NuBits sales, but that doesn’t increase liquidity.
It increases the liabilities and the assets each time NuBits are sold.
If you want more liquidity, you need to pay for it.

[quote=“Sentinelrv, post:1, topic:4114”]The most important thing to understand is that a degraded peg with a lower buy side is not a peg at all and will cause customers of Nu to lose money when they cash out. This isn’t desirable, so customers would rather avoid NuBits, causing demand to drop like a rock.
[/quote]
This depends on how you define a peg. When paying by credit card your USD isn’t pegged perfectly from the perspective of the one accepting the credit card.
There’s a fee required for a payment.
If you pay with NuBits on the blockchain, there’s a fee.
If you use them on an exchange, there can be a fee as well.
As there’s no tx fee, you need another fee -> spread!

[quote=“Sentinelrv, post:1, topic:4114”]The large amount of liquidity provided by this BTC buy wall encourages trading, which over time increases demand for more NuBits, which are then sold on the market. The process repeats with more BTC proceeds being added to the buy wall from NuBit sales. So as NuBits are sold, liquidity increases, which encourages even more demand.
[/quote]
The BTC proceeds from sold NuBits aren’t put on the buy walls afaik. They are put into the asset store of Nu. Please correct me if I’m wrong.
Further this indeed sounds like a ponzi scheme.

[quote=“Sentinelrv, post:1, topic:4114”]The BTC expenses for maintaining lots of liquidity at a tight spread is a small price to pay for keeping the liquidity engine running, if the end result is the engine picking up even more speed through increased NuBit demand and sales.
[/quote]
I haven’t found reliable information how big that price in fact is. I suppose it isn’t as small as you might think it is.
Once again: you need accounting information. Especially from the time when the Liquidity Engine was running.
I fear the costs have been tremendous.
But I don’t know. I just speculate.

[quote=“Sentinelrv, post:1, topic:4114”]So in theory, as long as we continue to provide high amounts of liquidity at a tight spread, NuBit demand will continue to increase.
[/quote]
If you need to attract new money with a Liquidity Engine that consumes a lot of gas, but doesn’t generate revenue, this again looks like a ponzi scheme.

Two words: ponzi scheme
I’m tempted to rename this machine Ponzi Engine :wink:

Ponzi Engine. Likely not only slowly burning the proceeds from NuBits sale.
Only sustainable as long as there’s gas left to operate the machine of refilled by people jumping on board.

Valid assumption. How many transactions do you need to pay Nulagoon alone?
And how many, if you even scale up the operation?
Small tx fees appear insufficient to sustain this Nu system unless the adoption is several orders of magnitude bigger than it is now.
You won’t get there without running out of gas to fuel the Ponzi Engine.
This is no reliable business scheme.
From the numbers I could find it looks like you need to have approx. 20,000 tx per day to cover the liquidity costs alone.
Liquidity costs are not the sole costs.
What about development, marketing, etc.?
Where’s the accounting?

The path that has a good chance of succeeding is sorting out your costs and creating revenue that is bigger than the costs.
If you have revenue that’s at least as big as the costs, you will stay solvent for a longer time than with having almost no revenue.

Fully agree.
That’s the reason why Nu needs to make money on the exchanges, e.g. from a spread - the idea suggests itself.

Nu should always have sufficient reserves.
How much is sufficient?
I don’t know. I can’t even make an educated guess based on your lack of accounting information
Evading BTC volatility is a challenge.

Unless you have highly stable and liquid assets that can be sold.
In this case: NSR.
How stable and liquid has NSR been?
Would you bet all on that?

Wrong - this way isn’t capable of buffering a huge drop of NuBits demand in a short period of time.
It’s merely capable of keeping the system running.

How much did that cost?
Was this really organic growth?
Did it cross your mind that this might be the result from feigned trades?
Airtight accounting could help telling.

Without accounting I remain suspicious about the motives.
Only Jordan knows the financial state of Nu in that time.

From then on you know that liquidity costs money.

Withdrawing them to multi signature addresses would have sufficed to mitigate exchange hacks.
BTC volatility would have remained as risk.
You traded BTC volatility for NSR volatility.

Parking was defeated, because it was clear that Nu was low on reserves.
You couldn’t have kept the peg for long with that few BTC.
NBT would have been floating earlier.
No good environment for parking.

If the interest from parking is bigger than the spread, it can be worthwhile.

How many NBT were parked from random NBT users?
Wasn’t a majority parked from Blocks & Chains Exchange?
Who decided that?
For the Blockshare holders it would have been better to buy BTC with them.
That would have brought Nu where it’s now, but Blocks & Chains Exchange would still have a development fund left.
It was only a matter of time until Nu runs out of BTC in a BTC bull run.

It was sour from the beginning.
No transparent figures about costs, no bills, no accounting, almost no revenue, except for a handful of NBT from tx fees.

When you did the buybacks, you already were relatively safe from theft by FLOT.
Is it right that FLOT didn’t provide a collateral? Nevertheless they have been trustworthy with their multi signature funds as far as I can tell.

Missing revenue was a major nail.
The buybacks were another important nail.

I don’t believe so. The way from where Nu is/was to where the tx fees could’ve compensated the costs is a long one.
I can’t show you that I’m right, because I have no data to prove it.

You would end at the same place sooner or later - unless you find a way to make revenue.

Absolutely right!
But it’s easier, if the peg is less tight.
The tighter the peg, the bigger the costs.
The more volume, the bigger the costs.
Try to find out how much liquidity at what spread you can afford.
Make the spread wider and adjust the liquidity.
The result will be different from what you long for when you think back of Nu’s first months.

The title of the corresponding movie: Ponzi Engine Reloaded

I doubt it would have worked. It only looked like good experience and I continue to say that until you convinced be by showing me the little costs.
If I’m right, the costs have eaten you alive and you’d have failed later without the hackings with even more liabilities and even more people who’d have lost money.
You can be glad the Nu bubble burst now. It’s much less damage. That’s why I think it’s not completely over.

If you really don’t understand why revenue is crucial and why high liquidity at a tight peg of a very volatile asset is very expensive, you’re chasing dreams, but aren’t running a business.

If he had no mind for Nu, how could he successfully question the behaviour of those who were more involved in liquidity?
I’ve read in another thread that B&C lacks accounting and the progress of B&C can’t be found in the software repo.

Conclusion
You need to face some hard truths:

  • without reliable, sufficient revenue you play against time; your funds will be eaten by costs - a lot of startups die this way
  • if your Liquidity Engine requires continuous new NBT sales to run - to have BTC proceeds to fuel it - it’s a Ponzi Engine
  • a tight peg at exchanges is more expensive than a less tight peg (increased losses by hedging: your NAV will decrease faster than with a less tight peg. If the peg is wide enough, you might be able to keep the NAV stable or even increase it)
  • a big amout of liquidity is more expensive than a small amount (more funds at risk of hacks, etc.)
  • you need reserves
  • to buffer a drop of demand fast enough
  • if you peg to USD, they need to be as USD stable as possible/affordable
  • if USD stable doesn’t work, you need diversified assets
  • if you serve the BTC/NBT pair, your ideal reserve asset is one that reliably appreciates delayed when BTC depreciates and vice versa (I don’t know one; I doubt it exists - I hope my mind didn’t play tricks on me when it make me sort the dependency this way)
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You make great points here. I just wanted to point out again that I wrote this only to interpret what I think Jordan believes. Maybe I am completely wrong in my understanding of his system. I have no idea myself if it could actually work or not. It would be great if @JordanLee could respond to all of your criticism. I really hope he does. I want to find out these answers as well.

Great arguments, @ConfusedObserver

Regarding parking, I believe we have sufficient data here: https://www.parkingyournubits.rocks/parkinglot/?filter=all

Hardly any parking until end of April this year.

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Great points by both Sentinel and Confused Observer

Just after the large NuBit sale by a single holder on May 27th, the peg was lowered to 0.95. That is the cause of the failure of the liquidity engine. Period.

We can go on to explain why this single action arrested nearly all functioning of the liquidity engine. The way this makes parking completely undesirable has been discussed by multiple authors already. Abandoning the peg also makes NuShares completely undesirable, because they only have value to the extent there is confidence that NuBit demand will increase. With the peg already sacrificed, it is clear total peg failure will occur, which means additional NuBit demand is unlikely, and can only occur after a long process of rebuilding. NuShares sales have succeeded in raising funds in the past in the presence of an intact peg. They failed this time precisely because of the abandonment of the peg. NuShares sales can be moderately effective before the peg is lost, but their effectiveness is dramatically reduced once peg failure has occurred.

It is very sad, but our story is that at the first sign of trouble on May 27th, the next thing the network did was capitulate and give up without any kind of fight to keep the peg whatsoever. I don’t think the liquidity providers who did this understood that lowering the peg was essentially a complete capitulation because they didn’t have a proper understanding of how their actions were going to impact the liquidity engine.

The liquidity engine failed because the people operating it didn’t understand how it works. This is a really important conclusion to understand. The liquidity engine failed for lack of expertise in operating it. That may put liquidity providers on the defensive, but actually it shouldn’t. What is amiss here is the expectations we placed on liquidity providers. These people are typically shareholders that follow the forum regularly, have full time professional jobs unrelated to liquidity provision, families and so forth. Given that we were an enterprise worth all of 2 million USD and a budget to match, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that we weren’t able to place liquidity engine experts and experts in NuLaw in each of the 20 or so liquidity provider roles we have.

How can we deal with the confusion about how the liquidity engine functions? Well, you either have to pay to hire qualified experts or you have to find a way to not rely on the liquidity engine as much. We can’t afford to pay for such qualified experts, so we must go the route of not relying on the liquidity engine as much going forward. The main way you afford yourself the luxury of not relying on the liquidity engine is by increasing reserves. While reserves still need to be moved and managed, it is much simpler and much more forgiving.

Stated another way, we discovered we don’t have the scale needed to properly operate a liquidity engine. The best way to deal with this and deal with the fact that the market will have no faith in our liquidity engine for some time is to fill our reserves until they are full. This will require more NSR dilution, but if the plan is deemed viable and responsible (it is), then we can expect a rise in the NuShare valuation because investors will see we have a much better chance of additional NuBit sales with the new plan.

We have to use NuShares now to support NuBits. It is very sad we actually gave up on the peg without selling a single NuShare. It is very difficult to argue NuShares back the value of NuBits when there is a history of not using them at all to avert a peg break. It is quite clear NuLaw has been broken in this regard and the community needs to develop methods for dealing with such violations. If this isn’t done, there is no reason to have confidence that motions will be implemented, or to have confidence in anything we say about what we will do.

People will argue that NuShares shouldn’t be sold now because there isn’t much value there and there isn’t much liquidity. There isn’t much value in NuShares at this time precisely because shareholders and their representatives have clearly demonstrated a low commitment to maintaining the value of NuBits. With such a poor commitment to the value of NuBits, there isn’t much reason to think people will want NuBits in the future. To raise the NuShare price, you have to convince investors that you are acting in a way that will create future demand for NuBits. Perhaps the best way to do this is by showing how fiercely we defend the peg. The best way to do that right now is to sell NuShares for BTC, which are then used to defend a new peg.

Only 2.4 million NSR have been sold since May 27th (about 0.25% of total supply), but the NuShare price has collapsed 80% in BTC since then. This isn’t principally due to dilution or the threat of it. It is due to a massive drop in confidence that there will be additional demand for NuBits in the future. And for good reason. To improve the NuShare price, we have to build confidence that we will defend and promote the value of NuBits as our core mission.

We require a comprehensive plan for recovery and NuShare sales to build reserves at this time. I have already outlined a comprehensive one, although there are innumerable details the community needs to attend to. Most of all, we need to quickly develop consensus about how to move forward.

So can we actually sell NuShares to build reserve? Now? I don’t accept that they are currently being sold. The NSR buyback/sales calculation mandated them last week but they didn’t happen. That is a clear violation of NuLaw. Also, the current blind auction has a minimum bid price of 0.001 USD, while NSR are currently selling for 0.00075, only 75% of the minimum bid. I suspect no NSR will be sold in this auction.

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My good breeding doesn’t allow me to give you a more elaborate answer than: I differ regarding the reasons. Period.

But I agree that the Ponzi Engine was stopped.

@Phoenix

Why can’t you post under @JordanLee. Quit pretending to be the resurrected metaphorical savior of this project. It’s really weird man.

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I wasn’t quite sure at first, but now I’m pretty confident this is true. I don’t completely understand what the reasoning for it is though. When I think of a Phoenix, I think of the slogan “Rise from the ashes like a phoenix.” Maybe he thinks that’s what Nu is going to do and it’s purely metaphorical.

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You are thinking a lot about what Jordan Lee might think. That’s funny. Why don’t you just ask him what he thinks? You could then stop thinking about what he might think.

Btw I want to be called Brad Pitt in the future. If we can’t turn this into a successful DAO, we might provide enough stuff for a Hollywood comic movie.

That’s a little hard to do when he’s been absent for a week (or at least his Jordan Lee identity). So I wrote something hoping he would respond to it in order to clarify things.

Don’t you realize that this is already where the mess begins? He calls himself an innovative leader but leaves the whole community guessing for pretty much anything that a community could be guessing. How many accounts does he have? How many NSR does he have? How many NSR did he sell during the buybacks? How many NBT did he dump? How many NBT are still there as dev funds for BCE? Who the heck is Angela? What are his real thoughts about Nu’s future? Has he always had good intentions and if yes, is that still the case? Could he also be greenbar trying to sell some BKS on this forum? Or the new Bitcointalk account, who is also trying to get rid of BKS? And so on and so forth…

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Now you will ask me whether I really believe in some of the stuff I just asked. Well, can you either disprove or prove or answer any of the questions? No, and that is how he loves to operate. Wouldn’t be wondering if in the case of Nu’s total failure an account called “Mr. Bean” pops up and makes some funny eloquent jokes.