Continuing the discussion from CCEDK withdrawals impaired, because this is an interesting question in itās own right and hopefully will spawn a larger discussion:
It is possible, but weāve discussed it in the past and every time it comes up Iām reminded of the major challenges that such a system would introduce:
- Voting is a relatively quick process, in general, but in this context would appear nearly glacial in response to the actual timeline that the network would have to respond. That leads to the primary problem with this approach ā during the time that the network is deciding what to do other transactions are happening and NBT and NSR are moving throughout the system.
- Letās assume that you could move the network fast enough to a decision ā how do you prevent damage to parties that took possession of a portion of the stolen coins in exchange for their (legitimately provided) goods? āClawbacksā work in some cases, but I expect that there would be a significant chilling-effect on usage if it was true* that the network could decide in a future time to blacklist certain addresses or unilaterally decide to void transactions.
* For those only skimming, or trying to take this out of context, itās not a current function of Nu and is only used for example in this scenario.
- āTargetedā roll-backs could be used, where only the address in question and transactions after a point of āblockheight = Xā are excluded, but it isnāt simple to do, from what I understand, and requires a change to the clients that a majority of the nodes in the network are running.
Beyond the technical challenges, thereās a ethical challenge that I believe is even greater. In all cases that Iāve seen, it boils down to a āhe said, she saidā situation. Exchanges are attacked (or maybe they arenātā¦) and funds are moved to an address. Itās very difficult for any one person to gain access to enough information to be able to make a determination of what really happened. I donāt expect that the exchanges (or, eventually, vendors, and even individuals) to be forthcoming or even capable of providing enough clear information that would allow shareholders to vote for a motion to invalidate transactions.
I believe that solutions will arise that allow ācharge-backsā on the blockchain. I have no doubt that these will start as third-party solutions rather than protocol-level features, and expect that the team or company that solves this technical hurdle will find widespread success in the B2B and B2C space.
I donāt, however, believe that it is appropriate for shareholders to be involved in that process. The level of granularity becomes too fine for a consensus-based system to work. Voting is useful important for strategic, large-reaching questions (and to validate the global ledger); I find it far less suited for tactical decision making.
What do others in the Community believe is the role of shareholders to influence through voting for protocol-enforceable actions?