Thank @Chronos, with regard to this short-term lending suggestion, this is not mine, it just from Hayek’s theory.
- To avoid “tragedy of common”, the protocol may give some commission to LPC who pledges his NSR. It could be quite small amount of money so that Nu system operation cost saved and the risk of depositing borrowed NBT also compensated.
A little price spread(1.003/0.997)is OK, another solution is low interest rate voted by system,i.e. parking rate is 5.7days for 0.3% annual,11.4 days for 0.4% now. I borrow 1000NBT and return 998NBT after 5.7 days LPC operation.
- Recently the cap. of NSR is maintained more than 1.5 million, while NBT effective quantity is only around half million. This 3:1 ratio is safe for lending business.
We vote a NSR/NBT pledge ratio such as 1000NSR vs 1 NBT referencing real world’s NSR market price because the protocol itself has difficulty to perceive real world situation.
We can also vote a ratio of 1000NSR vs 0 NBT that means we stop any new lending contract and NBT supply will become ZERO after old short-term contract finished,i.e. 5.7 or 11.4 days.
In an extreme case, if NBT demands so high or NSR price attacked by malicious entity, we also vote 1000NSR vs 10000NBT even more, but our system is on risk because some NSR holders may run off. Alternatively, we vote for a classic granted LPC just like Kiara in these day, we produce NBT from thin air. But usually, the more NBT we sell and better quality of NBT(stable price), the higher NSR price which can be NBT’s reserve fund.